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Abstract 
 
 
My investigation of the capabilities approach as a burgeoning theory of global justice 
underlies the integrated-article format of this thesis, where each chapter treats a discrete but 
related problem.  In Chapter One I survey the rapidly growing philosophical literature on 
global justice, focusing on contemporary rights-based approaches.  I defend capabilities as 
central to global justice because justice demands that individuals be well positioned to enjoy 
the prospects of a decent life, measured by how well individuals are actually able to convert 
resources and opportunities into valuable functionings.  In Chapter Two I explore what I 
take to be the most promising alternative philosophical approach to addressing pressing 
global challenges in terms of justice: the ethics of care.  Just as capabilities help enrich and 
flesh out the depth and reach rights have, making capabilities a conceptually rich ally of 
rights, I argue rights signify a powerful ally to an increasingly global ethic of care.  In Chapter 
Three I consider the as yet under examined connection between rights and well-being by 
exploring Sen’s pioneering work on capabilities.  Capabilities provide us with an appropriate 
measurement for justice to the extent that the rights and well-being of individuals leave them 
empowered to enjoy a life of dignity that has at least a minimum set of opportunities.  In 
Chapter Four I consider Hugo Grotius’s theory of rights as an important historical basis for 
developing a capability-based theory of global justice.  In Chapter Five I argue that the status 
and treatment of nonhuman animals is not and cannot be a matter of justice within the 
structure of John Rawls’s theory, making it inadequate to this extent.  I defend capabilities 
theory as better able to account for why the treatment of nonhuman animals is a matter of 
justice. 
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Justice, Rights, and Capabilities: An Introduction 
 
In recent years political philosophers have dedicated considerable attention to issues 
of social and global justice, motivated by a sense of urgency concerning on-going injustices.  
Increased awareness concerning inequality, deprivation, and human rights violations has 
motivated political philosophers to determine what specific moral obligations wealthy 
individuals have toward poor individuals, what norms and institutions should govern the 
distribution of resources, how political institutions might be reformed and made more 
democratic, what are subjects of moral worth owed according to the demands of justice, and 
who qualifies for inclusion within the sphere of justice.  Much of the global justice literature 
falls into one of two camps: that which assigns fundamental moral significance to national 
boundaries, and that which does not.  The former focuses on the special obligations we have 
to our compatriots while the latter involves a commitment to cosmopolitanism, the view that 
each of us has responsibilities to distant others irrespective of national borders.  The most 
prominent cosmopolitan approaches to global justice have either been consequentialist or 
rights-based.  My thesis explores the capabilities approach as a theory of cosmopolitan 
justice.  Specifically, I ask what a capabilities approach contributes to a theory of global 
justice, focusing on the prospects of partnering capabilities with rights-based approaches.  
Like other cosmopolitan approaches the capabilities approach features an account of 
the informational basis that constitutes an individual’s good.  It is an ethical value theory with 
political implications.  It offers a standard for aggregative appraisal, it can inform our choice 
and evaluation of institutions, and can serve as a guide to policy.  Developed by Nobel-
Laureate economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum, the capabilities 
approach advocates that one be free to function in certain ways and able to shape one’s life 
2 
 
by choosing and doing a range of valuable things that constitute an empowered life.  
Nussbaum’s version offers an objective list of capabilities, the securing of which constitutes a 
dignified life.  Examples include being able to be adequately nourished, exercise reason and 
the imagination through education, and being able to participate in political choices.  
Accordingly, justice demands that these and other central capabilities be secured.  
What follows is a fairly wide-ranging investigation of the relationship between justice, 
rights, and capabilities.  Nussbaum has noted that while the language of rights plays a 
powerful moral role in political discourse, rights remain conceptually ambiguous.  She insists 
that assessing the as yet underexplored relationship between rights and capabilities is an 
urgent task given their apparent connections and possibilities for mutual reinforcement.  Sen 
maintains that the combination of the two gives us something that neither perspective can 
provide alone, arguing that the capabilities approach adds to a theory of justice an important 
focus on the freedom to choose particular levels of functionings.  Although recent work in 
this area suggests a capabilities perspective on global justice entails a strong commitment to 
rights, working out what such a theory might tell us about the principles and procedures 
required of institutions remains ongoing.  In recent years much attention has been paid to 
the contributions the capabilities approach makes as a measure of human development, 
including its crucial advantages over Gross National Product (GNP), utilitarian, and 
resource-based measurements used to measure quality of life.  Unlike these other 
measurements, the capabilities approach directly focuses on the abilities and opportunities 
each person has to convert available resources into valuable functionings, leading to its 
adoption by the United Nations Human Development Report.  The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) is a focal point for the pursuit of global justice since rights secure our 
capabilities to function, safeguard the value we attach to our freedom and well-being, and 
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infuse into a theory of justice a conception of moral entitlements that have political 
significance above and beyond the enhanced personal advantage they help secure.  
Rights are central to the language and issues of justice though rights and justice are 
sometimes characterized as conflicting ideals.1  Rights-based approaches to justice attempt to 
connect our understanding of these concepts by making equality of rights a primary 
requirement of any just order.  How rights are conceived to empower individuals directly 
informs the requirements we place on individuals, groups, and political institutions to achieve 
and reflect the demands of justice.  This requires on-going evaluation of the comparative 
advantages, disadvantages, and differences a rights-based capabilities perspective on global 
justice might have.  While rich in detail, it remains unclear how the capabilities approach 
might generate or accompany more thoroughgoing political principles to address pressing 
issues of global justice.  My larger goal is to advance current debate by bridging the gap 
between justice and capabilities, contributing to the challenge of working out our 
responsibilities as global citizens by furnishing a more precise answer to the questions: What 
does justice require? and To whom is justice owed?  My more modest goal is to get clear on where 
the capabilities approach currently sits within global justice theory.  By critically engaging the 
growing literature my hope is to provide a useful map of the terrain, point out fruitful 
pathways for further pursuit, and note evident challenges in the development of a rights-
based capabilities perspective on global justice.  
My investigation of the capabilities approach as a theory of global justice underlies 
the integrated-article format of this thesis, where each chapter treats a discrete but related 
problem.  My thesis roughly divides in two halves.  The first half is a new, long critical survey 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Tom Campbell, Justice, Second Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 1, Jonathan 
Gorman, Rights and Reason: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003), 152, 154, James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 66. 
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of contemporary rights-based accounts of global justice in manuscript form.  The second 
half is composed of four short argumentative essays that each deal with a distinct aspect of 
the relationship between justice, rights, and capabilities.  Earlier versions of these four 
chapters have been presented at conferences and three of them appear here as published.  In 
Chapter One I begin to assess the rapidly growing philosophical literature on global justice, 
focusing on contemporary rights-based approaches.  I showcase a rights-based capabilities 
perspective as central to global justice because justice demands that individuals be well 
positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life.  Justice requires universal respect for 
rights measurable by how well individuals are actually able to convert resources and 
opportunities into valuable functionings.  In Chapter Two I explore what I take to be the 
most promising alternative philosophical approach to addressing pressing global challenges 
in terms of justice: the ethics of care.  Just as capabilities help enrich and flesh out the depth 
and reach rights have, making capabilities a conceptually rich ally of rights, I argue that rights 
signify a powerful ally to an increasingly global ethic of care.  In Chapter Three I consider the 
as yet underexplored connection between rights and well-being by exploring Sen’s pioneering 
work on capabilities.  Sen defines rights as primarily ethical demands that highlight and 
secure threshold conditions of freedom.  The normative force of rights generates reasons for 
action for those in a position to advocate for and defend the freedoms that constitute the 
subject matter of rights.  According to Sen, political philosophers must focus on the 
informational basis we use for evaluative judgments about the subject matter of rights, 
namely the basic capabilities that constitute the real bite of a theory of justice, if substantive 
individual freedoms are to be of central importance to social and global justice.  Capabilities 
provide us with an appropriate measurement for justice to the extent that the rights and well-
being of individuals leave them empowered to enjoy a life of dignity that has at least a 
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minimum set of opportunities.  In Chapter Four I consider Hugo Grotius’s theory of rights 
as an important historical basis for developing a capability-based theory of global justice.  In 
Chapter Five I argue that the status and treatment of nonhuman animals is not and cannot 
be a matter of justice within the structure of John Rawls’s theory, making it inadequate to 
this extent.  I defend capabilities theory as better able to address the treatment of nonhuman 
animals in terms of justice.  Grotius excludes nonhuman animals from being subjects of 
justice, but leaves room for their inclusion in the structure of his rights-based theory of 
international justice.  Rawls, on the other hand, appears to recognize a powerful requirement 
to consider the interests of nonhuman animals, but requires their exclusion from the sphere 
of justice given the structure of his theory.    
A decent political philosophy provides compelling and plausible moral guidelines 
that help inform resolutions to political problems.  Worthwhile theories of global justice, in 
particular, develop approaches and perspectives for addressing grave political problems that 
exist on a global scale, such as staggering poverty, radical inequality, and other wide-spread 
violations of basic human rights.  Perhaps justice on a global scale cannot be achieved 
without navigating large-scale political institutions like nation-states or the United Nations.  
Certainly there is a justice (or injustice) in the ‘doing’ of institutions – in creating and 
establishing them, operating them, refining them, reforming them, opposing or dismantling 
them, and defending them.  Yet hesitation, distrust, and scepticism all strike me as healthy 
responses to such institutions as they currently exist.  Perfect or transcendental justice 
promises to deliver ‘the just’ institutional arrangement and usually involves overarching 
principles theorized as unifying competing values that dissolve conflict.  Yet idealized and 
static institutional arrangements conceived as the source from which ‘the just’ will 
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effortlessly flow are often impractical and illusory.2  Demanding and compelling moral 
principles must be pursued and a plethora of institutions will no doubt play central 
instrumental roles in the pursuit of justice, but justice theory must avoid adopting overly 
restrictive institutional lenses that exclude from vision other reasonable and feasible 
approaches.  In this regard, let us hope the focus of contemporary justice theory continues 
to move from providing the utopian solution to making a more immediate positive practical 
contribution.  This is certainly what I hope to do.  Academic philosophers working on global 
justice (myself included) surely know about, but very rarely confront, elementary truths 
central to our current global order: most, if not all, powerful states are extremely violent and 
fundamentally illegitimate institutions, many habitual and unnecessary forms of mass 
consumption lack moral justification, and perpetuation of the dominant consumerist lifestyle 
is inconsistent with our long-term planetary survival.  To avoid self-deception about our 
prospects for global justice we must acknowledge the need for widespread reform of the 
global economic and political order and the need for radically altering globally dominant 
lifestyles and power dynamics.  We must also confront, creatively and with persistence, the 
way individual and collective actions too often exacerbate rather than challenge or rectify 
global injustices because of powerful systematic processes and forces.  This requires a 
concerted, on-going effort and constant vigilance.  
                                                 
2 “Furthermore, it is not one thing: no single principle … can possibly capture the richness of human thinking 
about justice.”  David Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 3.  “If a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choice of policies, strategies or institutions, then the 
identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor sufficient.”  Amartya Sen, The Idea of 
Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 15. 
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Chapter 1 
Contemporary Rights-Based Theories of Global Justice: A Critical Survey 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the following chapter I critically survey the rapidly growing philosophical work on 
global justice, focusing especially on contemporary rights-based approaches.  By considering 
the breadth (what it includes) and scope (where it applies) of justice, including the place of 
human rights in global justice, I try to discern the general parameters and requirements of a 
substantive theory of global justice.  Along the way I map out the philosophical terrain, 
highlighting tensions and contested issues.  I then critically examine and compare the anti-
cosmopolitan approaches of John Rawls and David Miller with rights-based cosmopolitan 
approaches such as Thomas Pogge’s and the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum.  I highlight a rights-based capabilities perspective as central to a theory of 
global justice.  
Global justice is a relatively new and extremely lively area of political philosophy that 
has exploded in recent years.  As an active topic for academic inquiry, theory of global justice 
emerged in the mid-1970s.3  The primary distinction between much work on justice and 
rights and the contemporary global justice literature concerns the latter’s focus on questions 
of distributive justice across societies or states.4  As Gillian Brock writes: 
Like many concepts in political philosophy, what global justice consists in is 
contested and the subject of much debate.  However, we can identify at least 
one common element to theorists’ use of the term, namely, an appreciation 
that the topic of justice is not exhausted by considering what justice within a 
                                                 
3 Thomas Pogge and Darrel Moellendorf, for example, date the contemporary global justice literature back to 
the mid-1970s in their edited collection Global Justice: Seminal Essays (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2008).  David 
Miller indicates that “[t]he idea of global justice is comparatively new: it was rarely used before the last decades 
of the twentieth century.”  David Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy, 165.  
4 See Thom Brooks, “Introduction” in Thom Brooks, ed. The Global Justice Reader (Malden: Blackwell, 2008) xii.  
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state consists in, but rather global justice includes a concern for matters of 
justice that extend beyond the borders of one’s state (which was the focus for 
most philosophical theorizing about justice up until about the early 1990s).5 
 
Increased awareness of war, human rights abuses, and global inequality has motivated 
political thinkers to determine what specific obligations citizens of wealthy countries have 
toward the citizens of poorer countries and what principles should govern both the 
distribution of the world’s resources and the conduct of individuals and institutions globally.  
Much of this work falls into one of two camps: one that assigns fundamental moral 
significance to national boundaries, and another that does not.  The former focuses on 
special obligations we have to our compatriots while the latter involves a commitment to 
cosmopolitanism, the view that each of us is a citizen of the world with equal moral worth 
and, as individuals, each of us thus has responsibilities to distant others.  Interestingly, 
leading rights-based approaches to global justice fall into both of these camps. 
 Questions concerning political order, governance, and institutional design are central 
questions when it comes to the pressing challenges of global justice.  For the last few 
centuries our world has been organized into a system of states which orders an international 
system of law and a global market.  The extent to which our international system of states 
hinders or facilitates acceptable global norms and principles is central to global justice, 
although this is a complicated matter to assess and rarely addressed head on.6  However, 
much recent work ties questions of global justice or the prospect of resolving global 
                                                 
5 Gillian Brock, “Equality, sufficiency, and global justice,’ in Gerald Delanty, ed. Routledge Handbook of 
Cosmopolitan Studies (New York: Routledge, 2012), 341. 
6 Thomas W. Pogge’s World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity, 
2002) is, in certain respects, a noteworthy exception.  More often liberal political theorists assume that 
obligations of justice apply within the international system of nation-states, taking the existing political order as a 
natural given, like the air we breathe.  See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 238.   
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problems to arguments about obligations, claims about institutional boundaries and group 
membership, and views about collective responsibility.7  
One current debate concerns whether a world government or world state is necessary 
for global justice.  While the nationalist camp, which in many respects grows out of a 
Hobbesian perspective, sees the state as the highest unit of concern, the cosmopolitan camp, 
which in many respects grows out of a Kantian perspective, assigns ultimate concern to the 
individual person.8  Both perspectives, however, have assigned important roles to states but 
with noteworthy differences concerning states’ moral significance and political efficacy.  
According to both the Hobbesian and Kantian perspective, whatever units are assigned 
fundamental moral significance (individuals, nations, states, etc.) the political institution we 
know as the state is often taken to be legitimate and a necessary requirement for achieving a 
just global order.  As such, it is worth considering how these two broadly construed 
perspectives, including the nationalism versus cosmopolitanism debate, both frame and limit 
contemporary theories of global justice.   
Cosmopolitans insist that individuals are the appropriate subjects for all claims about 
justice while nationalists argue for some kind of deference to national or state autonomy in 
the name of justice.9  Theorists from both perspectives often endorse or oppose a world 
state according to the way they characterize the necessity of the state for global justice.  
Indeed, these two positions are often remarkably similar, differing more in their focus than in 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Nicole Hassoun, Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Tracy Isaacs, Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), Richard Vernon, Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global Justice (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
8 Thom Brooks, for instance, characterizes the literature this way in his introduction to The Global Justice Reader.  
I am aware this generalization has many noteworthy exceptions such that the link is not sufficiently strong to 
constitute a decisive tendency.  Thanks to Charles Jones for this important clarification. 
9 Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer, “Introduction,” in their co-edited volume Global Justice (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999), 2-3. 
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any sharp disagreement about the objects of our obligations and special duties: “both most 
nationalists and most cosmopolitans agree that duties exist beyond our borders and that we 
have a special connection with those nearest and dearest to us.  The difference then only lies 
with how highly we prize our obligations to compatriots and how strong are our 
commitments to non-citizens.”10   
Statism, to be clear, is not simply the view that the state is a necessary requirement of 
justice domestically and globally.11  Some non-statists provide an instrumental account of the 
link between the political authority and coercion of the state and justice, defending specific 
state activity on strategic not principled grounds.  For example, human rights advocate 
Noam Chomsky states: “My short-term goals are to defend and even strengthen elements of 
state authority which, though illegitimate in fundamental ways, are critically necessary right 
now to impede the dedicated efforts to ‘roll back’ the progress that has been achieved in 
extending democracy and human rights.”12  Some rights-based approaches to justice view the 
state as (temporarily?) necessary for realizing or at least defending rights, while others simply 
start with the moral and political demands of rights without exploring whether and to what 
extent the state might be a necessary requirement to meet these demands.  Statists defend, as 
a matter of principle, the link between the political authority and coercion of the state and 
justice: “Globalists [or cosmopolitans] think the relevant relation holds among all human 
beings in virtue of the existence of practices that relate all humans to each other within a 
single global order.  Statists think the relevant relation holds (only) among individuals who 
                                                 
10 Brooks, “Introduction,” xvii. 
11 According to Brian Barry, “[s]tatism is in essence a doctrine that endorses the status quo among states, almost 
regardless of what that is.”  Brian Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique,” in Shapiro and 
Brilmayer, eds. Global Justice, 25. 
12 Noam Chomsky, Barry Pateman, ed. Chomsky on Anarchism (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005), 192-193. 
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share membership in a state.”13  Statism involves a principled commitment to the state as the 
desirable and necessary political authority through which principles of distributive justice are 
mediated.14  So, at the level of moral principle cosmopolitans first consider the demands of 
global justice for individuals per se while statists approach the demands of global justice 
through an institutional lens:  
Are we aiming at justice among individual human persons (as cosmopolitans 
maintain) or among states (perhaps aiming more at international justice)?  
Indeed, for many a central issue revolves around state membership.  One of 
the key issues concerns whether membership in a state matters to the 
principles of distributive justice that we should endorse.15   
 
Cosmopolitans and statists may share the same views on the moral legitimacy and 
justification of states yet diverge concerning the fundamentals of justice.  The more 
cosmopolitans embrace states and the more statists embrace principles of global justice for 
individuals, the more similar these otherwise divergent positions become.16  
The continuing centrality of states alone neither establishes their normative legitimacy 
nor demonstrates political philosophy’s success in defending such institutions.  As a 
descriptive truth it is sufficient that states continue to effectively function for their authority 
to remain real, even if the “highly inegalitarian global distribution of wealth is protected and 
reinforced by the political division of the world into sovereign nation-states that differ greatly 
from one another in their political power and over whom no international authority is 
binding.”17  How the status quo ought to be navigated in pursuit of global justice presents an 
enormous challenge.  The systems and institutions we might navigate in pursuit of justice 
                                                 
13 Mathias Risse, “Global Justice,” in David Estlund, ed. The Oxford Companion of Political Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 264. 
14 As Debra Satz indicates: “Statists argue that states are the appropriate units of moral concern, and they 
endorse a principle of the legal equality of all states.”  Debra Satz, “Equality of What among Whom?  Thoughts 
on Cosmopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism,” in Shapiro and Brilmayer, eds. Global Justice, 69.  
15 Brock, “Equality, sufficiency, and global justice,” 343. 
16 “Indeed, the line between cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans seems, in some ways, to be getting harder 
to locate.”  Ibid. 349 note 1.  
17 Shapiro & Brilmayer, “Introduction,” 9. 
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may themselves be sources of, or complicit in, profound injustices.  One approach involves 
trying to work out the demands of global justice irrespective of how realizable they currently 
are.  Another approach aims to tinker with existing institutions, perhaps by challenging the 
profound injustices of the status quo.18  Some may see the necessary path to global justice as 
stemming directly from the international system of states, however unjust or morally 
illegitimate certain states or the global economic system as a whole.  Perhaps national and 
international institutions, however illegitimate, represent the only viable means to achieving 
globally just outcomes, even if they only constitute part of the political landscape and even if 
they only play a peripheral political role in the lives of many.  While working out the 
demands of global justice can remain decidedly abstract, most leading contemporary political 
philosophers turn their attention to the intricacies of the political order.19  This is why I 
introduce my survey by emphasizing the centrality of questions of institutional legitimacy.  
Indeed, how we ‘do’ justice hinges on the available and potential political avenues open to us. 
Some of the most important and influential contemporary theories of justice reject 
cosmopolitanism in favour of statist approaches that refer to states or state affiliation in their 
primary principles.  They regard something like a global order of states as the desirable, 
legitimate, and necessary institutional structure for realizing global justice.  David Miller’s 
nationalism and John Rawls’s law of peoples are two prominent examples.  By assuming that 
a set of overarching values is shared amongst a nation’s members and that this is part of 
what it means to constitute a legitimate nation, Miller subsumes individual responsibility 
within the bounds of state membership.  Miller argues that nations, which are assigned 
fundamental moral significance, are communities whose existence depends on the shared 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 3, 9. 
19 See, for example, the work of Gillian Brock, Thomas Pogge, David Miller, Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, 
and numerous others. 
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beliefs and mutual commitments their members take to be constitutive of community 
membership, including a distinct public culture that features active views about territorial 
integrity, extended in history.20  With respect to global justice, responsibilities are then 
characterized as responsibilities of citizens within nation-states.  Miller juxtaposes his statist 
principle of responsibility with a capabilities-based cosmopolitanism that, he argues, risks 
disrespectfully interfering with the responsibilities and shared values of citizens in other 
cultures.21  Charles Jones argues that Miller’s nationalism does not justify limiting duties of 
global justice to the responsibilities of citizens within nations.  A cosmopolitan morality that 
construes our moral obligations to the needy in terms of individuals rather than as citizens is 
consistent with nationalist attachments.22  My concern is the way Miller seems to naturalize 
and neutralize the power dynamic of the state order.  Though characterized as legitimate and 
stable, power dynamics within and between states are quite problematic, volatile, and 
contested.  Miller appears to regard conventional political membership as a paramount value 
and assigns central priority to this value in his theory of justice.  To the extent Miller’s theory 
defends the value of shared beliefs in the nation or state per se it dispenses with the more 
onerous critical task of considering the rationality and truth of these beliefs as well as the 
predictable consequences for justice that follow.   
 Rawls’s approach is not cosmopolitan because the primary commitment underlying 
his theory of international justice is not, in the first instance, to the equal moral worth of 
individuals or even citizens but to the equal moral worth of peoples.23  This should not 
surprise us, argues Leif Wenar, because Rawls’s theory is concerned more with the legitimacy 
                                                 
20 David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 27. 
21 David Miller, “National Responsibility and International Justice,” in Deen K. Chatterjee, ed. The Ethics of 
Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 128-139. 
22 Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150-172. 
23 See John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) or John Rawls, From 
The Law of Peoples in Thom Brooks, ed. The Global Justice Reader, 217-236.  
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of global coercion, the view that coercive political power may be legitimately exercised when 
peoples can accept the basic structure as appropriate.24  Since a cosmopolitan basic structure 
could not, according to Rawls’s theory, meet the fundamental requirements of legitimacy, 
concern for the interests of individuals remains indirect.  Nussbaum insists we focus on 
Rawls’s theory of justice because it is the strongest and most distinguished in the Western 
tradition of political philosophy, even though cosmopolitans have serious misgivings about 
his account of international justice.25  As Samuel Scheffler indicates, cosmopolitanism 
“opposes any view which holds, as a matter of principle, that the norms of justice apply 
primarily within bounded groups comprising some subset of the global population.”26  In 
this respect, “[c]osmopolitanism is a moral outlook, not an institutional prescription.”27  A 
central task in the development of a capabilities theory of global justice like Nussbaum’s is to 
work out a critical perspective on anti-cosmopolitan theories of justice like Rawls’s and 
Miller’s and to point in the direction of viable alternatives. 
 One of my concerns with the state-centric theories of Miller and Rawls is the way an 
idealized system of states, nations, and/or peoples is defended with reference to the existing 
global order.  By opposing cosmopolitanism on the grounds that no robust public political 
culture yet exists to accommodate such commitments both theories endeavour to hold the 
current order against would be world-citizens as reasons why free and equal ‘citizens’ cannot 
relate fairly to one another as cosmopolitan individuals.  Gillian Brock and Darrel 
Moellendorf have noted, “[c]osmopolitanism can embrace almost any theoretical perspective 
                                                 
24 Leif Wenar, “Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” in Rex Martin and David A. Reidy, eds. Rawls’s 
Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 95, 100, 102-104. 
25 Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 224-272, Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond the social contract: 
capabilities and global justice,” in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, eds. The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 201-207. 
26 Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 112. 
27 Barry, “Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan Critique,” 35. 
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and a wide range of normative theories may legitimately claim to be cosmopolitan, since 
there are a number of ways of understanding a person’s good or what it is to be an ultimate 
unit of moral concern.”28  Capabilities theory features an account of what constitutes an 
individual’s good in terms of her freedom to function in certain ways and ability to shape her 
own life by choosing and doing a range of valuable things that constitute a dignified and 
empowered life.  One compelling way of justifying human rights is to supply an ethical 
argument about the valued capabilities of individuals.  In this way having a right means 
having a fundamental entitlement to a certain level of capability to function.  That is, having 
a right means being entitled to be empowered with the genuine opportunity to live a life of 
dignity by being able to do certain things and by being able to be a certain way, above a 
minimum threshold of justice.  That the capabilities approach entails cosmopolitan 
commitments is clear enough, given its emphasis on the equal dignity and worth of 
individuals, irrespective of factors taken to be morally arbitrary including one’s birth country.  
The extent of these cosmopolitan commitments is less clear.  
Before critically engaging contemporary rights-based approaches and defending a 
rights-based capabilities perspective, I first consider the breadth (what it includes) and scope 
(where it applies) of justice by exploring the conceptual terrain of social and global justice.  I 
then critically examine and compare the anti-cosmopolitan approaches of John Rawls and 
David Miller with rights-based cosmopolitan approaches such as Thomas Pogge’s and the 
capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.  
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Gillian Brock and Darrel Moellendorf, “Introduction,” in Gillian Brock and Darrel Moellendorf, eds. Current 
Debates in Global Justice (Norwell, MA: Springer, 2005), 2. 
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1.2 From Social Justice to Global Justice 
An excellent starting point for exploring the conceptual terrain of justice and 
discerning the general parameters and requirements of justice theory is Iris Marion Young’s 
powerful and influential work.  Her Justice and the Politics of Difference challenges the frequent 
reduction of social justice to distributive justice.  She argues that mainstream theory of justice 
fails to address the problem of an inclusive participatory framework, especially for 
marginalized people.  The distributive paradigm construes social justice too narrowly.  
Nonmaterial social goods such as rights, opportunity, power, and self-respect are awkwardly 
squeezed into a conception of social benefits and burdens to be distributed according to the 
demands of morality.  Her criticism of the distributive paradigm effectively demonstrates 
mainstream approaches (Rawls, Miller, etc.) are too limited and underequipped to effectively 
address forms of institutionalized domination and oppression, including exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.  Social justice requires a 
broader theoretical response than distributive theories offer.   
Young assumes that basic equality for everyone is a desirable moral value, that deep 
societal injustices can only be rectified by institutional changes, that there exist numerous 
oppressed groups, and that structures of domination wrongfully pervade society.29  She 
defines social justice as “the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression” and 
claims that any kind of social organization or practice involving domination and oppression 
is a matter of justice and thus subject to evaluation according to ideals of justice.30  The 
distributive paradigm she assesses and aims to displace construes social justice much more 
                                                 
29 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 14.  For a 
useful summary see Tom Campbell’s chapter on ‘Justice as Empowerment: Young and Affirmative Action’ in 
his Justice, Second Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001). 
30 Ibid. 15. 
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narrowly, in terms of the proper distribution of social benefits and burdens demanded by 
morality:   
The distributive paradigm defines social justice as the morally proper 
distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members.  
Paramount among these are wealth, income, and other material resources.  The 
distributive definition of justice often includes, however, nonmaterial social 
goods such as rights, opportunity, power, and self-respect.  What marks the 
distributive paradigm is a tendency to conceive social justice and distribution as 
coextensive concepts.31  
 
Young views distributive issues as important but incomplete components of a satisfactory 
conception of justice.  The just distribution of material goods is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for social justice.  First, given its focus on the allocation of material goods or social 
positions the distributive paradigm ignores existing power dynamics and institutional 
arrangements that make up the social context and underlie widespread patterns of 
distribution.  Second, the narrower conception of justice that focuses on distribution of 
wealth, income, or resources, represents nonmaterial social goods such as power, rights, 
opportunity, and self-respect, as static objects instead of fluid and varying features of the 
social context.  Such nonmaterial social goods are intertwined with personal, civic, and 
professional relations as well as institutional processes.  To get a sense of how this 
misrepresents nonmaterial social goods, consider a static and atomistic end-state pattern 
concerning, for example, the just social distribution of love and affection.  By equating 
distributive justice with social justice and then characterizing nonmaterial social goods as akin 
to externally possessed things rather than practices we engage in, theorists overextend the 
concept of distribution. 
Young’s view bears on current debates between Rawlsians who argue that the best 
measure of justice concerns the goods which society produces and which people can use and 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 16. 
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capability theorists who argue we should focus on what people are actually able to do and be.  
Her view is relevant to this debate since she argues that a focus on possessions ignores what 
people are doing according to particular social contexts, customs, and institutionalized 
rules.32  For example, Young argues that rights are not best understood as things one 
possesses in some quantity.  Rather, “they are institutionally defined rules specifying what 
people can do in relation to one another.  Rights refer to doing more than having, to social 
relationships that enable or constrain action.”33  Rights are, in part, a dynamic aspect of social 
practices.  As with rights, opportunity is a concept concerning what individuals are able to 
do, rather than simply something one possesses.  Surely ideals of justice compel us to see if 
rights and opportunities really enable individuals.  It is inadequate to rank as just a situation 
where rights and opportunities are, in principle, equally distributed yet not effectively 
exercised and enjoyed given existing social power structures.  In this manner nonmaterial 
goods like power, rights, opportunity, and self-respect have a wider scope than distribution, 
concerning as they do contextual relations and processes within which individuals act. 
By widening the scope of distribution to fit nonmaterial goods, the social context, 
including power dynamics and institutional rules, becomes the neutral and necessary 
background.  Issues of justice must then be conceptualized in terms of distributive patterns.  
Robert Nozick, for example, has argued that such static or end-state patterned approaches to 
justice are inappropriately ahistorical, ignoring the processes that generate the goods and 
produce distributive patterns.34  The demands of justice are met, according to Nozick, when 
everyone has that to which they are entitled.  Patterned theories of justice involving the 
                                                 
32 See for example, Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009), Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Elizabeth S. 
Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics Vol. 109, No. 2, 1999. 
33 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 25. 
34 Ibid. 28.  See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). 
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redistribution of material goods like wealth, according to Nozick, disrupt and destroy liberty 
by violating individual self-ownership rights secured by the free market.  While Young 
criticizes Nozick’s entitlement theory for ignoring potentially coercive and involuntary 
structural consequences that may result from individual actions, she applauds his general 
criticism that patterned theories ignore social processes.  Contra Nozick she claims the 
evaluation of distributive patterns, including the redistribution of material goods, is a priority 
of justice and an important starting point.  However, by ignoring social processes the 
distributive paradigm concerns itself more with a particular pattern of distribution at a 
particular moment than with the underlying social context that generates distributive patterns 
over time.35  As with rights and opportunities, power is a relation rather than a thing.  To the 
extent power is characterized simply as something individually possessed, structural power 
dynamics disappear into the background.  These dynamics greatly influence how well 
individuals can exercise their rights and act on their opportunities.  Domination and 
oppression exist, but because they are structural or systemic phenomena, they are largely 
sidestepped by a distributive understanding of justice which misses, for example, the way in 
which the powerful enact and reproduce their power.  Focus on distributive patterns and not 
social processes simply fails to adequately identify the existence and nature of domination 
and oppression. 
Recall that the meaning and scope of justice is at issue here.  It is one thing to 
explicitly adopt a narrower account of justice for practical purposes, acknowledging that such 
accounts are aspects of rather than exhaustive of social and global justice.  Rawls and Miller, 
however, insist that social justice is distributive justice within nation-states.  The real debate, 
therefore, concerns the conceptual grounds and methodological principles of justice theory.  
                                                 
35 In other words, “regarding such social values as rights, opportunities, and self-respect as distributable 
obscures the institutional and social bases of these values.”  Ibid. 30. 
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The debate between cosmopolitans and nationalists is one of principle.  Distributive justice 
within nation-states is obviously important, but with Young and others I challenge the 
narrowing of justice theory to the state-centric distributive paradigm.  Contra Miller and 
Rawls, who both begin their theories of justice by assuming the political institutions through 
which justice is pursued, Young and others invert the meaning and scope of justice by 
asking: “what is the proper scope of obligations of justice to which political institutions 
ought to correspond?”36  In a cosmopolitan light, existing institutions are neither idealized, 
neutralized, nor assigned fundamental moral significance and must instead answer to, rather 
than frame, the demands and obligations of justice. 
For Miller the problem philosophers have with social justice is not their narrow 
interpretations of it in distributive terms, but rather their tendency to approach the idea of 
global justice as simply social justice writ large.  Despite Young’s powerful criticisms he still 
largely defends the reduction of social justice to distributive justice.  He is more adamant, 
however, in his defence of social justice as distinct and separate from global justice.  Indeed, 
his persistent defence of a theory of justice, both social and global, in state-centric 
distributive terms is closely connected to how he defines social justice.  Admittedly many 
thoroughgoing cosmopolitans also limit their focus to distributive principles.  However, they 
often do so conventionally and on practical grounds.  Miller defends a state-centric 
distributive paradigm contra Young as exhaustive of social and global justice.  For Young 
and others the nation-state may or may not factor into social justice, depending on the 
context and issue.  Obligations of justice extend to a global level for the straightforward 
reason that the scope of numerous social interactions also now extend globally.  Societies 
and nation-states are not the same thing, though they can interact in familiar ways.  Miller 
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cannot be charged with equivocating social justice and justice within and according to nation-
states because he explicitly defends these disparate concepts as constituting the same thing.  
This enables him to more comfortably limit social justice in distributive terms, since focus 
remains on the central role of the nation-state in the handling of distributive principles.  
Perhaps this explains Miller’s denial of the existence of a robust global society, since in his 
terms a global society appears to require and be contingent upon a world-state.  For Miller 
the site of politics concerns the passive effect nation-states have on their citizens, while for 
Young the site of politics concerns the active engagement and empowerment individuals 
have in relation to others socially.  For Young ‘doing’ social justice may or may not be doing 
global justice since the scope and claims of justice have never equated to narrow distributive 
terms or to the nation-state.  Rather, obligations of justice extend globally making the 
conceptual transition from social justice to global justice a matter of context and focus rather 
than a strict crossing of political or conceptual boundaries.37  As a general approximation the 
more central the role political boundaries play in a theorist’s account of justice, the more 
likely it is that theorist defends firm conceptual boundaries between social and global justice.  
Likewise, among the cosmopolitans, the more central the role of critically assessing the 
justness of both existing and theoretical institutions in a theorist’s account of justice, the 
more likely it is that she characterizes obligations of justice as dependent on the particular 
context and issue.  In Young’s work justice is dynamic, not static, and concerned with the 
features of relationships amongst individuals in a context, be it local, regional, social, or 
global. 
 Rawls and Miller privilege relationships defined by the collective boundaries of 
peoples or nation-states.  Accordingly, “the pursuit of justice involves a division of labour 
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between domestic and international spheres, with states having the primary responsibility for 
promoting social justice among their citizens, while the chief task of the international 
community is to create the conditions under which that responsibility can be discharged.”38 
This section is about social and global justice, including the nature and extent of any 
conceptual distinctions between institutional boundaries in competing political philosophies.  
Cosmopolitans increasingly endorse conceptions of relational equality that transcend and may 
be in tension with such boundaries: 
As we see with real-world egalitarian social movements, the focus should 
rightly be on creating relations of equality which have as their focus not 
equalizing luck but rather eliminating sources of domination and oppression 
that preclude standing in the right kinds of relations with one another, 
namely those characterized by equal respect, recognition, and power.39   
   
Gillian Brock endorses this conception of relational equality because it reflects a 
cosmopolitan commitment to moral equality based on recognition of our equal moral worth 
and entitlement to equal respect.  It focuses on the way unequal power can block the 
possibility of standing in relations of equality.  It also aims to bridge sufficientarian and 
egalitarian concerns and expand justice beyond distributional issues.40  This perspective has 
the virtue of taking the world as it is, with a multiplicity of social interactions that do not 
neatly map onto political borders.  It is justice for human beings as such, and since social 
interactions increasingly extend globally, ‘doing’ social justice entails the challenge of 
globalizing theories of justice.41   
Cosmopolitans do not insist in principle that we use social and global justice 
interchangeably as though they are the same thing or always signify a seamless connection.  
                                                 
38 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 21. 
39 Brock, “Equality, sufficiency, and global justice,” 344.  For similar defences of relational equality see, for 
example, the work of Elizabeth Anderson, Gillian Brock, Martha Nussbaum, and Iris Marion Young. 
40 Ibid. 344-348.  Sufficientarian accounts aim to ensure people have the prospects for at least minimally decent 
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41 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 92. 
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They are sufficiently distinct concepts that involve a different focus and express different 
demands and obligations of justice.  However, because social and global justice may also 
feature the same bundle of central issues that overlap in important and complicated ways, 
cosmopolitans often highlight the joint pursuit of both for practical purposes.  Principled 
disagreement exists between nationalists and cosmopolitans about whether social and global 
justice are in tension with one another, demanding trade-offs and either-or choices, or are 
instead compatible goals that must be pursued simultaneously.  Simon Caney, for example, 
appears to regard the distributive principles for social and global justice as one and the same:  
one central feature of cosmopolitanism is its suggestion that there is no 
fundamental morally significant difference between the domestic and global 
realms such that the values that are appropriate in the former realm are inappropriate in 
the latter.  For cosmopolitans, the principles of justice that inform the 
domestic level should also inform the global realm.42   
 
Cosmopolitans grant, to varying degrees, that we can have special duties to our compatriots 
but in a manner that is not practically at odds with the demands of global justice.  Miller, 
however, argues that the demands of social justice and global justice conflict in ways that 
more often force us to choose between the two. 
While much contemporary work reiterates a narrower focus on transnational 
distributive justice, my account of the breadth (what it includes) and scope (where it applies) 
of global justice, echoes Young’s account of social justice and requires a broader theoretical 
response than distributive theories offer.  Transnational distributive justice is a necessary part 
of, but does not exhaust the subject matter of global justice.  The predominance of 
distributive justice in contemporary philosophical work is more reflective of habitual 
disciplinary focus rather than a principled narrowing of the topic.  However, global justice 
                                                 
42 Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 265.  
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includes a number of noteworthy concerns and issues that do not clearly or neatly reduce to 
matters of distribution.  These include analysis of the justness of political arrangements, 
justice movements that are global in scope such as justice for farmers or sweatshop workers, 
issues of domination, exploitation, and oppression involving nonmaterial social goods such 
as rights, opportunity, power, and self-respect, as well as questions of justice for indigenous 
peoples, the disabled, nonhuman animals, biological systems, and future generations.  In 
terms of scope, global justice arguably transcends without presupposing one or more 
dominant political order or institution.  Global justice applies transculturally to a global civil 
society increasingly unrestricted by traditional political boundaries, and transnationally across 
the borders of nation-states.    
Even if human rights are now taken to be the proper cause of justice, whether the 
vision of a just future order animated by rights is one of international justice or one of global 
justice is hotly debated.  Cosmopolitans continue to approach the demands and obligations 
of justice in such a way that does not and need not sharply divide between justice within 
states and transnational justice.  When the nation-state is privileged as a matter of principle 
and conceptually, global justice is conceived as narrowly contingent upon relevant analogs in 
the global context.  While defenders of this approach, such as Rawls and Miller, emphasize 
the need to be realistic they strangely betray such claims by requiring the global context to be 
analogous to that within nation-states.  They then fault accounts of global justice for both 
requiring and lacking a world-state rather than taking the real world as it is and moving forward 
in a fluid manner with a plurality of possibilities in-line with the moral demands and 
obligations of a global justice.  By judging in advance the required, familiar, and traditional 
political circumstances of justice a certain creative movement toward global justice, animated 
by a scientific spirit and an openness to new social and institutional arrangements conducive 
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to justice, is stifled.  As Nussbaum argues, “[b]ecause all the major Western theories of social 
justice begin from the nation-state as their basic unit, it is likely that new theoretical 
structures will also be required to think well about this problem.”43  Theories of global justice 
should be offered as a contribution to the global justice movement rather than as a complete 
self-contained system.  Sen contrasts this more comparative and relational approach with 
what he calls transcendental institutionalism.  If the individual is the most appropriate subject 
of a theory of justice, then what really happens to people must be a central concern within a 
theory of justice.44  Sen contends that a Rawlsian theory of justice fails to combine the 
operation of principles of justice with the actual behaviour of people.  Transcendental 
institutionalism concentrates on what it identifies as perfect justice rather than on relative 
comparisons of justice/injustice.  In other words, it aims at identifying the nature of ‘the just’ 
rather than on ways of being ‘less unjust.’  It concentrates primarily on getting the 
institutions right, not on the actual societies that would emerge.  This contrasts with more 
comparative and relational approaches that are concerned with the social realizations that 
result from actual institutions, actual behaviour, and other influences.45    
 
1.3 Rawls’s Account of Social and International Justice 
Before surveying contemporary rights-based approaches to global justice it is 
important to start where most contemporary accounts of justice start, with the work of John 
Rawls.  Rawls’s theory of domestic justice is the foundation of many early liberal theories of 
                                                 
43 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 2. 
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justice,” for instance, in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
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this priority of justice.  Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 245. 
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global justice and continues to be a central influence in contemporary global justice theory.46  
In terms of understanding and refining rights-based approaches to global justice, however, 
getting clear on Rawls is essential since his account of international justice stands as an 
alternative to, and in some sense challenge to, rights-based approaches. 
Rawls’s account of social or domestic justice found in A Theory of Justice fits squarely 
into the egalitarian camp while his account of international justice found in The Law of Peoples 
fits squarely into the sufficientarian camp.  A sufficientarian account of justice aims to ensure 
people have the prospects for at least minimally decent lives.  It is a minimal account of what 
justice requires, usually based on a view about what basic capabilities and rights individuals 
are entitled to, but sometimes, as in the case of Rawls, based on a view about an institutional 
arrangement or international political structure sufficient for justice.  Rawls seems to regard 
his theory of domestic justice as delivering an account of a fully just social arrangement while 
his theory of international justice is an account of a sufficiently, but not fully just 
international arrangement.  Both accounts stress the political conditions necessary for a 
society to function according to some minimal institutional requirement of justice, but 
according to Rawls justice demands, domestically, certain human rights and egalitarian 
commitments that, internationally, do not obtain.  Rawls does not, strictly speaking, advance 
a rights-based approach to or theory of global justice.  Indeed, as a matter of international 
justice Rawls simply insists for reasons of peace and stability that peoples are to honor 
human rights.  His account is sufficientarian in the sense that it specifies the necessary 
political conditions for the international order to qualify as reasonably just.  Also, he does not 
defend human rights as grounded on an account of our common humanity, conceiving 
                                                 
46 See, for example, Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), Charles R. 
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) and Thomas W. 
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individuals as fundamentally free and equal.  Instead, he defends a narrow political account 
of persons first as members of groups which uphold a minimal set of human rights that 
accord with a decent system of social cooperation.47  His The Law of Peoples is not strictly 
speaking a theory of global justice despite often being treated as one and featuring centrally 
in the global justice literature: “[i]nquiries into global justice differ from those into international 
justice precisely by not limiting inquiry to what states should do.  They may also question the 
very moral acceptability of states and explore alternative arrangements.”48  Instead, Rawls is 
focused on justice between peoples where a people is an idealized nation-state and concerned 
with the legitimacy of international coercion.  He aims to offer guidelines for the foreign 
policy of liberal democracies and at establishing international peace and security.49  The Law of 
Peoples completes Rawls’s domestic theory of liberal democratic justice and signifies a pole 
star for theory of global justice because it is a carefully set out position on international 
justice by perhaps the most important twentieth-century political philosopher in the English-
speaking world.  As Brighouse claims, “[s]ince it dominates, and provides the springboard 
for, most contemporary debates about justice, it is essential to have a good grasp of John 
Rawls’s theory of justice.”50  Accordingly, in agreement with Nussbaum, “[t]hinking in detail 
about what is promising and what defective in Rawls’ theory of justice among nations is thus, 
I believe, a very good way to start thinking about global justice as we try to write theories 
that are adequate to this complex and changing world.”51 
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Rawls’s theory involves an ideal of reasonable reciprocity or fairness between moral 
equals.  His aim is to theorize a conception of justice that features and advances familiar 
themes in the social contract tradition.  Principles of domestic justice are the objects of an 
original agreement arrived at by free and equal rational persons behind a veil of ignorance.  
Principles of international justice are products of an international hypothetical agreement 
chosen by representatives of peoples, not individuals.52  The original position corresponds to 
the state of nature and is purely hypothetical.  Justice as fairness conveys the idea that the 
principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.  Rawls considers his view a 
contract theory that yields agreement and acceptance of certain moral principles that underlie 
liberal democratic political institutions.  The purely hypothetical procedure sees these 
principles of justice as ones that would be chosen by rational persons or reasonable 
representatives of peoples.  These rational persons or reasonable representatives are parties 
to the agreement and the principles are ones that would be acceptable by all parties as a 
matter of public knowledge.  The two principles of justice that feature centrally in his 
domestic account are, first, that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.  Second, social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are (a) to the advantage of the least advantaged, 
and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.  The social primary goods are rights and 
liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect.  
The natural goods include health and vigor, intelligence and imagination.  Such principles, 
especially the second, result from setting aside morally arbitrary (because unearned and 
undeserved) features such as natural endowments and the contingencies of social 
circumstance (such as where, and to whom, one is born).  Justice as fairness thus consists of 
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(1) the hypothetical choice situation and (2) the set of principles agreed to.  Rawls is not 
employing the social contract device as a pre-state fiction meant to serve as retro-justification 
for one or other existing order.  Rather, the original position is a purely hypothetical 
abstraction meant to account for how principles of justice for the basic structure of a well-
ordered society or an international Society of Peoples might be chosen.  The specific content 
of the agreement supplies the moral principles for this basic structure.   
According to Rawls domestic justice concerns the equal distribution of social goods.  
We treat people as equals not by removing all inequalities, but by removing only those which 
are disadvantaging.  By treating the contingencies of birth and circumstance as social assets 
to be employed to the advantage of everyone, inequalities remain acceptable provided they 
are to the benefit of the least advantaged.  The principle of equal liberty is egalitarian because 
it distributes extensive liberties equally to everyone.  The second part of the difference 
principle is egalitarian because it instructs opportunities to be considered for offices and 
positions to be distributed in an equal manner.  The first part of the difference principle aims 
for the goal of equality, but is not by itself technically egalitarian.   
Rawls thinks that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice.  
Justice, he says, is the first virtue of social institutions.  By securing certain individual rights a 
just society takes the liberties of equal citizenship as settled.  A well-ordered society is a more 
or less self-sufficient association of persons, regulated by a public conception of justice that 
advances the good of its members.  Conceptions of justice specify basic rights and duties, 
and they determine the appropriate distributive shares, affecting and affected by problems of 
efficiency, coordination, and stability.  Rawls restricts his pursuit of domestic justice to a 
society conceived as a closed system isolated from other societies.  He thinks reasons for 
doing so are obvious and require no explanation, even though very few closed and isolated 
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societies now exist.  This major methodological assumption receives no further explanation 
or defence.  This abstraction from actually existing society(ies) to a society theorized as 
perfectly just is what Rawls calls ideal theory.  As such Rawls’s project is not focused in the 
first instance on arguing for a constitutional liberal democracy.  Rather, Rawls is focused on 
supplying a sound theoretical account of the primacy of justice central to liberal democratic 
thought.  Rawls assumes the only way to gain a deeper understanding is to animate our 
pursuit of justice with a worked out theory of an ideal (future) perfectly just domestic and 
international society.  By keeping to a conception of justice for the basic structure, however, 
we do not fully work out and advance a more comprehensive social ideal. 
Rawls says the basic liberties of citizens include: political liberty (right to vote and run 
for public office) as well as freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and 
thought, freedom of the person including the right to hold personal property, and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and seizure.  His serial or lexical ordering puts the first principle of 
justice prior to the second.  Any or all distributive arrangements, including the distribution of 
social values of liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect, 
must therefore be consistent with equal citizenship and equality of opportunity: “Injustice, 
then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.”53  Rawls’s two principles require 
that everyone benefit from economic and social inequalities.  In combining fair equality of 
opportunity and the difference principle, the egalitarian idea is that the higher expectations of 
those better situated is just if and only if such an arrangement improves, as a matter of 
degree, the situation of the least advantaged.  In this sense, everyone benefits when the 
difference principle is satisfied.  Rawls suggests that treating the question of distributive 
shares – how fundamental rights and duties are assigned and how social and economic 
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inequalities are regulated – is a matter of pure procedural justice.  Whatever design the social 
system features, let it be designed to arrive, as a matter of procedure, at an outcome that is 
just.  In this instance, the background circumstances of a just basic structure give rise to a 
just procedure.  The role of the principle of fair equality of opportunity is to insure that the 
system of cooperation is one of pure procedural justice.  So, while modern states are riddled 
with grave injustices, the claim is that the difference principle could realistically inform an 
institutional arrangement.  The basic structure of society could be arranged to satisfy the 
demands of liberty and fair equality of opportunity. 
A common objection is that those better situated deserve their greater advantages 
irrespective of the influence or effect they have on others.  If someone works hard and plays 
by the rules, the objection goes, that person is entitled to any and all advantages that follow: 
“In this sense the more fortunate have a claim to their better situation; their claims are 
legitimate expectations established by social institutions, and the community is obligated to 
meet them.”54  In response Rawls notes this sense of desert – what one deserves given one’s 
circumstances and efforts – presupposes a cooperative scheme, just one that (happens?) to 
be personally advantageous which may or may not also benefit others.  Rawls argues that it is 
surely incorrect to maintain that someone deserves any of the greater advantages enjoyed or 
achieved because of fortunate natural endowments and social circumstances.  On the 
contrary, we have an intuitive moral understanding that informs our considered judgments 
that no one deserves his or her life chances, including natural endowments (abilities) and social 
contingencies (starting place, resources, opportunities).  People no more deserve their 
empowering superior IQ than they do the initial societal circumstances into which they 
happen to be born.  Those inclined to argue that they deserve their advantages will or should 
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embrace, demand, and defend the difference principle in order to correctly maintain this 
sense of desert, otherwise they will lack any basis for defending their advantage as in any way 
deserved.  Such intuitive considerations are offered to clarify the sense in which the 
difference principle is egalitarian, acceptable to both the more and the less advantaged.  It 
appears to follow that a social system is unjust to the extent it is organized to advantage 
some by making others worse off, in terms of equality and primary social goods.  Those with 
better circumstances should be unwilling to have their greater advantages unless this works 
out for the benefit of the least fortunate.   
A Theory of Justice defends a liberal account of justice within domestic society.  The 
Law of Peoples builds on and extends Rawls’s theory to a system of international justice 
governing the Society of Peoples composed of reasonably just, liberal, or decent peoples 
(well-ordered peoples).  While citizens are the basic actors in domestic society, peoples are 
the actors in the Society of Peoples.55  The principles of international justice agreed to 
according to the model of the original agreement are established by the rational and 
reasonable representatives of liberal and decent peoples who conceive of themselves as free 
and equal peoples in the Society of Peoples: 
It is, therefore, part of a people’s being reasonable and rational that they are 
ready to offer to other peoples fair terms of political and social cooperation.  
These fair terms are those that a people sincerely believes other equal peoples 
might accept also; and should they do so, a people will honor the terms it has 
proposed even in those cases where that people might profit by violating 
them.  Thus, the criterion of reciprocity applies to the Law of Peoples in the 
same way it does to the principles of justice for a constitutional regime.56 
 
Domestically, political liberalism insists that comprehensive doctrines of truth or right be 
replaced by an idea of what is politically reasonable between citizens.  Internationally, “public 
reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and its principles are addressed to 
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peoples as peoples.”57  Decent hierarchical peoples would endorse the Law of Peoples, 
according to Rawls, since they respect others by not engaging in aggressive war, strive to 
protect the human rights and good of their own, and maintain security and independence 
while acknowledging the benefits of trade and the idea of assistance when in need.58   
Specifically, the eight principles agreed to in the original position by representatives 
of peoples as specifying fair terms of political cooperation are:    
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other 
than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. 
 
Rawls defines human rights as a special class of urgent rights, “such as freedom from slavery 
and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from 
mass murder and genocide.”59  While the transnational force of human rights is here 
explicitly recognized, Rawls’s remarkably sparse list of rights omits numerous rights typically 
defended as basic or fundamental, including the majority of international human rights 
enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).60  At issue here is both 
the content and role of human rights in Rawls’s account of international justice.  Noticeably 
absent, for example, is the right to equal political participation, full liberty of conscience, the 
demand of full equality for women, and freedom of expression and association.  As Allen 
Buchanan emphasizes: 
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So it appears that for Rawls a society in which there is a permanent racial, 
ethnic, religious, or gender underclass, hovering just above subsistence, 
systematically excluded from the more desirable economic positions, having 
grossly inferior property rights, lacking access to education and health care 
services available to the dominant classes, unable to afford legal counsel and 
bereft of sophisticated due process protections available to others, would not 
be a society in which those who were thus disadvantaged could complain that 
their human rights were violated.61   
 
For many cosmopolitans the scope of Rawls’s account of international justice is too limited.  
Criticisms emphasize the manner in which his conception of toleration is extended to qualify 
as just and in good standing the morally intolerable attributes of “decent peoples,” his 
explicit exclusion of a global distributive principle, and his narrow understanding of the role 
of human rights.62  Critics often highlight apparent inconsistencies between his two accounts, 
and reject the anti-cosmopolitan, state-centric perspective underlying The Law of Peoples.  
Pogge, for instance, praises Rawls’s domestic account for theorizing justice as something 
worth realizing for the sake of individual human persons, taken as the ultimate units of moral 
concern.  He then faults Rawls’s international account for implausibly and incoherently 
defending a just domestic regime as an end in itself.63  Young rejects as essentialist and 
exclusionary such static accounts of the distinctness of peoples, arguing that,  
[i]nstead, peoples should be understood as relationally constituted, and the 
political recognition of the distinctness of peoples would be able to 
accommodate the millions of people who think of their identities as hybrids 
of national membership, or who construct a cosmopolitan identity.64 
                                                 
61 Allen Buchanan, “Taking the Human out of Human Rights,” in Martin and Reidy, eds. Rawls’s Law of Peoples: 
A Realistic Utopia?, 151. 
62 See, for example, Tan’s “The Problem of Decent Peoples” where he notes: “The problem of tolerating 
decent peoples is that it lets down dissenting individual members in these nonliberal societies.” 85.  See Thomas 
W. Pogge’s, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” in Thom Brooks, ed. The Global Justice Reader, where he argues: “A 
plausible conception of global justice must be sensitive to international social and economic inequalities.” 238.  
See Alistair M. Macleod’s “Rawls’s Narrow Doctrine of Human Rights,” in Martin and Reidy, eds. Rawls’s Law 
of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, where he defends the claim that: “no justification seems to be on offer for [Rawls’s] 
implicit unwillingness to recognize that rights as fundamental as the right to full liberty of conscience and the 
right to equal participation in political decision-making processes ought to be regarded as human rights.” 135.  
63 Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” 246. 
64 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 237.  Nussbaum echoes this criticism by faulting the fixity and finality of 
peoples (what she calls states) in Rawls for the weak analogy between peoples and moral persons, the manner in 
which the status quo seems to be accorded legitimacy, and for assuming self-sufficiency in what is actually a 
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 In defence of Rawls, however, there is a straightforward consistency between his 
account of domestic and international justice about which he is explicit: there is no global 
justice.  There is only internal social justice within closed, static, domestic societies 
understood as idealized nation-states.  The end of each society is to become fully just and 
stable by realizing just institutions according to the internationally stabilizing influence of the 
Law of Peoples: “[o]nce that end is reached, the Law of Peoples prescribes no further target 
such as, for example, to raise the standard of living beyond what is necessary to sustain those 
institutions.”65  Despite being the twentieth century’s leading liberal egalitarian his focus is 
simply not global, neither directly concerned with individual humans as such nor with 
addressing global material inequality.66  Instead, The Law of Peoples completes Rawls’s theory 
of domestic justice by extending to the international realm his theory of political legitimacy 
first advanced in his Political Liberalism: “It states that the exercise of coercive political power 
over persons is legitimate only when this exercise of power is in accordance with a basic 
structure that those persons can accept, regarding those persons as either decent or 
reasonable, as appropriate.”67  Rawls means to draw on the international public political 
culture from which representatives of peoples agree to principles for the international basic 
structure.  Accordingly, Rawls’s standard of international legitimacy is much more permissive 
than his standard of justice: 
This focus on people produces a thoroughly statist version of liberal 
internationalism.  The thoroughgoingness of Rawls’s statism gives his theory 
a high degree of internal coherence, but this coherence comes at a price.  
                                                                                                                                                  
much more complex interdependent world.  Nussbaum, “Beyond the social contract: capabilities and global 
justice,” 200. 
65 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 119. 
66 Wenar, “Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” 95. 
67 Ibid. 100.  See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 
137. 
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Because Rawls’s global theory works exclusively in terms of peoples, it 
cannot show any direct concern for individuals.68   
 
Provided Rawls maintains state-centric assumptions about the international public political 
culture, it follows that a rights-based cosmopolitan account of global justice is not possible: 
1. A global state with a stable monopoly of coercive power is either impossible or 
highly undesirable. 
2. In the absence of a global state, territorial powers with armed forces that may 
permissibly protect territorial borders will be a permanent feature of the global order. 
3. If territorial powers may permissibly use armed forces to protect territorial borders, 
then individuals’ basic rights and liberties cannot be fully specified without reference 
to those individuals’ territorial affiliation. 
4. No complete set of pure cosmopolitan principles is possible.69  
 
As I claimed in my introduction, one of my concerns with such state-centric assumptions is 
the way an idealized system of states, nations, and/or peoples is defended with reference to 
the existing international (not global) order.  By opposing cosmopolitanism on the grounds 
that no robust public political culture yet exists, Rawls’s highly systematic theory holds the 
current order against would be world-citizens, and denies that free and equal ‘citizens’ can 
relate fairly to one another as cosmopolitan individuals.  According to Rawls’s systematic 
account of justice, cosmopolitan purity, whereby individuals remain the ultimate units of 
moral concern, is fine in principle yet, globally, impossible in practice.  That is the way the 
world is, the world is not what we make of it.70 
For cosmopolitans Rawls’s account is, at best, noble but misguided.  Indeed, it strikes 
many as outdated.  First, it is outdated for its peculiar us-and-them use of ‘liberal’.  Second, it 
is outdated for its narrow, undefended account of human rights, inconsistent with the efforts 
and status of the international human rights movement.  Third, it is outdated for its state-
                                                 
68 Wenar, “Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian,” 104.  “The fact that the concerns of peoples do not 
‘trickle down’ to become concern for individuals gives Rawls’s accounts of human rights and humanitarian 
intervention a bloodless, institutional character.”  Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 108. 
70 Ibid. 108-110. 
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centric perspective at odds with widespread cosmopolitan regard.  Fourth, it is outdated for 
its explicit indifference to questions of transnational distribution in defence of the well-being 
of the globally worst-off individuals as a matter of justice.  Rawls contrasts his view with 
cosmopolitanism: “The ultimate concern of a cosmopolitan view is the well-being of 
individuals and not the justice of societies.  According to that view there is still a question 
concerning the need for further global distribution, even after each domestic society has 
achieved internally just institutions.”71  For many cosmopolitans justice demands a basic 
minimal kind of life for each and every individual, variously conceived in terms of well-being 
or welfare, decent or dignified existence, human rights, needs, capabilities, and so on.  Justice 
in Rawls is the realization of just institutions.  But of course, cosmopolitans are also 
concerned with the justice of societies.  It is uncharitable to imply that, for cosmopolitans, 
the demands of justice necessarily remain unmet in a world populated with nothing but just 
societies.  Rather, at issue here is the fundamental unit of moral concern.  For cosmopolitans 
it is the individual.  For statists like Rawls, it is the nation-state.72  Certainly cosmopolitans 
care about social justice and global stability, but justice remains unsatisfied by an 
international order, even the idealized one of Rawls’s, in which morally sufficient standards 
of a minimally decent life remain unmet.  As Kok-Chor Tan writes, “[c]osmopolitanism is 
thus not a form of moral imperialism or paternalism that has as its fundamental intention the 
imposition of liberalism on all societies.  Rather it is concerned fundamentally with 
protecting the rights of individuals, no matter where they are, to choose a life for 
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72 “Peoples are thus states twice idealized.  First, peoples are states with a moral capacity for complying with a 
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themselves.”73  For cosmopolitans Rawls’s idealized account of international justice is not 
populated by just societies because such societies are not populated by individuals regarded, 
as a matter of justice, as free and equal moral persons.  
Rawls’s human rights minimalism has not found much approval because he 
overstates the way cosmopolitanism violates his conception of political liberalism and 
understates the centrality of human rights with respect to the demands of justice.74  The Law 
of Peoples is admittedly at odds with his own conception of what social justice demands.  
Rawls writes, 
To repeat, I am not saying that a decent hierarchical society is as reasonable 
and just as a liberal society.  For judged by the principles of a liberal 
democratic society, a decent hierarchical society clearly does not treat its 
members equally … A decent hierarchical society honors a reasonable and 
just Law of Peoples even though it does not treat its own members 
reasonably or justly as free and equal citizens, since it lacks the liberal idea of 
citizenship.75 
 
As suggested by Tan, Rawls seems to falsely assume that a rights-based cosmopolitanism 
constitutes a form of Western imperialism, expounded in terms of controversial 
comprehensive religious doctrines or philosophical doctrines of human nature.76  A Theory of 
Justice is itself among the discounted for featuring rights distinctive of liberal democratic 
citizenship.77  This is surprising since, “[i]n some way or other, individuals need the social 
protection of these rights as a precondition for the development and exercise of their moral 
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powers, and this is supposed to hold true independently of how the conceptions of 
rationality, fairness, and the good involved are spelled out.”78   
In The Law of Peoples Rawls’s use of ‘liberal’ is awkward in at least four respects.  First, 
‘liberal’ is strangely offered as uniquely Western.79  Second, full credit is given to the ‘liberal’ 
basis of human rights when rich parallel accounts are supplied or embraced by various 
different traditions.80  Third, the implication of his use of ‘liberal’ is that reasonably just 
liberal peoples are actually to be found here in the real world.81  Fourth, it is assumed without 
argument that any broader account of basic human rights animated by values common to 
liberalism, such as the humanist, rationalist, and individualist sensibilities that often underlie 
human rights claims, automatically renders it a comprehensive doctrine. 
Rawls seems to regard cosmopolitanism as overly individualistic and arrogantly 
disrespectful of cultural and national identities.  Catherine Audard nicely captures the 
apparent way Rawls thinks of cosmopolitanism: 
Cosmopolitanism is universalistic in the Kantian sense of unconditional respect 
for the human person as an end in itself.  It claims that full human rights 
should apply to anyone anywhere in the world and neither historical 
contingencies nor natural circumstances should play any role in their 
application.  It starts with the very ambitious claim that all persons are to 
have the equal liberal rights of citizens of a constitutional democracy.  
Cosmopolitanism takes seriously the priority of justice over state powers or 
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prerogatives, economic welfare or religious traditions, and wants the full list 
of human rights, both political and economic, to be implemented.82 
 
 To avoid the charge of parochialism – that human rights are merely the rights possessed by 
citizens of a liberal society – Rawls adopts an austere anti-cosmopolitan conception of 
human rights compatible with severe discrimination and oppression.83  His account of 
human rights purposely lacks any reference to morally fundamental characteristics claimed to 
be shared by all human beings.  Rawls contends that a political conception of justice 
addresses individuals as citizens, and claims only to be reasonable, while a comprehensive 
conception of justice (which by default appears to include cosmopolitanism) addresses 
individuals as whole moral persons, and claims to hold universally.  Rawls writes, “[t]he list 
of human rights honored by both liberal and decent hierarchical regimes should be 
understood as universal rights in the following sense: they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples 
and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally.”84  That is, what 
makes them universal is that they are accepted by reasonable and rational representatives of 
peoples as a minimal standard of decency and thus part of the minimal criteria of 
international political legitimacy in the Society of Peoples.  As such, they do not rely upon 
any particular comprehensive conception of morality or the good.   
In contrast, the universality of human rights according to rights-based cosmopolitan 
accounts is grounded upon certain common characteristics in human beings.  Buchanan 
writes, 
For example, James Nickel, Henry Shue, Amartya Sen, and Martha 
Nussbaum each ground human rights in common characteristics of human 
beings – more specifically, in a conception of basic human interests (or of 
central human capabilities in the cases of Sen and Nussbaum) understood as 
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those interests that must be realized (or those capabilities that an individual 
must have) if a human being is to have the opportunity to live a decent or 
minimally good life.  It is also clear that all of these theories are intended to 
support longer lists of rights than Rawls’s.85 
 
Such theorists, contra Rawls, do not defend human rights as part of a comprehensive 
conception of the best or most fully good life.  Rather, they defend human rights on 
sufficientarian grounds, as minimal moral standards of a decent life, standards that justice 
demands.  Once the human rights everyone is fundamentally entitled to as a matter of justice 
are met, the whole range of possible lives individuals might then embrace according to a 
plethora of comprehensive conceptions of the good remains open.  As Buchanan notes, such 
rights-based cosmopolitan approaches to global justice remain agnostic about whether any 
more encompassing theory covers all moral subjects and are silent on most other subjects 
typically addressed by a comprehensive moral philosophy.86  What matters is whether claims 
made to ground a list of human rights, according to human interests or capabilities, are well 
justified: “if they are, then it is unreasonable to deny them, and attempting to implement the 
human rights norms in question may not be parochial or intolerant in the sense of imposing 
an alien conception on those whose rejection of it is not unreasonable.”87  It is close scrutiny 
of the content of rights-based cosmopolitan approaches and not the mere existence of such 
approaches that will determine whether such theories are parochial.  Cosmopolitans can then 
focus on arguing that their claims about human interests or capabilities that justify their list 
of human rights cannot be reasonably rejected.88  What, instead, may be parochial is, first, 
assuming basic human interests or capabilities are uniquely Western, rather than featuring 
more globally in ideas of human dignity and respect for persons.  Second, it may be parochial 
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to deny the universality of a broader list of human rights on the grounds that certain societies 
limit conceptions of individual good from recognizing basic human interests or capabilities 
as common to all human beings.89  An ill-informed fear that a rights-based cosmopolitanism 
necessarily imposes one peoples’ comprehensive view onto another forces Rawls to leave the 
basic rights of individuals demanded by justice unprotected, and sanctioning as part of a 
reasonably just order the comprehensive views of illiberal peoples. 
Perhaps a more charitable interpretation will praise Rawls’s account of international 
justice for comfortably assuming, without needing to philosophically defend, human rights as 
“firmly established elements of our moral common sense.”90  Human rights are employed by 
Rawls as a minimal standard of decency.  They are not, however, regarded as a fundamental 
demand of justice that both accords and reflects individuals’ free and equal moral standing.  
Rawls’s account features an instrumental conception of human rights, where rights are 
advanced for the sake of peace and stability rather than for the sake of global justice itself.  
The Law of Peoples represents a worthwhile but flawed challenge to rights-based accounts of 
global justice.91   
 
1.4 Global Justice and Human Rights 
The claim that global justice must include respect for human rights per se is not 
particularly controversial.  However, claims about which rights, the place of rights within a 
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theory or approach to global justice, and reasons why we have duties to respect rights are often 
more contentious.  For my purposes rights-based theories of global justice are synonymous 
with rights-based approaches to the morality of a basic global minimum.  Such theories stake 
out a number of specific claims concerning human rights.  For example, they defend the 
basic minimum demanded by global justice in terms of human rights.  They defend a set or list 
of human rights to be included in the basic global minimum.  They also situate human rights 
within the demands of global justice.  Some rights-based accounts contend that human rights 
exhaust the demands of global justice.  Some others argue that human rights are the primary 
or most urgent but not the only demand of global justice.  Still others argue that human 
rights feature equally, derivatively, or as lower priority than other pressing demands.  In this 
manner rights-based theories of global justice address the if and why question concerning 
human rights, which human rights, and where human rights fit within the demands of global 
justice.  A common theme among contemporary rights-based theories is that global justice 
demands that every person be well positioned to enjoy the prospects for a decent life.  
Explaining and realizing this demand is modelled upon universal respect for and promotion 
of human rights.92  Focus on whether people meet some threshold condition for a decent 
life, perhaps in the context of exploring our obligations to eliminate global poverty, is 
expressed in terms of sufficiency: “On sufficientarian accounts of global distributive justice 
obligations, what we owe others is informed by what is sufficient for a decent life.  Different 
theorists elaborate on this theme by invoking a set of basic needs, capabilities, or basic 
human rights.”93  Focus on sufficiency is juxtaposed with a focus on equality/egalitarianism 
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aimed at eliminating global inequalities irrespective of whether individuals surpass the basic 
minimum.94   
In the following section I tease out some of the common claims, tensions, and 
challenges in contemporary rights-based approaches by surveying several of the leading 
perspectives.  Instead of unpacking in detail one or more of these theories I develop more of 
a composite account aimed at drawing out the salient features with regard to their content 
and central claims with respect to justice.95  In the next section I outline and assess the 
capabilities approach as a particularly compelling species of rights-based approach to global 
justice.  I am interested in the commonalities and mutually reinforcing aspects of the valuable 
members of the team of concepts central to rights-based sufficientarian accounts, 
specifically, capabilities and human rights.  Focus on the finer conceptual distinctions or 
competing principled commitments between fundamental concepts, while of central 
importance to global justice theory, remains outside the scope of my present inquiry.96    
 Theories of rights focus on the most important questions concerning their 
application, content, justification, meaning, and relation to other values.  There is, to be sure, 
an embarrassment of riches when it comes to the existence of competing rights theories.  A 
rights-based approach to justice regards all of the world’s citizens as equal in their status as 
rights bearers.  Conceptually or philosophically, human rights feature the twin commitments 
to universality and to a form of equality.97  The universality of human rights means, at the 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
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describes, and thus the burden of proof is on the cosmopolitans to defend the symmetry they assume, and one 
45 
 
first level of approximation, that they apply to everyone everywhere simply in virtue of one’s 
membership in the human species, simply in virtue of one’s humanity.  The form of equality 
human rights claims entail means that we all share a basic level of equal moral worth.  These 
twin commitments underlying the concept of human rights demand philosophical 
justification.  Indeed, a human rights claim, as Brian Orend suggests, is a reason to treat persons 
in certain ways rather than being a particular property of persons.98  In other words, human 
rights do not describe our nature.  Instead, they prescribe our behaviour.  In Ronald 
Dworkin’s view, such important moral reasons for treating persons in certain ways make 
rights trumps, powerful and weighty claims that take priority.  Orend concludes: 
A human right is a high-priority claim, or authoritative entitlement, justified 
by sufficient reasons, to a set of objects that are owed to each human person 
as a matter of minimally decent treatment.  Such objects include vitally 
needed material goods, personal freedoms, and secure protections.  In 
general, the objects of human rights are those fundamental benefits that every 
human being can reasonably claim from other people, and from social 
institutions, as a matter of justice.99 
 
The sense of claim of which a human right is a high-priority claim, is not the narrow one of 
actually uttering or stating a claim, but the broader one of being entitled to utter such a claim.  
A rights-holder does not have to verbalize his or her claim.  Even if a rights-holder does not 
state her claim, she is entitled to make it in virtue of her humanity and to expect that it be 
fulfilled.  While such claims and entitlements may be codified in a legal system, human rights 
are distinctively moral rights that exist within social moralities or within what Orend calls a 
critical, or justified, morality.100  The point here is that it is primarily the moral reasons, as 
opposed to the legal facts, that instantiate human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                  
might suggest that there is no non-question-begging way of affirming the universality of justice.” Tan, “The 
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 A right is a justified claim to something, whereas the object of the right, what is 
sometimes called the right’s substance, is that very something being claimed.  Thus, what 
makes a right real is that the substance of the right, the something claimed that the rights-
holder is entitled to possess and enjoy, is realized for the rights-holder, not whether the right 
is written into a legal code or endorsed by a majority of people.  Sadly, plenty of rights exist 
in law and in declarations and plenty of rights are supported by a majority of people in 
various cultures that nonetheless remain unrealized.101   
 The question ‘who holds human rights?’ is a difficult one once we reflect upon the 
complicated challenge of working out which humans we mean.  Do criminals count?  Does a 
fetus count?  Infants?  Future generations?  If we allow for certain distinctions and 
discriminations do we not run the risk of adopting the same exclusionary thinking we 
condemn rights-violators for?  If only normal, well-functioning, adult human beings who do 
not violate the human rights of others qualify as genuine holders of human rights then the 
two bedrock beliefs of universality and moral equality thought to underlie human rights 
appear at risk: “If human rights are not really shared by all human beings, then do we lose 
the global reach and cosmopolitan concern – the ‘one world’ quality – that has long seemed 
part of the idea’s real promise?”102  Some think that one’s perspective on human rights has 
little, if any, necessary connection to whether one believes that other species, or things, also 
have rights.  While I do not endeavour to settle the question of who has rights, my view is 
that any conceptual or philosophical defence of human rights bears a direct connection to 
who or what might qualify as a rights-holder.  Those philosophers most inclined to exclude 
nonhuman animals from the category of rights-holders confirm rather than deny this view, 
which explains why they offer thoughtful and well-developed arguments for why they think 
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the category of rights-holder should be restricted to humans.  My own view, which I defend 
at some length elsewhere, is that a kind of moral inconsistency follows from the behaviour of 
the human rights activist who is indifferent to the severe exploitation of animals, the 
eradication of species, or to factory farming practices.  My argument, in brief, is that a viable 
theory of justice, domestic or global, must take account of nonhuman animals since they are 
potential rights-holders capable of experiencing gross injustices.  Questions concerning the 
treatment of nonhuman animals are demanding enough to qualify as matters of justice, not 
just matters that require us to express our compassion and humanity.  The tendency of 
rights-based approaches, and global justice theory in general, to focus primarily on humans 
strikes me as largely practical and habitual, motivated by a laudable desire to tackle gross 
human rights violations. 
 This section is about teasing out some of the common claims, tensions, and 
challenges in contemporary rights-based approaches to global justice by surveying a number 
of theories.  Several of these theories claim that part of what makes one a rights-holder is 
having fundamental interests in, or vital needs for, living a minimally good life.  One has 
fundamental interests in, or vital needs for, all of the things required to function in a way 
typical of the kind of creature one is (the species norm).  An individual is said to be unjustly 
harmed if she is deprived of or lacking in these basic things, where no acceptable substitutes 
exist and they are an integral part of what makes a life minimally valuable.   
 Simply invoking the language of human rights is a globally recognized response to 
injustice.  While there is little consensus on the best, correct or final justification of human 
rights, as a moral idea and set of moral norms human rights do not suffer from a lack of 
justification.  Rather, human rights suffer from the opposite problem of having numerous 
competing accounts, which, some argue, is one of the concept’s great strengths: “a sign – the 
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best possible sign in modern circumstances – that people take rights seriously.”103  Prominent 
philosophical justifications that garner widespread support, and warrant more consideration 
than I can offer here, are all fundamentally linked by their regard for the individual human 
subject.104  Human rights are often said to be grounded in the basic human dignity of each and 
every person.105  Some accounts regard human rights as direct products of our reason, arguing 
that we are fundamentally entitled to well-being and freedom in order to engage in purposive 
action.  Accordingly, reason itself forms the basis for a fuller doctrine of human rights 
because it demands as a matter of logical consistency that we possess and enjoy rights that 
secure our well-being and freedom.106  A related view is that our individual lives ought to be 
under our own control, that life ought to be self-directed, self-authored, or self-legislated.  
On this view rights are derived from autonomy and choice as fundamental ingredients in any 
valuable life.107  Another influential line of justification, grounded on equality, claims that our 
equal moral worth is best respected when we are accordingly treated as equals morally, 
socially, and politically.108  Philosophers continue to develop compelling arguments and 
scientists continue to amass compelling empirical evidence that certain basic needs, especially 
around security and subsistence, exist universally among humans.  Requirements to fulfill 
such basic needs directly link to the concept of rights.109  Sometimes defined as the general 
goods required to live a life of dignity, capabilities concern what individuals can do and be.  
Working out what humans ought to be able to do and be to live a life of dignity, especially 
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when deployed as a corrective against the state-centric distributive paradigm to account for 
matters of gender justice, provides a more pluralistic justification for human rights.110  
Finally, the minimalist approach to rights aimed at international consensus avoids a specific 
grounding or foundation and instead justifies human rights by focusing on areas of 
agreement among diverse people, offering such agreement as the basis for legitimating 
rights.111  
 Like so many values claims, justifications of human rights often rest on a conception 
of human nature in combination with some view about the demands and requirements of 
morality and justice.  Importantly, pursuing the best chain of reasoning need not commit us 
to the problematic assumption that only one true justification, if any, exists.  Perhaps several 
good reasons exist for providing compelling support for the existence and force of human 
rights.  Even if reason is not always the most effective way of changing peoples’ beliefs and 
behaviours, reason is the best instrument we have for grounding value claims and moral 
principles.  Neither the existence of effectively codified rights nor the existence of actually 
practiced moral custom provides the kind of rigorous justification that reason demands.  
Justifications focused on the underlying basis of rights are required. 
 A proper understanding of human rights, claims Jay Drydyk, sees them as justifiable 
from within all cultures.112  Drydyk juxtaposes this proper understanding with more limited 
conceptions of human rights.  Triumphalist conceptions characterize human rights as the 
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evident achievement of Western cultures.  Rejectionist conceptions agree that human rights are 
synonymous with Western cultures and then deny that human rights have value since they 
might be consistent with a corrupt and ill-fated social and political order.  Assimilationists deny 
that human rights conceptions and beliefs are exclusively Western and instead emphasize the 
need to find grounds for accepting human rights in all cultures.  Revisionists find justifications 
for human rights within non-Western cultures by revisiting and analysing historical traditions 
and foundational texts.  Finally, transformationalists argue that concepts of human rights, 
however defective, are employed in all cultural traditions and that existing features of cross-
cultural dialogue challenge, forbid, and continually reform such defective conceptions.  As 
Drydyk argues, “… a consistent and complete knowledge of human rights can emerge cross-
culturally, if the dialogue is not abused and if the relevant moral and political experience is let 
into the dialogue, from all quarters.”113 
 Joshua Cohen picks up on this transformationalist conception of human rights as 
justifiable within all cultures.  He stresses the distinction between hope, the best kind of 
rights-based approach to justice we can hope for, and expectation, the most we can expect 
assuming a narrow human rights minimalism.114  Here it is important to distinguish between 
the case for certain universal but minimal rights required of justice, versus the case for the 
specific content of these minimal requirements.  In other words, distinguish between the role 
of human rights in global justice, what Cohen refers to as justificatory minimalism, and the 
content or objects of human rights, what Cohen calls substantive minimalism.  According to 
justificatory minimalism a conception of human rights should be presented independently of its 
philosophical or religious justification, as we saw, for instance, in Rawls.  Cohen contends 
that the “point is not simply to avoid a fight where none is necessary; the point is to embrace 
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the value of toleration.”115  Accordingly, human rights serve a practical global role 
establishing a broad terrain of agreement about reasonable global norms.  Global public 
reason provides the space for different ethical traditions to find common ground.116  We do 
not ‘find’ conceptions of human rights in different ethical traditions, rather, “there are ways 
of elaborating an ethical outlook that is nonliberal in its conception of the person and 
political society, but that is also consistent with a reasonable conception of standards to 
which political societies can reasonably be held.  Similar elaborations can be (and have been) 
developed for other ethical traditions.”117  A transformationalist conception of human rights 
embraces the value of toleration, according to Cohen, by acknowledging, trusting, and 
reasonably hoping that different ethical traditions have their own resources to support rights-
based global justice.118      
 A transformationalist understanding of human rights should not be premised upon a 
static account of cultures, peoples, nation-states, or ethical traditions.  Abduallahi Ahmed 
An-Na’im says:  
If international human rights standards are to be implemented in a manner 
consistent with their own rationale, the people (who are to implement these 
standards) must perceive the concept of human rights and its content as their 
own.  To be committed to carrying out human rights standards, people must 
hold these standards as emanating from their worldview and values.119   
 
Static accounts of cultures, peoples, nation-states, or ethical traditions are often unrealistic, 
suggesting sameness, agreement, and closure where there is difference, dispute, and 
openness.120  The values that underpin human rights and the best justificatory reasons 
available for their defence must be embraced by those who are to adopt and implement 
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them.  By no means does this close off substantive minimalism from providing rigorous 
competing accounts of the preferred substance, objects, or contents of human rights.  
Cultural ideas do not simply clash.  They travel and transform, are shared and explored.  
They remain no one’s unique property or heritage as if fixed in time and place.  In this 
respect there is no good reason why local, traditional, or historical ideas must reign when 
they are renewed, displaced, or transformed by better ones.  General norms of toleration and 
respect need not push in the direction of accepting the less than sufficiently just practices of 
those cultures simplistically characterized as fixed and illiberal.  Respect and toleration also 
push, importantly, to limit the intolerance of unjust cultural practices wherever they 
remain.121  The interaction of cultures requires rather than undermines the search for 
universal values, compelling us to ask which cultural values enrich and which hinder dignity.  
As soon as we begin to criticize externally imposed values in defence of diversity, the value 
of diversity itself directs us toward a transcultural framework of assessment, approximating 
and supporting a general search for common ground.  By regarding diversity as a good to be 
protected the argument from diversity invites us to question values in relation to this good, 
suggesting some are worth preserving while others are not, implying at least a general 
universal standard from which to assess cultural values.122  Imposing ‘liberal’ or ‘Western’ 
values on others is an evil to be avoided since it undermines respect for people’s capacity to 
determine their own moral course, treating them as inferior rather than free agents.  It is also, 
in important respects, a chimera, an oversimplification of something otherwise fluid and 
dynamic as static, usually couched in state-centric ‘us’ and ‘them’ terms.  The argument 
against paternalism, that cultural values should not be paternalistically imposed on others, 
appeals to an anti-authoritarian sentiment.  This anti-paternalism is embraced by accounts of 
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human rights that build in the protection of choice by respecting people’s own capacities to 
choose a life.123    
 Henry Shue’s account of human rights, which is among the earliest and most 
influential in the global justice literature, is inspired by H. L. A. Hart’s inference that we at 
least have the right to liberty: 
1. Everyone has the right to something. 
2. Some other things are necessary for enjoying the first thing as a right, whatever the 
first thing is. 
3. Therefore, everyone also has rights to the other things that are necessary for enjoying 
the first as a right.124 
 
Based on this argument Shue stipulates that security, subsistence and liberty are the three 
necessary conditions, what he calls “the basic rights,” for any subsequent exercise of special 
rights.  Philosophical accounts like this offer a set of objects (such as Shue’s list of basic 
rights) that are regarded as necessary for living a purposeful and meaningful life.  Notably, 
these accounts are at odds with conventional Western liberalism which downplays or ignores 
severe economic needs, though they are familiar enough in societies that are often 
pejoratively labelled ‘traditional.’  Such justifications observe that all human beings have vital 
needs, fundamental interests, and a minimal value.  Reason demands some list or set of human 
rights necessary to realize and respect our universal needs, interests, and value, and some 
account of the necessary conditions of, not just survival, but a minimally good, decent, 
dignified life.125  Rights-based sufficientarian accounts concern the morality of the depths, 
social guarantees in defence of basic needs below which no one is allowed to sink.  If there 
are any rights there must at least be a basic right to physical security since physical security is 
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a precondition for enjoying other rights.126  Shue also argues that a right to subsistence or 
minimal economic security, including clean air and water, adequate food and shelter, and 
minimal preventive public health care, is basic since it “is needed for a decent chance at a 
reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length, barring tragic 
interventions.”127  As for the moral duties basic rights give rise to, Shue says:  
That a right involves a rationally justified demand for social guarantees 
against standard threats means, in effect, that the relevant other people have a 
duty to create, if they do not exist, or, if they do, to preserve effective 
institutions for the enjoyment of what people have rights to enjoy.128   
 
What particular institutions are required and how they will look and function, however, 
cannot be deduced merely from such a theory, which speaks to the sufficientarian rather than 
the comprehensive nature of such approaches to justice.  As a sufficient standard for justice 
rights-based approaches aimed at securing minimally good, decent, dignified lives leave quite 
open the specific institutional arrangements, cultural traditions, and comprehensive 
conceptions of the good that individuals might favour and adopt in a political community.129  
According to Shue rights are basic when their enjoyment is essential to the enjoyment of all 
other rights, and such basic rights are demanded as a matter of justice, as everyone’s 
minimum reasonable demand upon the rest of humanity.130  
Shue maintains that neither physical security nor subsistence neatly map onto the 
negative versus positive rights distinction.  Historically, civil and political rights were 
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associated with negative rights, rights that are realized and respected by inaction or non-
interference, while social and economic rights were associated with positive rights, rights that 
require some sort of proactive effort from individuals and institutions.  Establishing a legal 
system replete with police, courts, legislation, and so on to respect civil and political rights 
requires much more positive action than simply refraining from interference.  Likewise, 
sometimes social and economic rights remain unrealized because there is disempowerment 
and undue interference.  The distinction between negative and positive rights raises the 
question: what duties can we reasonably require of people and institutions?  Part of the 
challenge of answering this question involves determining what rights we think everyone is 
entitled to as a matter of minimally decent treatment.  On its own, a basic right indicates very 
little about the requisite actions and institutions required to secure it.  It is remarkable how 
misguided such dichotomous assumptions about negative versus positive rights and their 
correlative duties start to appear when we eschew certain state-centric perspectives.  
Protecting so-called negative rights requires positive measures while fulfilling so-called 
positive rights may require opportunities for self-support, perhaps by removing 
disempowering obstacles.131  In short, arguments defending negative rights as cheaper and 
easier while opposing positive rights as overly expensive and demanding are empirically 
dubious.  Rather, for every basic right Shue argues the following three duties correlate: I. 
Duties to avoid depriving, II. Duties to protect from deprivation, and III. Duties to aid the 
deprived, which he fleshes out in further detail in his work.  On this matter Shue again aligns 
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his view in opposition to conventional Western liberalism, arguing that the pro negative rights 
but anti positive rights perspective has, until recently, been ubiquitous and largely 
unquestioned.132 
The influence of Henry Shue’s rights-based account is significant, and often explicit.  
Importantly, echoing Shue, James Nickel insists that as minimum standards demanded by 
justice, human rights do not assume a particular existing institutional order or dictate an ideal 
future one.  Rather, they place important moral demands on the social and political world 
without necessitating one or other comprehensive doctrine.  Nickel argues,  
Human rights do not require everything that might contribute to making a 
life good or excellent.  Other concepts are available for talking about the 
requirements of excellence and for dealing with issues that human rights do 
not cover.  The concept of human rights does not need to encompass every 
important dimension of social and political criticism.
133
   
 
Nickel provides four reasons in defence of a sufficientarian rights-based approach to global 
justice.  First, by limiting the account of human rights to address very severe problems we 
ensure their fundamental status as high priority norms while affirming their universal appeal.  
Second, we leave ample room for cultural variability and democratic decision-making: 
“[g]lobalization is already producing excessive uniformity around the world.  Human rights 
should not contribute to such uniformity except in a few important areas where only one 
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way is the acceptable way.”
134
  Third, as minimal standards they express tolerance for and 
consistency with independence and self-determination, at the individual and collective level.  
Finally, as minimal standards, human rights are feasible as practical demands on individual 
and official behaviour, legislation, and policy-making. 
 Charles Jones notes that, as perhaps the most popular form of cosmopolitanism, 
“[t]he cosmopolitan character of the rights approach should be obvious, for ‘the whole 
thrust of human rights theories is that the boundaries of nations are not the boundaries of 
moral concern.’”
135
  Jones acknowledges a debt to Shue by aiming to assess the prospects for 
a rights-based theory of global justice by focusing on, and defending, the right to 
subsistence.  He regards human rights as protections for the basic interests of individuals.  A 
minimal set of shared interests are sufficiently important to justify corresponding duties to 
respect, secure, and promote such interests.  Human rights connect basic interests to the 
duties of individuals and collectivities.
136
  A right to subsistence is then a right to the means 
to a minimally adequate existence, since it is in everyone’s basic or vital human interests to 
have what is necessary, such as certain resources and opportunities, to lead a minimally 
decent life.  Jones argues, “[r]ights as we are conceiving them here are grounds for imposing 
duties, but rights themselves are justified by appealing to the interests individuals have in the 
contents of those rights.”
137
  It follows that, from a moral perspective, highly important 
human interests, such as interests in adequate shelter, nutrition, care, and the like that 
concern our primal necessities and vulnerabilities, push in the direction of supporting a basic 
right for their protection.  Provided we establish reasonable priorities regarding our most 
important basic interests, we can then establish a more extensive working list of justified 
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human rights by identifying the substantive content the right is claimed for, the duties they 
give rise to, and the appropriate agents who bear such duties.
138
 
 James Griffin’s philosophy of human rights resonates with interest theories like 
Jones’s where rights have the purpose of promoting the well-being of the rightholder.  
Griffin grounds human rights directly in what he defends as the substantive values of 
personhood, understood as what is needed for human status as opposed, for example, to 
what promotes human good or flourishing.  As with previous philosophers he regards human 
rights as protections, and, as with previous accounts, he regards the things they protect as 
uniquely characteristic of a human life, especially important human interests, and that which 
is part of a minimally good, decent, dignified life.
139
  Griffin situates his own account within 
the human rights tradition that sees rights as grounded in natural or objective facts about 
human beings.  Basic needs, interests or capabilities that ground human rights are 
evaluatively rich features of the world, whose realization or lack thereof are goings-on in the 
world.
140
  We protect our basic needs, important interests, or central capabilities as 
fundamental entitlements because of both the independent value of the content, objects, or 
substance of rights and the valuable outcome of a distinctly dignified life that their 
                                                 
138 Ibid. 62, 65-67. 
139 “Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or, as I shall put it, our personhood.  
And one can break down the notion of personhood into clearer components by breaking down the notion of 
agency.  To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are capable, one must (first) choose one’s own path 
through life – that is, not be dominated or controlled by someone or something else (call it ‘autonomy’).  And 
(second) one’s choice must be real; one must have at least a certain minimum education and information.  And 
having chosen, one must then be able to act; that is, one must have at least the minimum provision of resources 
and capabilities that it takes (call all of this ‘minimum provision’).  And none of this is any good if someone 
then blocks one; so (third) others must also not forcibly stop one from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile 
life (call this ‘liberty’).  Because we attach such high value to our individual personhood, we see its domain of 
exercise as privileged and protected.”  Griffin, On Human Rights, 33.  “I single out functioning human agents via 
notions such as their autonomy and liberty, and I choose those features precisely because they are especially 
important human interests.  It is only because they are especially important interests that rights can be derived 
from them; rights are strong protections, and so require something especially valuable to attract protection.  So 
my notions of ‘human nature’ and ‘human agent’ are already well within the normative circle, and there is no 
obvious fallacy involved in deriving rights from notions as evaluatively rich as they are.”  Ibid. 35. 
140 Ibid. 35-36. 
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enjoyment gives rise to.
141
  Griffin continues that when it comes to the specific content, 
objects, or substance of human rights we must also ground them in ‘practicalities’ so they 
can be an effective guide to behaviour.  They must be safely kept from overreaching their 
urgent sufficientarian character.  Human rights must also remain reasonably in check with 
human nature, society, and the political order.  As moral standards human rights occupy but 
by no means exhaust the domain of justice: “There are forms of distributive justice, for all 
their importance, that do not bear on our personhood – so long, that is, as the human right 
to minimum provision is respected.”
142
  This marks the important distinction in the global 
justice literature between sufficientarian and egalitarian concerns.  
Without theoretical supplementation rights-based approaches remain squarely 
sufficientarian, aimed at securing minimum provisions demanded by justice without, for 
example, also demanding global distributions of income, wealth, resources, opportunities, 
life-chances, and the like according to egalitarian commitments.  This issue is not about 
whether equality is an acceptable and fundamental value but rather about how best to 
interpret and apply it according to the demands of justice.143  David Miller weighs into this 
debate by defending a rights-based sufficientarian account while strongly criticizing global 
egalitarianism.  Although the bare facts of global inequality – that what people are, what they 
have, and what they can do vary considerably – are not wrong per se, such vast global 
inequalities in people’s life chances seem so unfair, so unjustified, and so gross that they 
press us for an urgent response.144  The continued existence of such inequality is a profound 
                                                 
141 Ibid. 36. 
142 Ibid. 41. 
143 Thus, as Will Kymlicka suggests, “the idea of an egalitarian plateau for political argument is potentially better 
able to accommodate both the diversity and unity of contemporary political philosophy.”  Will Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4-5. 
144 As Rawls says: “The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into 
society at some particular position.  These are simply natural facts.  What is just and unjust is the way that 
institutions deal with these facts.”  A Theory of Justice, 102. 
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global injustice and principles of global justice are required to address such an unacceptable 
condition.  The sheer existence of such global inequalities is a moral travesty, a lamentable 
wrongdoing of huge proportion.  While such a response is understandable and perhaps even 
morally praiseworthy, Miller worries it overlooks important points of principle integral to the 
pursuit of global justice.  According to Miller the case for making global equality a matter of 
justice rests on the ethical grounds that exist for challenging global inequalities.  He argues 
that these grounds include infringements of people’s basic rights or exploitative economic 
processes.  For Miller, empowerment and responsibility, not equality of resources, are the 
central issues that should concern us.   
 According to Miller it is not egalitarian principles that underlie our judgment that the 
most egregious forms of inequality in life chances represent a gross injustice.  The injustice 
of global inequality, he argues, is independent from the claim that justice demands equality.  
That is, nothing about this injustice shows that justice demands global egalitarianism.  
Rather, the wrongness, the injustice, the grossness of global inequality stems from a concern 
about absolute poverty or deprivation which is best addressed by defending universal human 
rights.145  Miller’s account of human rights as setting the global minimum arises from 
considering what responsibilities we have to aid the world’s poor.  He claims that we owe 
respect for basic human rights and that anyone, individual or group, able to protect such 
rights bears responsibility, at least in principle, for doing so.  Like other defenders of human 
rights, Miller highlights the sense of moral urgency rights language exhibits and, as with other 
rights-based approaches, his account involves a comparatively short subset of familiar 
international human rights – basic human rights – as the most morally compelling.146  
                                                 
145 David Miller, “Against Global Egalitarianism,” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9 (2005), 64. 
146 He indicates that, “[h]ere I follow, among others, Henry Shue for whom ‘basic rights … are everyone’s 
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity.’”  Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 164 
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When rights establish minimum standards separating tolerable from intolerable 
institutional arrangements the focus is on enhancing justice and removing injustice.  
However, when the purpose of rights is characterized as defining conditions of political 
legitimacy, the focus changes from moving toward more just conditions to qualifying 
institutions as just or legitimate.  I am not opposed in principle to the idea of a just institution 
functioning in an otherwise unjust society.  I also agree that human rights are political 
aspirations, standards that inform and hold to account political institutions.  However, when 
the institution in question concerns the political legitimacy of nation-states, the most 
powerful institutions ever known, institutions that are sometimes used interchangeably with 
the societies they regulate, institutions that claim a monopoly of force, I think it is not the 
place of rights to render such institutions officially just or legitimate.  Considerations of 
justice ought to inform the criteria for and meaning of legitimate institutions, but rights 
should not be used as static placeholders fixing justice or legitimacy as officially achieved.  I 
share Rawls’s view that justice represents a particular subset of moral considerations.  Justice 
is not the full range of morality.  In particular, I regard justice as a key subset of a particularly 
urgent kind concerning the sphere of basic entitlements.  Rights-based accounts of justice do 
not exhaust what justice requires.  They are proposed as minimal demands or necessary 
conditions of social and global justice.  States should be for rights but rights are not for 
states.  As Jacques Maritain put it, in his version of the cosmopolitan insistence that 
obligations of justice precede rather than stem from political institutions: 
The State is not the supreme incarnation of the Idea, as Hegel believed; the 
State is not a kind of collective superman; the State is but an agency entitled 
                                                                                                                                                  
footnote 2.  Miller indicates that Shue’s defence of basic rights is the best account known to him.  David Miller, 
“Justice and Global Inequality,” in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, eds. Inequality, Globalization, and World 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 319-320 endnote 10.  Miller’s purpose “is to identify a list of 
rights that can specify a global minimum that people everywhere are entitled to as a matter of justice, and that 
therefore may impose obligations, on rich nations especially.”  Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 
166. 
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to use power and coercion, and made up of experts or specialists in public 
order and welfare, an instrument in the service of man [sic].  Putting man at 
the service of that instrument is political perversion.  The human person as 
an individual is for the body politic and the body politic is for the human 
person as a person.  But man is by no means for the State.  The State is for 
man.147 
 
Justice admits of varying degrees along numerous continuums.  Just societies and global 
justice are goals and pursuits, replete with accomplishments worth celebrating.  While statists 
employ rights to claim and celebrate the legitimacy of nation-states, I think the rest of us 
should focus on rights-based approaches aimed at enhancing justice and removing injustice.  
This means not presupposing nation-states as the only lens through which to view the 
politics of human rights.  It also means taking care to avoid statism as a comprehensive 
doctrine.148   
For this reason Miller’s otherwise compelling account of human rights as setting the 
global minimum is in tension with his liberal nationalism.  Duties to respect human rights, 
and other duties of justice, run up against and press upon all social and political orders.  The 
nation-state cannot be rendered neutral, natural, and intrinsically valuable, even if we work 
with it, within it, or through it in pursuit of justice.  Otherwise commitments to freedom, 
justice, and human rights are peculiarly inverted and limited to being the results of, as 
opposed to measures of and challenges against, political institutions.  This tension is worth 
pointing out here since the purpose of our rights-based account, what we want our theory of 
                                                 
147 Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), 13.  To be clear, Miller 
means to use society and the state interchangeable so he is not guilty of equivocation: “Obviously what we need 
to get clear about here is what is meant by ‘a society’ and which of its features are supposed to be important 
from the point of view of justice.  The answer I think is that by ‘societies’ we mean ‘nation-states’, using ‘state’ 
here in a somewhat broad, quasi-Hegelian sense to include not only formal political institutions but also the 
informal associations that make up civil society.  Social justice is justice within nation-states so understood, and 
this is not accidental, as I have argued elsewhere.”  Miller, Justice for Earthlings: Essays in Political Philosophy, 170. 
148 I have in mind approaches to justice (social and global) that, unlike state-centric institutional accounts, align 
with the active doing and pursuing of justice on the ground or ‘from below’ whereby social justice includes, for 
example, “the social labour of groups and persons implicated in human rights struggles in historically specific 
socio-cultural contexts, yet proceeds ‘upward’ to formulate normative reconstructions of what is required 
ethically and politically of these struggles to advance the work of global justice.”  Fuyuki Kurasawa, The Work of 
Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 10. 
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human rights to do, will inform the kind of justification we give in its defence.  The 
justification that endorses a specific state-centric institutional arrangement differs from a 
justification that specifies what individuals are fundamentally entitled to as a matter of justice.  
As noted, the difference in focus is between securing fundamental human rights demanded 
by justice without presupposing more comprehensive political doctrines, or using rights to 
reinforce specific state-centric institutional arrangements.  The fundamental entitlements 
justice demands transcend any particular political order or institutional arrangement.  In this 
light, the state-centricity of Miller and Rawls appears to be the kind of comprehensive 
doctrine that should neither be assumed nor imposed.  
Miller defends a nationalist conception of global justice.  He assumes national 
boundaries signify morally appropriate lines according to which individuals assign loyalties, 
stake out identities, and determine obligations of justice.  For Miller, while some of these 
obligations cross national and state boundaries, such boundaries constitute the lens through 
which obligations of global justice are determined: 
If we are also to treat people as agents, however, we must respond to them 
not just as individuals, but as members of collectives whose practices and 
decisions may have profound effects on how individual lives go.  So the 
boundaries that separate these collectives must count, as a matter of principle 
as well as a matter of fact.  We cannot understand global justice without 
recognizing that belonging to a particular group or a particular society is not 
just an arbitrary feature like hair colour but something that can legitimately 
affect a person’s life chances.149   
 
As an empirical claim this has considerable merit, at least in the broad sense that our being 
members of particular groups or societies can fundamentally influence our life chances.  As a 
normative claim about the paramount moral importance of the nation-state, however, I think 
                                                 
149 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 263. 
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this is false.  Without careful nuance, qualification, and consideration, it is also reckless.150  
Nationalist sentiment and collective movement toward self-determination are not valuable in 
themselves.  If nationalism has any value, its value is instrumental and derivative rather than 
intrinsic or constitutive of justice.   
There is an uncomfortable disconnect between Miller’s nationalist perspective and 
the record, behaviour, and constitution, of actual nation-states.  I share Crispin Sartwell’s 
view that however benevolent, legitimate, and ideal our purported justifications for the state, 
“the sheer fact of its overwhelming force is the distant whiff of burning flesh.  No force in 
human history has caused more suffering and death … only a fool could examine the history 
of the twentieth century and not see that once such a power is constituted, all bets are off.”151  
Thus, I regard Miller’s nationalism, including his tendency to slide from idealized 
philosophical justifications to practical support for and strengthening of states, as playing 
with fire.  If our conception of global justice is to be informed by empirical evidence, analysis 
of nation-states as threats to justice and causes of injustice must be pursued alongside the 
more sanitized claims typical of philosophers who characterize nation-states as mutual 
benefit schemes aimed at securing our rights and promoting justice.   
                                                 
150 It is important to make clear here that what I take to be reckless (not just sloppy) are undefended transitions 
from rigorous defence of an ideal conception of nation to apparent endorsement of the status quo international 
order of existing states, repeatedly found in Miller’s work.  Veit Bader, for example, writes: “According to 
Miller, ideally democratic nations ‘coincide with state-boundaries’ and if not, he claims that we have ‘strong 
ethical reasons to make that happen’.  This move from a very much debatable ‘ideal’ to practical 
recommendations in the ‘real world’ is a foolish recipe producing disastrous nightmares.”  Veit Bader, 
“Reasonable Impartiality and Priority for Compatriots: A Criticism of Liberal Nationalism’s Main Flaws,” 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (2005), 92 fn 18.  The closest thing to an acknowledgment of 
this ‘foolish recipe’ in his work appears in a footnote where Miller writes: “Veit Bader underlines several 
respects in which existing nation-states diverge from the communitarian model that is used to justify special 
obligations to compatriots.  These points are well-taken, so long as we recognize that such divergences are a 
matter of degree.  We have obligations to our compatriots to the extent that our nation meets the conditions 
described in the text.  A similar point might be made about families and other forms of attachment.”  David 
Miller, “Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (2005), 67 
footnote 9.     
151 Crispin Sartwell, Against the State: An Introduction to Anarchist Political Theory (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2008), 
69. 
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Miller’s preoccupation with countering the cosmopolitan claim that a person’s 
nationality is morally arbitrary limits his analysis to what can be positive and meaningful 
about national identity.  Lack of critical attention to the disease-like qualities of nationalism, 
to the ill-intentions behind and resultant scars of nationalist movements, and to the 
overwhelming human rights abuses of nation-states is a critical shortcoming for any practical 
conception of global justice.  Miller’s liberal nationalism dramatically underplays the gulf that 
exists between his account of global justice and the manifold injustices of the actually 
existing, state-based global order.    
According to Miller, “[g]lobal justice must be understood as justice for a world of 
culturally distinct nation-states each of which can legitimately claim a considerable degree of 
political autonomy.”152  This makes global justice for a world of states, even if nation-states 
are carefully conceived as an idealized political form at once theoretically attractive and 
functionally dissimilar from actually existing ones.  Certainly global justice must be 
understood as informed by the complexities of the existing world, but this need not entail 
predetermined, principled commitments to contingent political institutions.  Respecting 
individuals as agents and not simply as deprived and suffering victims involves seeing people 
within a context and as capable of making choices.  Justice may demand that we effect 
change to that context through an approach focused on personal ethics, institutional 
arrangements, or both.  On some level we risk being disrespectful as well as unimaginative by 
requiring in advance that culturally distinct nation-states necessarily constitute the future 
world order for each and every individual and group, however attractive our definition of 
                                                 
152 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 278. 
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nation-states may be.153  Actually existing states are a central feature of our international 
order and may be, at least strategically, appropriate tools to effect change.  If a world of 
culturally distinct nation-states is not the only or the best way to understand global justice, 
viewing global justice through national spectacles risks limiting or impeding the pursuit of 
global justice.  One reason for being hesitant about viewing global justice through a 
nationalist lens stems from embracing a scientific spirit and remaining open-minded about 
what future just political forms might or should feature socially and globally.  Another stems 
from wishing to maintain a healthy amount of scepticism towards states as we know them to 
be.  Since we can be confident that states will remain central political institutions into the 
immediate future, Miller’s nation-state-centric approach strikes me as an important strategic 
tool for navigating a world of states in pursuit of global justice.  Whether it should limit our 
vision of a just global order is another matter.   
Finally, there is a noteworthy ordering problem in Miller’s work.  This concerns his 
aim to identify the underlying principles of justice that spring directly from various modes of 
human relationships.  Various modes of human relationships are treated as ideal types that 
are meant to illuminate real world relationships.154  His conclusion that the nation-state is a 
fundamental unit of justice does not follow from his premises regarding interpersonal justice.  
The problem is that while he claims to start from a small number of basic modes of 
association from which to draw principles of justice, he advances his resultant theory of 
justice to stake out, defend, and reinforce his preferred political order of nation-states.  Why 
not simply include among the very real and increasingly common modes of human 
                                                 
153 As Daniel M. Weinstock suggests: “Here, philosophical imagination has been hamstrung by the hold that the 
nation-state paradigm still exerts upon philosophers.”  “Introduction” in Daniel Weinstock, ed. Global Justice, 
Global Institutions (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), xviii.  
154 Miller sets out his methodological pluralism about justice in “A Sketch of a Theory of Justice” in his Principles 
of Social Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
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relationships something like ‘transnational association,’ ‘global citizenship,’ or ‘humanity as a 
whole’ from which principles of justice spring?  Miller fails to consider that the demands of 
global justice stem directly from acting, living, and thinking globally.  If, according to Miller, 
equality is the primary principle of justice governing relations among domestic citizens and 
something like global citizenship is acknowledged to be, or is becoming, a basic mode of 
association, Miller’s own method should undercut his opposition to global egalitarianism.155   
Miller argues that the best theories of justice reflect shared understandings of human 
association as much as or more than they reflect differences in principle between nationalism 
and cosmopolitanism, for instance.  Despite his opposition to strong cosmopolitanism 
involving global egalitarianism, Miller defends a weak cosmopolitanism in the form of a 
rights-based global minimum as part of his theory of global justice.  Weak cosmopolitanism 
involves commitments to equal moral concern for all individuals while strong 
cosmopolitanism involves commitments to substantial forms of equal treatment.  My claim 
here is that Miller’s own methodological pluralism about justice, including his acceptance of 
some form of cosmopolitanism, may force him to abandon his preferred institutional lens.  
By contrasting Miller’s rights-based justice through state-centric principles with Pogge’s more 
thorough-going cosmopolitanism we see more clearly the significant difference between 
approaching global justice through an institutional lens and approaching global justice by 
focusing on the justice of institutions themselves.  
                                                 
155 “When people share a common identity as members of a community, they see their lives and destinies as 
interwoven, and their sense of themselves as free-floating individuals is correspondingly weakened, their 
solidarity gives rise to a more or less powerful sense of mutual obligation, and this naturally expresses itself in a 
conception of justice as distribution according to need.”  Quoting Miller in Leif Wenar, “Human Rights and 
Equality in the work of David Miller,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
2008, 406.  As we see, for example, in Pogge’s cosmopolitan conception below, this pushes in the direction of 
global justice, where a world community of increasingly interconnected people increasingly share a common 
identify and are subject to the same global institutional order as fellow members of humanity. 
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Thomas Pogge’s cosmopolitan conception of human rights is an example of a rights-
based approach that assesses nation-states and the global economic order as threats to justice 
and causes of injustice, not just as avenues through which justice might be pursued.  Pogge’s 
rights-based theory of global justice focuses on the moral claims persons have on any 
institutional order imposed upon them and against those who are imposing this order.  There 
is no inconsistency between his claim that the present global order is unjust, a massive crime 
against humanity, and his view that we are a few minor reforms and redesigns away from a 
global institutional order that would satisfy the minimal human rights standards of justice.156  
Pogge’s sufficientarian account directly subjects the global institutional order to this standard.  
He does not presuppose a world of nation-states as the institutional structure through which 
justice happens.  Both Pogge and Miller assume the state-based global order will continue to 
define the circumstances of justice into the immediate future.  However, Pogge denies that 
the mere existence of states necessarily constitutes an injustice, while Miller defends in 
principle, as a requirement of justice, a state-based global order.  Such differences in focus, 
between whatever institutional order satisfies the demands of justice versus justice through a 
particular institutional order, hinge on differences concerning the basic units of justice.  Both 
Pogge and Miller, like Rawls, adopt a decidedly institutional focus.  However, Pogge neither 
assumes nor defends state-centric principles of justice.  Instead, he emphasizes individual 
human rights as minimum standards that inform and hold to account political institutions, 
separating tolerable from intolerable institutional arrangements.  His theory is focused on 
enhancing justice and removing injustice, not transcendental justice.  
                                                 
156 “My main claim is then that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably 
cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor – or, to put it more 
descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity every 
committed.  Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were vastly more evil than our political leaders, but in terms of 
killing and harming people they never came anywhere near causing 18 million deaths per year.”  Thomas Pogge, 
“Real World Justice,” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1-2, 2005, 33. 
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Accordingly, institutions must always be subject to the standards of justice rather 
than signifying in principle the baseline or institutional lens through which such standards are 
applied.  This distinction is at the forefront of the debate between cosmopolitanism and 
statism.  Cosmopolitanism eschews fundamental commitments to particular institutional 
arrangements.  Where statists embrace the link between the political authority and coercion 
of the state and justice, cosmopolitans remain agnostic, insisting that the devil is in the 
details.  Institutions are not idealized, neutralized, assigned fundamental moral significance, 
or defended as having intrinsic value in cosmopolitan accounts of justice.  Instead, 
institutions answer to, rather than frame, the demands and obligations of justice. 
 According to Pogge social and political arrangements that foreseeably result in 
millions of avoidable deaths signify some of the largest human rights violations the world has 
ever seen.157  The world’s affluent have negative duties of justice to avoid imposing a rights-
violating global institutional order that massively harms the global poor: 
This minimal conception is proposed as merely a necessary condition of social 
justice.  I do not hold that human rights exhaust what justice requires.  I 
merely hold that justice requires at least that any institutional order we impose 
must fulfill the human rights of those on whom it is imposed insofar as this is 
reasonably possible.  I work solely with this minimal requirement of social 
justice because it is widely acceptable and suffices to reach my conclusions.  
That some institutional order foreseeably reproduces an avoidable human 
rights deficit is thus on my view merely a sufficient, not a necessary, condition 
for this order being unjust and for its imposition being a violation of a 
negative duty of justice and hence a harming.158 
 
Human rights are conceived in terms of the globally recognized and shared basic universal 
needs of human persons which, in the first instance, social and political institutions must 
                                                 
157 Thomas Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties,” Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, 2005, 79.  Examples might include protectionist policies that disadvantage poorer countries, global rules 
for incentivizing pharmaceutical research by rewarding medical research of and for the affluent with monopoly 
prices out of reach of the global poor, profiteering from international resource and borrowing privileges 
granted to tyrants and dictatorships, and the like. 
158 Ibid. 76. 
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officially protect and respect.159  Pogge writes, “[h]uman rights are, then, moral claims on the 
organization of one’s society.”160  This institutional understanding of human rights 
transcends debate between libertarians who think that human rights require only self-
restraint and maximalists who think that human rights require efforts to fulfill everyone’s 
human rights everywhere.  Individuals have a negative duty not to uphold or impose rights-
violating institutions, including institutional arrangements that fail to secure access to basic 
necessities.  These basic necessities require protection of civil and political and social and 
economic human rights set out, for example, in the UDHR.161  Pogge emphasizes the radical 
potential and transformative power of simply fulfilling negative duties when it comes to 
addressing severe global poverty.    
Pogge’s powerful argument is cleverly couched in terms of negative duties.  He 
argues that the affluent, because we are most responsible for perpetuating a system that fuels 
global poverty, are tasked with redesigning the international order and compensating the 
world’s poor for their deprivation.162  Critics might argue that no algorithmic calculation 
specifying a precise allocation of responsibility for complex collective harms can be given.  
However, given his emphasis on negative duties, this objection is beside the point.  We fulfill 
our duties not to harm as well as duties to avert harm by not collaborating in and benefiting 
from institutional arrangements that produce foreseeable and avoidable deprivations.  As 
such, “we have much more stringent duties to seek to reform these social institutions and to 
                                                 
159 “The preeminent requirement on all coercive institutional schemes is that they afford each human being 
secure access to minimally adequate shares of basic freedoms and participation, of food, drink, clothing, shelter, 
education, and health care.  Achieving the formulation, global acceptance, and realization of this requirement is 
the preeminent moral task of our age.”  Ibid. 51. 
160 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, 64. 
161 Ibid. 66-67. 
162 Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 239.  The massive deprivations and unprecedented inequalities 
Pogge has in mind concern, for example, the fully one-third of all human beings that currently die from 
poverty-related causes.  Again, according to Pogge, such deprivations are a result of the global institutional 
order so, to be clear, this notion of deprivation concerns institutionally imposed rights-violations not simply 
comparative or relative deprivation.  
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do our fair share toward mitigating the harms they cause.”163  Pogge’s forward looking 
intention is to constructively work out how citizens can work together to fulfill such 
responsibilities.164  This conception of human rights is premised upon the assumption that 
world poverty is a product of human construction, foreseeably reproduced under the present 
global institutional order.  Certainly justice requires more, but Pogge’s rights-based theory of 
justice is sufficientarian.  Whatever else justice demands, minimally our human constructed 
institutional order must be designed to avoid basic universal human rights violations.  In 
conceiving human rights, Pogge’s focus is on what human rights are rather than on the 
justification of one or other particular list.165  
Nothing about his account excludes positive duties, one or other particular set of 
rights, one or other particular conceptual or justificatory basis for rights, or other non-
institutional conceptions from combining with his.  Pogge maintains that a plausible and 
widely shared conception of human rights signifies our best hope for international agreement 
on a common moral standard for achieving a sufficiently just global order.166  For this reason 
I now turn to a rights-based capabilities perspective which features this criteria of broad 
sharability because it embraces and builds upon the many strengths of the rights-based 
theories of global justice considered thus far. 
 
                                                 
163 Pogge, “Real World Justice,” 36. 
164 Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties,” 81-82.  He writes: “I am not writing against you, 
to make you feel guilty or to present you with an itemized bill for wrongful damages done.  I am writing for you, 
to suggest that we can lead much better, happier lives in a much better country if we are willing to do without 
that bit of extra affluence now purchased for us with rivers of blood, sweat, and tears of the global poor.” 
165 “A conception of human rights addresses then two questions: what are human rights?  And what human 
rights are there?  I believe that these two questions are asymmetrically related in this sense: we cannot 
convincingly justify a particular list of human rights without first making clear what human rights are.  Yet we 
can justify a particular understanding of human rights without presupposing more than a rough idea about what 
goods are widely recognized as worthy of inclusion.  This, in any case, is what I will attempt to do.”  Thomas 
Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” in Pablo De Greiff and Ciaran Cronin, eds. Global Justice 
and Transnational Politics: Essays on the Moral and Political Challenges of Globalization (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2002), 158. 
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1.5 Capabilities Theory of Rights 
A gulf persists between rights expressed in the language of moral philosophy and 
rights as the language of political struggle.  Rights theory has traditionally focused on 
justifying and sustaining the foundation(s) upon which legitimate rights claims can be 
made.167  Increasingly, critical accounts that see rights as historically relative tools of 
corporations and an exploitative global economy have coincided with anti-foundational 
approaches that dismiss all such philosophical accounts as futile in the power struggle for 
rights.  A capabilities theory of rights must be able to play an important practical role in 
political struggle and bridge the gap between rights activism and rights theory.168  The 
capabilities approach is a logical candidate for mounting such a defence since it is grounded 
in a theory of value embodied by the idea of universal rights.  Universal values are not 
established by institutional authority or majority rule but by an on-going normative project 
committed to working out what powers, opportunities, and faculties seem so essential and 
characteristic of the species norm that we regard them as minimal thresholds of dignified 
existence that apply universally.   
Amartya Sen states that “[i]n the most general form, the notion of human rights 
builds on our shared humanity.  These rights are not derived from citizenship in any country, 
or membership in any nation.  They are taken as entitlements of every human being.”169  Sen 
sees a direct connection between rights and capabilities, regarding human rights as 
fundamental entitlements to a capability to function.  For him, “[a] pronouncement of 
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human rights … is an assertion of the importance of the freedoms that are identified and 
acclaimed in the formulation of the rights in question.”170  Like Nussbaum, he advances a 
decidedly internalist account that avoids any metaphysical position.  He states that, “[a]ny 
moral theory would have to begin with some primitive diagnosis of value … I accept fully 
that one has to dig for foundations, but there is a substantial issue involved in deciding where 
to stop digging.”171   
Sen advocates for capabilities as the best measurement of justice or most appropriate 
conceptual space for evaluating quality of life.  His lack of commitment in defence of a finite 
set of foundational capabilities is deliberate, leaving such specification open-ended and, 
therefore, open to different contextual specifications within varying scenarios.  Contrary to 
Nussbaum’s account that specifies a threshold level of ten central capabilities, Sen does not 
adopt one particular list.172  He expresses concern that any view of human nature could be 
“tremendously over-specified.”173  In the past, Sen was content to develop a capability-based 
theory of justice in outline form, arguing that a complete theory is not needed to analyze 
gender inequality or any other form of injustice.174  However, Sen helps defend the increased 
moral complexity involved in combining capabilities and rights when he states: 
It is also possible for an ethical theory to include more than one type of 
variables in the category of basal significance.  We may be concerned both 
with liberties and with levels of well-being.  We may attach intrinsic 
importance both to well-being and to agency.  We may value freedom as well 
as achievement.  Indeed, pluralist proposals make up much of practical ethics, 
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even though descriptive homogeneity evidently appeals to many moral 
philosophers (utilitarians among them).175 
 
Sen distinguishes his own position from the basic needs approach that focuses on 
commodities and the primacy of economic needs.  He argues instead for the primacy of 
political rights such as freedom of speech, association, and political participation, noting: 
“[p]olitical rights are important not only for the fulfillment of needs, they are crucial also for 
the formulation of needs.  And this idea relates, in the end, to the respect that we owe each 
other as fellow human beings.”176 
Sen’s suggestive sketch of a capability-based theory of rights signifies a crucial 
definitional contribution: 
Rights, then, are defined as basic not because they are indispensable to the 
fulfillment of any other right but because they are a way of formulating the 
urgency of minimal levels of eminently valuable human (actual and possible) 
functionings.  It is intrinsically good for humans to be and do in certain ways 
and to have the freedom to so function, to be above the ‘threshold’ that 
enables them to so function.  To justify something as a fundamental right is 
to identify a human functioning as basic, that is, as intrinsically and supremely 
good.  Rights are grounded in the good in the sense that they are justified 
with reference to valuable human functionings.177 
 
Basic rights secure central human capabilities to function and are intrinsically valuable with 
respect to human dignity.  Capability-based rights understood as justified claims and 
fundamental entitlements help define what a rights holder must minimally have the 
opportunity to be.  They establish a threshold above which the rights holder is empowered 
with genuine opportunities to function in ways deemed valuable.178  The list of central human 
capabilities is conceived as a set of minimal requirements essential to a dignified existence.  
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The basic rights that secure these capabilities to function should be regarded as constraints 
on goal seeking action.  Nussbaum insists, 
This is important, since a list of human rights typically functions as a system 
of side constraints in international deliberation and in internal policy debates.  
That is, we typically say to and of governments, let them pursue the social 
good as they conceive it so long as they do not violate the items on this list.  I 
think this is a very good way of thinking about the way a list of basic human 
rights should function in a pluralistic society; and I have already said that I 
regard my list of basic capabilities this way, as a list of urgent items that 
should be secured to people no matter what else we pursue.  In this way, we 
both conceive of capabilities as a set of goals (a subset of total social goals) 
and say that they have an urgent claim to be promoted, whatever else we also 
promote.179   
 
The key to such a system is establishing the correct set of capabilities and rights that should 
be secured no matter what else we pursue.   
Despite the ascendancy of the idea and use of human rights, significant skepticism 
remains concerning the depth and coherence of a rights-based approach to justice.  Sen 
addresses three such critiques.  First, the legitimacy critique casts doubts on the status of rights 
that are not sanctioned and enforced by political authority.  Second, the coherence critique takes 
issue with the form the politics of human rights takes, specifically, by casting doubt on the 
duties entailed by certain conceptions of rights.  The worry is that responsibilities for 
securing human rights are too loosely placed on those who, without any forthcoming and 
substantial change in political orientation and moral motivation, risk leaving such duties 
unfulfilled.  Third, the cultural critique sees the moral authority of rights as resting on the 
accepted cultural practices and conventional social ethics of each society rather than on 
universal values.  
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Sen forcefully rejects the legitimacy critique exhibited by Marx, Bentham, and others 
who have insisted that rights are only products and instruments of institutions, not 
preexisting ethical entitlements.  Such a position militates against the basic idea of universal 
rights – rights as a set of ethical claims – that must be kept conceptually distinct from 
legislated legal rights.180  Instead, Sen insists that we continue to regard rights as a system of 
ethical reasoning and the basis of political demands.  He argues that human rights are not 
principally legal demands, though they can inspire legislation.  In response to the coherence 
critique that suggests it is incoherent to talk about rights without specifying who, in 
particular, is responsible for fulfilling rights, Sen counters that it is perfectly coherent to 
advance conceptions of what people should be able to do and be even if such normative 
claims are only generally addressed to anyone in a position to help.  Without the language of 
rights to describe the freedom individuals should be able to achieve, it would appear difficult 
to distinguish between an unfulfilled right an individual nonetheless has and a right they do 
not have.181  The cultural critique challenges the universality of human rights and has 
featured, for example, in debates about ‘Asian values’.  Sen counters the false notion that a 
distinct set of static values separate a large and heterogeneous population from the values 
that underlie universal human rights, arguing that, 
What we have to investigate, instead, are the constituents, the components, 
of this compound idea.  It is the powerful presence of some of these 
elements – in non-Western as well as Western societies – that I have been 
emphasizing.  It is hard to make sense of the view that the basic ideas 
underlying freedom and rights in a tolerant society are “Western” notions, 
and somehow alien to Asia, though that view has been championed by Asian 
authoritarians and Western chauvinists.182 
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Such claims against the universal values embodied by a basic conception of international 
human rights are unfounded, often rooted in narrow, arbitrary readings and motivated by 
political self-interest.  Instead, Sen highlights the intrinsic importance and the constructive 
role of the genesis of universal values as part of the case for basic freedoms and their 
associated formulations in rights.183  Doing human rights thus becomes a process of 
establishing, not simply appealing to supposedly established, universal values.  Debate, 
argument, and disagreement about human rights is both a feature of the practice of human 
rights and part of the general discipline of human rights. 
Rights-based approaches to justice can inspire and guide policy formation and public 
action.  They aim to empower otherwise marginalized people(s) to enter mainstream debates 
on an equal social and political footing.  They enable the articulation of, and aspiration 
towards, equal dignity and respect.  They also strengthen the increasingly broad institutional 
influence and cosmopolitan appeal rights have.184  Theories of global justice appeal to rights 
that secure and protect well-being and freedom.  Certainly the UDHR features both sorts of 
rights, broadly based on a conception of shared human capacities that demand respect.  It is 
my contention that a capabilities perspective can help refine and supplement such theories of 
global justice.  I contend that rights are important because they secure capabilities to 
function, safeguard the value individuals attach to their freedom and well-being, and infuse 
into a theory of justice a conception of moral entitlements that have political significance 
above and beyond the enhanced personal advantage they help secure.  Unfortunately, rights 
theorists have been reluctant to explore and develop this connection, perhaps because they 
regard capabilities as restricted to human development, as moving too far towards a 
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perfectionist account of justice,185 or because capabilities theorists have not, until recently,186 
provided the kind of institutional analysis that other contemporary rights-based approaches 
to global justice supply.187 
 As a theory of global justice involving a list of political goals, Nussbaum has 
presented the capabilities approach as an alternative language to people’s basic entitlements.  
Some of the central questions she asks concerning the project of partnering capabilities and 
rights are: 
Does the capabilities approach view supplement a theory of rights, or is it 
intended to be a particular way of capturing what a theory of rights captures?  
Is there any tension between a focus on capabilities and a focus on rights?  
(Are the two approaches competitors?)  On the other hand, is there any 
reason why a capabilities theorist should welcome the language of rights – 
that is, is there anything in the view itself that leads naturally in the direction 
of recognizing rights? … Does the capabilities view incline us to opt for any 
particular set of answers to the various questions about rights or any 
particular conception of rights?188 
 
From the start Nussbaum has insisted that the capabilities approach be combined with 
rights-based approaches.  She understands human rights as involving “an especially urgent 
and morally justified claim that a person has, simply in virtue of being a human adult, and 
independently of membership in a particular nation, class, sex, or ethnic, religious, or sexual 
group.”189  While the language of rights does indeed play a central role in contemporary 
political discourse, rights remain conceptually unclear, bogged down in theoretical debate 
about their basis, substance, and role.  Capabilities, it should be noted, may only be thus far 
immune to the enormous disparity between official declarations and public practice because 
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they have not yet featured in constitutions and public policy the way rights have.190  
Capabilities and rights are understood as fundamental entitlements and protections 
demanded by justice.  Basic capabilities – what individuals should be free to do and be – 
flesh out the content, objects, or substance of rights.  As a type of human rights approach 
the capabilities approach identifies basic capabilities underlying the formulation of rights.  
It is important to retain the normative moral force of rights.  Some suggest 
individuals only have rights when the content of those rights can be secured.  This too easily 
accepts as natural the political reasons why rights are not secured, and implies people do not 
deserve the rights assigned to them universally.  Nussbaum picks up on and sympathizes 
with this prepolitical ethical quality of rights and suggests that “thinking in terms of capability 
gives us a benchmark as we think about what it is to secure a right to someone.”191  This 
benchmark for assessing whether a right has indeed been upheld or realized “makes clear 
that this involves affirmative material and institutional support, not simply a failure to 
impede.”192  This suggests a comparative advantage of capability-based rights over traditional 
rights theories: “Often fundamental entitlements have been understood as prohibitions 
against interfering state action, and if the state keeps its hands off, those rights are taken to 
have been secured; the state has no further affirmative task.”193  The right to political 
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participation, for instance, might nominally exist while individuals continue to lack the 
opportunity to exercise it. 
 Rights can also be thought of as prior to and thus the justifying ground for securing 
the capability to function.  For example, a right to not involuntarily starve is one instance 
where a right can be understood as providing the justifying ground for securing the capability 
to function.  The political goal is to support the internal capabilities of a person with a 
suitable external environment that enables that person to exercise, or have the choice to 
exercise, the function.194  In this sense rights language helps flesh out the capabilities 
approach where specific rights to things like freedom of expression, religion, and assembly 
speak to aspects of the general capability to exercise practical reason, one’s mind and senses, 
as well as make self-defining personal choices: 
Thus capabilities have a very close relationship to human rights, as 
understood in contemporary international discussions.  In effect they cover 
the terrain covered by both the so-called “first-generation rights” (political 
and civil liberties) and the so-called second-generation rights (economic and 
social rights).  And they play a similar role, providing both a basis for cross-
cultural comparison and the philosophical underpinning for basic 
constitutional principles.195 
 
Combining both concepts improves both their rhetorical and theoretical force.196  
Capabilities supplement and bring precision to the language of rights by stating the 
motivating concerns and goals.197  By this account fulfilling rights in a meaningful sense 
necessitates due consideration of the capabilities of each individual.  The list of central 
human capabilities is established through an evaluative process of the species norm in order 
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to secure a minimal threshold for all individuals.  Since individuals are the fundamental 
bearers of rights, fulfilling rights to capability to function requires consideration of the 
opportunities that exist in the context of that life.  While having rights is not contingent on 
what individuals are actually able to do and be, realizing such rights in practice entails 
consideration of the capacities and facilities they need to be able to act with reasonable hope 
of success.  This point highlights one way in which capabilities and rights should be 
combined: 
Human talents vary considerably, within a fixed framework that is 
characteristic of the species and that permits ample scope for creative work, 
including the creative work of appreciating the achievements of others.  This 
should be a matter for delight rather than a condition to be abhorred.  Those 
who assume otherwise must be adopting the tacit premise that people’s rights 
or social reward are somehow contingent on their abilities.  As for human 
rights, there is an element of plausibility in this assumption in the single 
respect already noted: in a decent society, opportunities should conform as 
far as possible to personal needs, and such needs may be specialized and 
related to particular talents and capacities … Difficult questions of practice 
are sure to arise in any functioning social group, but I see no problem of 
principle.198 
 
Rights to freedom of movement, for instance, require that people be able to move freely 
from place to place as an aspect of the central human capability of bodily integrity.  Realizing 
such rights for those in a wheelchair, for example, means connecting the rights they have 
with what needs to be done to ensure a genuine opportunity to exercise such rights.199  In 
this light, upholding one’s capability to function equates to upholding one’s right, implying 
the existence of a certain integral and symbiotic relationship.  If the basic duties demanded 
by a capabilities theory of rights better explain our responsibilities to realize rights, this can 
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influence how we assess the institutional structures and arrangements in which we 
participate.200 
 A capabilities theory of rights represents a strong conceptual combination that is 
consistent with a broadly shared and intuitive sense of justice and supplies us with 
philosophical justification and increasingly measurable criteria for its practical achievement.  
Perhaps the most obvious issue yet to be addressed is the question of specification 
concerning what rights, capabilities, and capability-based rights to include, develop, and 
advance.  This demands critical assessment and hard thinking about fundamental human 
rights and the demands of justice in light of the content of Nussbaum’s list.  Sen’s theory of 
rights as goals is concerned with establishing an account of what rights we have by 
considering the consequences of prioritizing and enforcing the wrong rights.  Nussbaum, 
however, has continued to develop a list of central human capabilities that might, for 
instance, be situated alongside existing international human rights.  This approach would 
have strategic value in aiding the international human rights project but does not strictly 
address the issue of which rights a sufficientarian approach to global justice demands.  To 
some extent this is a practical job for policy-makers, but should be explored philosophically.  
Nussbaum’s detailed and evolving list of central human capabilities primarily concerns some 
undetermined but finite set of basic rights.  Although rights can be conceptually understood 
as rights to capability to function, we are in no position to suggest that all the official 
international human rights neatly fit with Nussbaum’s central human capabilities.  Matching 
her list with the rights of the UDHR, for example, is strictly strategic and political.  The 
normative ethical pull of rights should come from the considered and substantive content of 
rights, rather than the authority of any declaration or institution.  
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 A major philosophical question concerns the ‘foundational’ issue of what rights are 
based on.  Sen avoids pursuing at length the question of foundational basis.  Instead, he 
starts by acknowledging that human rights demand a broad international acceptance and play 
a central role in contemporary discourse.  Perhaps it is counterproductive or even insulting 
to insist that reasons for action on human rights should stand or fall on what philosophy 
delivers to us.  I do not dispense with the foundational project or deny the importance of 
thinking hard about the basis of our values, yet agree that a problematic ‘foundational’ 
account can weaken and sour more practical and otherwise agreeable arguments about rights.  
Political philosophy must attend to the issue of what precisely is required of us concerning 
rights.  Sen wants to establish strong moral responsibilities for anyone in a reasonable 
position to help fulfill rights.  
The 2000 UN Human Development Report embodies a number of features of a 
capabilities theory of rights that is worth briefly noting.  In many respects the first chapter of 
the Report reads as a latent version of the theory awaiting scrutiny.  This is not very 
surprising given that the Report acknowledges Sen as having provided the conceptual 
framework and Sen is also its co-author.  The Report notes that capabilities and rights “share 
a common vision and a common purpose – to secure freedom, well-being and dignity of all 
people everywhere.”201  Rights are described as claims to social arrangements that safeguard 
against violence and neglect and secure the freedom for a dignified existence while 
capabilities expand opportunities for choosing valued functionings.  Conceptually, and in 
action, each reinforces the other, signifying a new and innovative approach with growing 
political support.  Specifically, rights add value to human development by highlighting the 
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importance of accountability for their fulfillment, protection, and respect.202  Sen argues that 
each concept complements and enriches the other:  
If human development focuses on the enhancement of the capabilities and 
freedoms that the members of a community enjoy, human rights represent 
the claims that individuals have on the conduct of individual and collective 
agents and on the design of social arrangements to facilitate or secure these 
capabilities and freedoms.203   
 
Capabilities add to rights a more definite language with which to analyze human 
development, policy work, and existing social conditions. 
 A substantive theory of rights must be open to different contextual specifications in 
varying scenarios, but also venture a more specific account of basic goods.  Rights and 
capabilities seem made for each other when combined in the aforementioned ways: “[i]f the 
capability approach can operate with some cross-culturally agreeable central human 
capabilities, it has then a better scope of functioning as a substantive theory of justice.”204  
Unfortunately, the language of ‘capabilities’ has not yet been adopted in contemporary 
popular discourse.  Capabilities are not as familiar as rights and do not enjoy the same pride 
of place in normative theory and political practice.  Sen himself has noted that capability is not 
an especially attractive word or even perhaps the best word to describe a being’s ability to do 
valuable acts or reach valuable states of being.205 
 With capabilities theory already breaking ground in development economics and 
being used to combat the global injustices facing women, there is a need to work out its 
relationship with rights expediently in order to avoid redundancy and political inertia.  Every 
effort should be made to render explicit how each concept synthesizes and diverges to 
counter potential political abuse and neglect, as well as to avoid lost opportunity.  While any 
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innovative theory aimed at improving quality of life is morally welcome, capabilities theory 
risks encountering the same limitations earlier rights-based approaches have faced.  Hilary 
Charlesworth has pointed out that the capabilities approach does not clarify the status of 
groups, enable us to address indigenous peoples’ claims to self-determination, or clarify how 
clashes between different capabilities are to be resolved.206  In a positive light, that 
capabilities can be understood to have counterparts in rights suggests that capabilities theory 
may help extend and develop rights guarantees, adding content and changing the focus from 
legal provision to political action.207  While providing a more concrete basis for evaluating 
quality of life, political progress, and public policy, the capabilities approach, according to 
Michael Freeman, “provides a relatively strong philosophical-anthropological basis for the 
justification of rights.”208  Jan Garrett expresses a similar point this way:  
We can now link the idea of capabilities with the idea of human rights.  The 
idea of human rights may be interpreted as implying the following moral 
principle: the capabilities of human beings should not be permitted to fall 
below a certain floor, so far as nation-states and the international community 
are able to produce the minimum threshold for everyone.209   
 
The capabilities approach helps flesh out the normative content, role, and value of rights, 
which enriches our understanding of rights.  The approach leads us to consider the particular 
capabilities of each individual, requiring earnest respect for difference.  As value-laden claims 
justifiable with reference to capabilities, rights can then help highlight and celebrate, without 
unfairly privileging, the unique abilities of individuals in a pluralistic society.  Combining 
capabilities and rights in this globalizing era is a valuable theoretical and practical move that 
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contributes greater conceptual clarity and understanding to the struggle for rights and global 
justice.  
In recent years Nussbaum, Sen, and other capability theorists have focused on the 
parallels, connections, and possibilities that capabilities have with respect to rights theory and 
a theory of justice.  The most significant methodological difference between Nussbaum and 
Sen’s account is Nussbaum’s specification of a list of central capabilities regarded as universal 
and essential to any life of dignity.  Only with a definite set of capabilities, Nussbaum argues, 
can the approach construct a normative conception of justice with enough critical potential 
to concretely address gender issues, insisting that “[b]efore the approach can offer a valuable 
normative gender perspective, we must make commitments about substance.”210  Without a 
working set of criteria the capabilities approach remains suggestive only in a general sense, 
silent as to the specific levels of health service or educational provision, for example, a just 
society should provide.  As she repeatedly emphasizes, sensitivity to cultural difference has 
been built into the construction of such a list.  First, she ensures the list is open-ended and 
subject to revision.  Second, she purposely specifies the list in a short, abstract, and general 
way so as to leave room for independent cultural and political specification and deliberation.  
Third, she regards her list as a free-standing, partial moral conception to be used for political 
purposes, without divisive metaphysical commitments.  Fourth, it establishes capability not 
functioning as its goal.  Recall that capability is a kind of freedom, what a person is able to 
choose no matter what they actually decide to do.  Being able to play, for example, is an 
important freedom.  Provided workaholics are able to enjoy play, even if they choose not to, 
this goal has been met.  Fifth, it safeguards pluralism by assigning the major liberties of 
freedom of speech, association, and conscience as central features of the list.  Finally, 
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Nussbaum is strongly committed to establishing sound and compelling reasons for justifying 
such a list, rather than coercively imposing and implementing it.211   
Sen thus far refuses to endorse any specific list out of respect for democratic 
deliberation.  Nussbaum counters this by arguing that debate over a set of social entitlements 
is central to rather than inhibiting of democracy.  Starting with a set of capabilities allows for 
cultural specification and political debate around the basic criteria, advancing deliberation 
about a minimal threshold of dignity.  Promoting freedom may not be desirable or coherent 
if that freedom is not specified and debated: 
any political project that is going to promote the equal worth of certain basic 
liberties for the poor, and to improve their living conditions, needs to say 
forthrightly that some freedoms are central for political purposes, and some 
are distinctly not.  Some freedoms involve basic social entitlements, and 
others do not.  Among the ones that do not lie at the core, some are simply 
less important, but others may be positively bad.212 
 
So, for example, the freedom to drive a motorcycle without a helmet is simply less important 
than the freedom to enjoy adequate nutrition.  The freedom to pollute the environment 
without limit may be positively bad.  By arguing that we must make commitments about 
substance Nussbaum highlights the importance of specifying certain freedoms to function 
that are deemed valuable rather than defending freedom as a general, all-purpose good.213  I 
agree that it is important to make commitments about substance.  Nussbaum’s evolving list 
of basic capabilities is a valuable resource and a compelling philosophical achievement.  
However, I think Nussbaum’s challenge to Sen equivocates between the method by which 
agreements on substance are made and the importance of making such commitments.  Both 
agree that some freedoms are more important than others and both value democratic 
deliberation.  The difference between which aspects of the capabilities approach Nussbaum 
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and Sen develop is one of focus and theoretical preference.  Such methodological pluralism 
is an asset, enriching capabilities theory so that it has greater application at different levels of 
debate.  
 Nussbaum shares the view that individuals are the fundamental bearers of rights and 
that a system of basic rights should be regarded as “a total system of liberties and 
opportunities” rather than as “isolated atoms” that “can be given or withheld independently 
of one another.”214  Although this position does not rule out the possibility of collective 
rights including issues of minority rights and self-determination, any notion of institutional 
or group rights is derivative of the rights of individuals.  To realize or fulfill a right 
necessitates due consideration of the capabilities of each individual so that securing a right is 
specified in terms of securing a capability to function.  Capability-based rights are moral 
rights that should be protected by constitutional provisions and incorporated into public 
policy.  While Nussbaum focuses predominantly on the unjust global situation of women 
and on central human capabilities more generally, her approach regards the separateness and 
uniqueness of each individual as a source of value without adopting speciesist assumptions 
that limit moral worth to humans.  This involves asking what each individual should 
minimally have the opportunity to do and be, then regarding these as justified claims and 
entitlements that should be respected and secured.  
 
1.6 Conclusion 
My aim in critically surveying contemporary rights-based approaches has been to gain 
a better understanding of the philosophical terrain and to highlight a rights-based capabilities 
perspective as central to a theory of global justice.  This exercise has the value of putting into 
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clearer focus some of the tensions, battle lines, and new directions in global justice theory.  
While engaging some debates and side-stepping others, I acknowledge and consider, rather 
than resolve, a number of the most pressing philosophical issues.  For instance, two 
conceptual challenges regarding rights-based theories of global justice demand further 
attention.  Namely, the connection between rights-based sufficientarian approaches and 
cosmopolitanism215 and the competing basis of such sufficientarian accounts.216  Another 
important question is to what extent might a rights-based account feature a consequentialist 
theory of right action?  A consequentialist theory of right action judges the goodness of 
actions by the degree to which they secure desirable states of affairs.  Sen argues that there 
are advantages to theorizing rights as fundamental goals.  Respecting capability to function 
might form part of the state of affairs to be brought about by a consequence-sensitive theory 
of right action.  This perspective regards any consequence-independent theory of right action 
as defective or inadequate in some fundamental way.  For this reason Nussbaum defends 
capabilities theory as an outcome-oriented approach.   
A world in which the basic capabilities of individuals are respected and secured is a 
minimally just one.  Justice demands that individuals are entitled to the central goods of 
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44, No. 221, 2005.  Sen defends capabilities/freedoms as the foundational basis of rights and the most relevant 
threshold conditions against utility and interests in his The Idea of Justice, 366-379.  Elsewhere he faults basic 
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Justice, 179 footnote 24.   
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capabilities and thus a goal of any rights-based capabilities perspective on global justice is the 
realization of capabilities as fundamental moral entitlements.  An important line of inquiry 
for future consideration asks to what extent the normative demands of capabilities theory 
result in a hybrid theory or consequentialist theory of right action.  Such a theory might 
include, for example, multiple variables of basal significance along with pluralist proposals 
for their achievement.   
Considerable philosophical debate continues concerning the best way to measure 
justice.  Rawls, Miller, and Pogge, for example, have all opposed the capabilities approach.  
Rawls opposes it because he prefers primary goods as a better measurement.  Miller opposes 
it because he prefers the idea of a basic right over a basic capability as a better standard of 
international decency.  Pogge opposes it because he contends that Rawlsian theoretical 
properties supply better public criteria of justice without the risk of stigmatizing those 
lacking valued capabilities.  I direct readers to Elizabeth Anderson’s recent defence of the 
capabilities approach to justice as a powerful response to such criticisms.217  Nussbaum and 
Sen argue that Rawls’s account of primary goods should be formulated in terms of 
capabilities rather than as a list of things.   
Justice concerns the extent to which individuals are empowered to live dignified lives.  
The primary subject of justice is usually taken to be the institutional arrangements that 
generate the requisite opportunities for individuals to live dignified lives over time.  Justice 
demands that institutional arrangements empower individuals to exercise their fundamental 
capabilities, combat oppression, and foster a community of equals.  Equal respect for 
persons means treating people with dignity and not with condescending pity that addresses 
                                                 
217 See Elizabeth Anderson, “Justifying the capabilities approach to justice,” in Harry Brighouse and Ingrid 
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them as burdensome inferiors.  Most people lack significant power in the sense that they do 
not regularly participate in decisions that affect their lives, perhaps because they are not 
actively engaged in the social life of their communities, have only a marginal influence on 
political affairs and public policy, or do not enjoy workplaces that are organized 
democratically.  I am keenly interested in this relationship between the demands of justice, 
the nature and influence of democracy, and the meaning of empowerment.  The most 
fruitful and exciting work currently addressing this relationship is focused on the capabilities 
approach at the cross-sections of development studies, politics, and philosophy.218 
In the second half of my thesis I explore, in four short philosophical essays, related 
ways that a rights-based capabilities perspective on justice might be further developed.  This 
includes, in Chapter Two, looking at how the value of rights and the value of care might 
integrate as effective conceptual allies in response to powerful feminist criticisms that 
characterize justice and care as oppositional.  In Chapter Three I explore ways in which the 
ethical demands of rights might connect with value theory aimed at developing objective or 
hybrid accounts of well-being for political purposes.  Chapter Four considers Hugo Grotius’s 
ground breaking, rights-based theory of international justice and connects the rich historical 
heritage of the Grotian rights tradition to capabilities theory.  Finally, in Chapter Five I 
consider theory of justice as it relates to the question of nonhuman animal rights, defending 
capabilities as well equipped to broaden theory of justice beyond the limiting social contract 
tradition and the distributive paradigm.   
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A common theme throughout each chapter of my thesis is the opportunity for 
conceptual partnering, integration, and support aimed at strengthening theory of social and 
global justice.  With important qualifications concerning matters of scope, principle, and 
strategy, I pursue avenues for aligning and combining various reasonable alternatives 
because, in short, we should be throwing everything we have got at the challenge of global 
justice.  This involves the difficult task of pursuing theory of justice in a manner that 
constructively builds upon mutually reinforcing perspectives, and not simply characterizing 
the expansive global justice literature as competing, incomplete theories.  We do not just 
want to work away, in isolation or in competition, at political philosophy.  We want our 
political philosophies to work for justice, for understanding it, for pursuing it, and for 
achieving it.  
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Chapter 21 
On the Rescuing of Rights in Feminist Ethics 
“Feminism is a revolutionary program, since it is committed to overthrowing the deepest and most entrenched 
hierarchy of all – the hierarchy of gender.  It does not seek to substitute women for men in the hierarchy of 
domination but to overcome domination itself.  The care that is valued by the ethics of care can – and to be 
justifiable must – include caring for distant others in an interdependent world, and caring that the rights of all 
are respected and their needs met.  It must include caring that the environment in which embodied human 
beings reside is well cared for.  The ethics of care will strive to achieve these transformations in society and the 
world non-violently and democratically but with persistence.”2 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Feminist ethicists have advanced one of the most important and sustained critiques 
of contemporary human rights.  Narrowly defined liberal rights continue to reflect masculine 
interests and reinforce patriarchy, yet the potential of a more substantive moral conception 
and practice of rights that helps transform oppressive attitudes and institutions has inspired 
many feminists to rescue rather than abandon rights.  Virginia Held’s work has focused on 
the relations between justice and care and her contribution to the development of an ethics 
of care signifies one noteworthy strategy of rescuing rights. 
 In the following chapter I focus on Held’s account of human right by specifically 
asking whether she effectively responds to the feminist critique.  Care ethics is a promising 
and powerful corrective to traditional moral theory.  With her work Held seeks to 
accommodate, while critically interrogating, an account of rights meant to fit within a 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Association 
Conference, York University, April 2010.  Thanks to Amanda Porter, Tracy Isaacs, Craig Roxborough, Mark 
Schranz, Jason Breen, Susan Dieleman, and Lorraine Code for their assistance, feedback, questions, and 
comments on earlier versions.  I would also like to thank Jean Mueller and Hichem Naar, Editors of Praxis, and 
the two anonymous referees for their thorough and very valuable comments and suggestions.  A version of this 
chapter was published as “On the Rescuing of Rights in Feminist Ethics: A Critical Assessment of Virginia 
Held’s Transformative Strategy,” Praxis Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 3, No.1, 2011, pp. 66-83.  Special thanks to the 
editors for kindly permitting me to use this article here. 
1 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 66. 
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globalized ethics of care.  Out of sympathy with her transformative strategy I argue that her 
limited characterization of rights weakens the potential role of rights in contributing to her 
transformative vision.  A rescue effort that reclaims rights as far-reaching moral practice 
embodying the values of care and justice, rather than one that limits rights to the procedural 
domain of state law, would better serve Held’s transformative strategy. 
 
2.2 The Feminist Critique of Rights 
 Rights are central to the language and issues of justice though sometimes rights and 
justice are characterized as conflicting ideals.  Rights-based approaches to justice help 
connect our understanding of these concepts by making equality of rights a primary 
requirement of any just order.  How rights are conceived to empower individuals directly 
informs the requirements we place on political institutions to achieve and reflect the 
demands of justice.  Rights can be thought of as protections, entitlements, and/or claims, 
and can be negative or positive, legal or moral.  There is a vast philosophical literature on 
rights that features many different and competing understandings of the concept of rights.3  
While my present aim is critical, briefly stipulating my own understanding of rights will help 
define my terms and demarcate what I take to be a more substantive conception from the 
more narrowly defined liberal rights feminists primarily and rightly criticize. 
                                                 
3 For a very small representative sample see, for example, William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Allan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), Allan Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1982), Jonathan Gorman, Rights and Reason: An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Rights (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), Virginia Held, “Rights” in A Companion to Feminist Philosophy, eds. Alison M. Jaggar and 
Iris M. Young (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), Brian Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context (Peterborough, 
ON: Broadview, 2002), William J. Talbott, Which Rights Should be Universal? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005).   
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 A comprehensive theory of rights focuses on the most important questions 
concerning their application, content, justification, meaning, and relations to other values.4  
As a first approximation, rather than a detailed systematic account, I offer a brief working 
conception of right in terms of what justifies rights, how rights are defined, and how we 
ground the specific content of rights.  Rights are justified by an ethical argument about the 
valued capabilities of individuals and should entail, as well as emphasize, the interdependence 
of civil and political liberties and economic and social rights.5  As an underlying starting 
point, fundamental assumption, or primitive diagnosis of value I claim that since there is an 
inherent value and dignity to life, irrespective of one’s nationality, race, sex, or species 
membership, each individual is fundamentally entitled to the opportunity to live a life worthy 
of that value and dignity.  Having a right means having a fundamental entitlement to a 
certain level of capability to function.  That is, having a right means being entitled to be 
empowered with the genuine opportunity to live a life of dignity by being able to do certain 
things and by being able to be a certain way, above a minimum threshold.  As fundamental 
entitlements rights are prepolitical moral claims, not merely artefacts of laws and institutions.  
The contents of rights are grounded in our reasoned judgment of a species’ moral value 
generally and, more specifically, in our best determination of what basic capabilities must 
feature in an individual life so that we can reasonably say her actual life is sufficiently 
dignified.  In my view, securing a right is an affirmative task, not simply a matter of negative 
liberty where rights are regarded as secured if the state – or anyone in a position to help – 
refrains from interference on the matter.  To properly respect rights is to value the realization 
                                                 
4 Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, ix. 
5 For the capabilities approach upon which my account is based see, for example, Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2006), Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2009). 
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of rights such that the responsibility to defend, secure, or uphold rights falls on whoever is in 
a reasonable position to do so.  This focus on the central moral importance of rights, 
including their immediate practical significance for individuals, their cosmopolitan flavour, 
their explicit connection to responsibility and well-being, and their inclusion of non-human 
animals within the sphere of justice is what makes them a powerful and integral ally to an 
increasingly global ethic of care, not just a limited and subordinate formal resource.  It also 
has the distinct advantage of emphasizing the expression of a plurality of values in the very 
practice of rights. 
 Rights have been highly criticized from many perspectives.  Feminist critiques of 
rights have in particular been some of the most probing and extensive.  There are a wide 
range of feminist criticisms of the meaning, nature, and use of rights, and the following 
section offers a brief summary of the major recurring themes that emerge from these 
otherwise varied and diverse criticisms.  Held characterizes the feminist critique of rights as 
twofold.  The feminist critique of rights emerges from scepticism about traditional rights-
based moral theories and demonstrates the manner in which actual legal systems utilize rights 
to reinforce patriarchy and oppressive power structures.  Mainstream liberal rights have 
come under the heaviest criticism for their emphasis on impartial justice, individual 
autonomy, and the separateness of persons.  The feminist critique of rights regards the 
traditional liberal understanding of rights as overly individualistic, as obfuscating the real 
political issues, and as isolating people from one another.  Fiona Robinson maintains: 
Rights-based ethical theory is based on untenable assumptions about human 
rationality and the universality of human nature; it is an abstract impersonal, 
rule-oriented morality which obfuscates the social and political dimensions of 
global moral problems, and which can tell us remarkably little about who or 
what is responsible for ensuring that the claims of rights-holders are met.6 
                                                 
6 Fiona Robinson, “The Limits of a Rights-Based Approach to International Ethics,” in Tony Evans, ed. Human 
Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 60. 
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Mainstream rights theories, it is argued, remain too general and impractical, restricted to a 
limited range of abstract moral problems, void of contextual details and often restricted to 
negative obligations of non-interference.7  Catherine MacKinnon argues that by encouraging 
a detached, procedural, and legalistic account, dominant rights discourse promotes an 
ideological commitment to the external rules of authority and with it a defence of patriarchy: 
In the liberal state, the rule of law – neutral, abstract, elevated, pervasive – both 
institutionalizes the power of men over women and institutionalizes power in 
its male form … [M]ale forms of power over women are affirmatively 
embodied as individual rights in law … abstract rights authorize the male 
experience of the world.8 
 
Peterson and Parisi argue: “The masculinist state institutionalizes and sustains gender 
hierarchy – which denies women equal ‘human’ rights – both directly and indirectly.”9  By 
equating the practice of rights with obedience to the rule of law we risk authorizing and 
reinforcing conventional morality and the traditional power structure.  By equating moral 
rights with rational calculation, dutiful conformity to principle, and the illusion of 
autonomous moral action free of dependency and power imbalances we also risk adopting a 
self-interested atomistic and adversarial outlook detached from others as related possessors 
of moral value.  In Nel Noddings’s words, if we “come to rely almost completely on external 
rules [we] become detached from the very heart of morality: the sensibility that calls forth 
caring.”10  Feminist critics have argued that thinking in terms of rights reinforces this divisive 
tendency to think of ourselves as separate from and in conflict with others.11  As Carol 
                                                 
7 Samantha Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” Journal of Social 
Philosophy Vol. 30, no. 2 (1999), 262-264. 
8 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 238-248. 
9 V. Spike Peterson and Laura Parisi, “Are Women Human?  It’s Not an Academic Question,” in Tony Evans, 
ed. Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 144. 
10 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), 47. 
11 Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” 267. 
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Gilligan has suggested, “a morality of rights and non-interference may appear frightening to 
women in its potential justification of indifference and unconcern.”12  Coupled with the 
tendency of traditional rights theory to overlook or neglect large domains of women’s 
experience, including mothering and care giving, moral theories of rights may also appear to 
exist to benefit and reflect the interests of men: “Most feminist critiques of human rights 
focus on this androcentrism and argue that, ostensibly, human rights are in actuality men’s 
rights.  As a consequence, exclusions, constraints and abuses more typical of women’s lives 
are neither recognized nor protected by human rights instruments.”13  In this sense human 
rights are argued to express male bias, privileging male power and experience while 
neglecting women’s oppression and downplaying women’s concerns.  This privileging in 
turn reinforces a public/private dichotomy that relegates women’s moral concerns to the 
private realm while valuing what is male as important and public, rendering women’s moral 
concerns separate from and secondary to the broad requirements of justice and public 
morality. 
 
2.3 The Ethics of Care and Human Rights 
 The ethics of care has developed, in part, out of dissatisfaction with traditional moral 
theory and is often juxtaposed with an ethics of justice.  Whereas the justice approach is 
characterized as an impersonal and impartial morality based on abstract universal principles 
such as rights, the care approach acknowledges the existence of relationships of dependency, 
emphasizing the importance of care for helping and expressing concern for others.  As Brian 
Orend notes, “[c]are for others means sympathizing with them and supporting them, helping 
                                                 
12 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Woman’s Development (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 22. 
13 Peterson and Parisi, “Are Women Human?  It’s Not an Academic Question,” 132. 
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them develop their skills, being committed to a personal connection with them based on 
trust and mutual respect, taking on responsibility to do what one can to ensure their well-
being.”14  Since we are not all equal, independent, autonomous, adult, rational agents of 
traditional moral theory, such theory is unhelpful in addressing practical moral issues that 
arise within the context of relationships, especially relationships of dependency involving 
unequal vulnerability.  Traditional moral theory contributes to the view that women are 
morally deficient according to the scale of moral development developed through empirical 
interview-based study by Lawrence Kohlberg.15  On Kohlberg’s scale the indifferent and 
impartial autonomous rational man is placed at the top: “The morality of responsibility 
which women describe stands apart from the morality of rights which underlies Kohlberg’s 
conception of the highest stages of moral judgment.”16  Gilligan famously criticized this 
traditional model for largely disparaging and excluding the concerns and experiences of 
women.  She argued for an alternative model that characterizes women’s conceptions of self 
and morality in a different feminine voice than an ethic of justice modeled on male moral 
judgment: 
The moral imperative that emerges repeatedly in the women’s interviews is an 
injunction to care, a responsibility to discern and alleviate the ‘real and 
recognizable trouble’ of this world.  For the men Kohlberg studied, the moral 
imperative appeared rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others and 
thus to protect from interference the right to life and self-fulfillment.  
Women’s insistence on care is at first self-critical rather than self-protective, 
while men initially conceive obligation to others as negatively in terms of non-
interference.  Development for both sexes would seem to entail an integration 
of rights and responsibilities through the discovery of the complementarity of 
these disparate views.17 
 
                                                 
14 Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context, 173. 
15 See Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development. Vol. 1: The Philosophy of Moral Development (San Francisco: 
Harper & Row, 1981). 
16 Carol Gilligan, “In a Different Voice: Women’s Conception of Self and Morality,” Harvard Educational Review 
Vol. 47, No. 4, 1977, 509. 
17 Ibid, 511. 
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Gilligan’s view has been criticized for suggesting that moral development rests on gender-
specific differences, lending itself to an essentialist view of men and women.  Gertrud 
Nunner-Winkler reinterprets Gilligan’s position as establishing two different types of moral 
duties within one morality, contesting the view that there exists a distinct male and a distinct 
female ethical approach.18  Michele M. Moody-Adams argues that the great strength of 
Gilligan’s work is in its defence of considerations of care as morally important, but questions 
a strictly bimodal approach to moral thinking that frames the justice versus care issue along 
gendered lines.19 
 My own interest is in the development of an integrated moral theory.  In agreement 
with Joan C. Tronto I regard the ethics of care as an important intellectual concern for 
feminists, but feel that “debate around this concern should be centered not in discussion of 
gender difference but in discourse about the ethic’s adequacy as a moral theory.”20  
Specifically, the focus should be on what care ethics contributes to moral theory and practice 
and how it can be further developed, strengthened, and advanced.  The ethics of care should 
be regarded as a vital component of, not simply as a necessary corrective to, moral discourse.  
Otherwise it will be treated as functional to the improvement of a specifically public morality 
and, to the extent that it remains associated with privatized women’s morality, secondary and 
supplemental to impartialist views.21  Instead of siding with an impartialist view of the 
domain of morality that denies the existence of conflict between justice and care, I agree 
with the advocates of care that both rights and responsibilities are central descriptive and 
                                                 
18 See Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, “Two Moralities? A Critical Discussion of an Ethic of Care and Responsibility 
versus an Ethic of Rights and Justice,” in Mary Jeanne Larrabee, ed. An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
19 See Michele M. Moody-Adams, “Gender and the Complexity of Moral Voices,” in Claudia Card, ed. Feminist 
Ethics (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991). 
20 Joan C. Tronto, “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care,” in Mary Jeanne Larrabee, ed. An Ethic of 
Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1993), 241. 
21 Ibid. 247. 
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normative features of moral practice, public or private.  Dominant liberal rights discourse 
prioritizes justice, stemming from what has sometimes been referred to as the stranger 
model of morality.  Care ethicists such as Held regard such moral theories as poor models 
for relations between persons, pointing out the relational care central to our interdependent 
society is absent from such models and that they are demeaning when applied to domains of 
experience in which care is the primary value.22  Annette Baier has argued: “Liberal morality, 
if unsupplemented, may unfit people to be anything other than what its justifying theories 
suppose them to be, ones who have no interest in each others’ interests.”23  Absent a sense 
and recognition of care, rights-based liberal morality appears to lend itself to a cold unfeeling 
vision of moral judgement and behaviour.  The question for care ethicists, given their 
compelling insistence that care is as important for morality as justice, is how best to 
conceptualize this integrated view by looking critically at the promises and problems it 
presents. 
 Held maintains that most feminists recognize the important role rights continue to 
play in achieving feminist aims, from substantive equality rights for child care and maternity 
leave to the use of rights in combating racism and violence against women.  Feminists have 
also emphasized the centrality of rights arguments in movements for social change, including 
the struggle for global justice.  Rights may be unsuitable for dealing with particular moral 
issues arising in relationship contexts, where an ethic of care may be more appropriate.  In 
other instances, however, a discourse of care separated from an emphasis on rights has been 
used to justify colonial domination.  Uma Narayan has powerfully advanced this point, 
recalling “the colonialist project of denying rights to the colonized in the name of 
                                                 
22 Virginia Held, “Liberalism and the Ethics of Care,” in Claudia Card, ed. On Feminist Ethics and Politics 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 294. 
23 Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994), 29. 
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paternalistic concern for their welfare.”24  Feminist reconstructions of rights see 
opportunities for reformulating existing schemes, reworking the concept of right, or limiting 
the reach of legal rights.  Importantly, Held notes that, 
Rights are not fixed but are contested, and political struggles are effectively 
organized around the indignation widely felt over clear denials of rights and 
persuasive reasons to recognize new rights.  Among the strongest arguments 
women and minorities and colonized peoples have made are that they have not 
been accorded even the minimums of equal respect supposedly guaranteed by 
law.  The basis for many of the most substantial advances made by 
disadvantaged groups has been composed of justice, equality, and rights; of 
course this discourse should not be abandoned.25 
 
For these reasons both care and justice must be regarded as essential to a substantive moral 
theory. 
 
2.4 Held’s Account: A Critical Assessment 
 In their otherwise well-aimed criticisms, care ethicists sometimes equivocate between 
the dominant discourse and practice of rights and the philosophy of rights.  Put another way, 
they sometimes equivocate between the concept of rights as defended in traditional liberal 
theories and rights per se.  By granting their critical interpretations of either the dominant 
discourse or the mainstream liberal theories as the correct view of what rights are, the 
otherwise contested concept goes undisputed and is then dismissed prematurely or shown to 
be limited and in need of supplementation.  However, we should be cautious about 
restricting or dismissing the concept of rights based on the way mainstream liberal theorists 
and states conceive and utilize rights.  My own worry is that human rights scholarship has 
undergone an ideological perversion wherein the rights once employed to positively 
transform the social and political landscape are now used to insulate dominant institutions 
                                                 
24 Held, “Rights,” 506.  See Uma Narayan, “Colonialism and Its Others: Considerations on Rights and Care 
Discourses,” Hypatia Vol. 10, No. 2, 1995. 
25 Held, “Rights,” 507. 
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from criticism.  Held’s account strangely reinforces this worry, though she might object by 
insisting her very point is to develop an ethic of care, not rights, to facilitate her 
transformative strategy.  By tending to focus on the insulating role rights can play, the 
feminist critique sometimes neglects the transformative potential a more substantive 
integrated moral theory might have.  While rights can be and are used as weapon-like 
instruments to insulate existing systems of power, historically rights have not been the 
predictable and logical products of states.  Rather, they have been bitterly fought for and 
hard-won in an on-going struggle to pry open and make more accountable, democratic, and 
humane dominant institutions like the global market and the global system of states.26  It 
remains an open question whether anything resembling the current global market and global 
system of states is ultimately compatible with a sufficiently rights-respecting world.  Care 
ethics, in my view, presents as strong a case for reclaiming the concept in this manner as it 
does for seeking to transform the moral and political landscape with the cultivation of care.  
I argue, however, that Held’s own approach of rescuing rights is misguided, aimed at 
reconciling rights with care by demarcating limits on the role rights can play in moral 
practice.  Despite stressing the contested nature of rights, Held’s account is limited by her 
own reluctance to strive for a more inclusive rights theory embodying care.  In this sense 
Held’s account is not an effective response to the feminist critique of rights, nor is it 
postured as one, which, as I argue, is its biggest weakness.  The feminist critique of rights 
powerfully exposes the unsavoury flaws of traditional theories and dominant discourses and 
practice.  The motivation behind my own critical assessment of Held’s account of rights 
                                                 
26 See Noam Chomsky, “The United States and the Challenge of Relativity,” in Tony Evans, ed. Human Rights 
Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).  Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human 
Rights: A History (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007).  Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights from Ancient 
Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004).  
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stems from my view that a burgeoning theory of care is well situated to respond to, not 
simply advance, that critique by reclaiming a conception of rights. 
 Held’s transformative strategy involves developing a feminist morality that cultivates 
what might be called the art of moral practice.  She seeks to provide guidance in resolving 
actual moral problems and considers the implications care has for restructuring cultural 
practices and social and political institutions.  She envisions a more caring society as 
providing more accountable and democratically run services, decreased expenditures on legal 
remedies for illegal actions, reduced influence of the realm of law, increased participation in 
and creation of culture, and increased global concern and awareness.27  She has clearly and 
consistently rejected a view that would regard the value of justice as most appropriate to the 
public sphere and the value of care as most appropriate to the private one.28  Importantly, 
she has always maintained an integrative, albeit limited, approach aimed at rescuing rather 
than dismissing rights: 
The criticism of rights from the perspective of care may perhaps best be seen 
as a criticism of the conceptually imperialistic role that law has played in moral 
thinking.  It is not directed at overthrowing rights in the domain of law, but at 
limiting legal interpretations to the domain of law rather than supposing them 
to be suitable for all other moral problems as well.  Once the framework of 
justice and rights is understood as a limited one rather than as the appropriate 
way to interpret all moral problems, other moral arguments can become salient 
and social and political organization can develop around other aims than those 
of justice, law, and rights.29 
 
The problem with Held’s account here, however, is that she allows her criticism of the 
legalistic use of rights by states to inform her restriction and discouragement of a more 
substantive conception of rights.  While acknowledging the problematic way rights can be 
                                                 
27 Virginia Held ed., Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 153-154, 
165.  Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 75, 130. 
28 Virginia Held, “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 50, 
1990, 334-337.  Held, “Rights,” 509.  Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 68-69. 
29 Held, “Rights,” 509. 
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used by states she is too willing to concede the moral territory of rights to the domain of law.  
Inadequate, abusive, or imperialistic state practice should compel us to employ our entire 
arsenal of intellectual self-defence, including rights advocacy, to combat such moral failings. 
 Held’s most recent and detailed account of the ethics of care also features this 
underestimation of the progressive moral power of rights, focused as it is on discerning the 
value of care in apparent response to Tronto’s advice that, “[o]nly when care is assessed in 
its relative importance to other values can it begin to serve as a critical standpoint from 
which to evaluate public life.  Such an assessment will require a full-fledged moral and 
political theory of care.”30  We see Held working out the relative importance of other values 
when she states: “I am coming to the view that care and its related considerations are the 
wider framework – or network – within which room should be made for justice, utility, and 
the virtues.  This perspective does not mean that all other values, points of view, or the 
institutions or practices they recommend can be reduced to aspects of care.  Reduction does 
not seem like the right approach.”31  Held insists that care is both a practice and a normative 
moral value.  While her account lends itself to the development of a more integrative 
approach, her focus on the value of care too often characterizes the motive of care as 
dichotomous with and having normative priority over the motive of justice and this inhibits 
the role rights can play.  Instead of developing an approach that integrates rights and care, 
rights are juxtaposed with a commitment to care and argued to entail different 
considerations.  Rules, laws, and fairness underlie rights commitments while meeting needs, 
concern with well-being, or even the development of civil society is grounded on care.32  By 
equating rights with justice and juxtaposing the value of justice with the wider moral 
                                                 
30 Tronto, “Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care,” 248. 
31 Held, “Liberalism and the Ethics of Care,” 302. 
32 Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 40-41. 
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framework of care into which justice should be fitted, Held appears to adopt the very notion 
of rights feminists primarily criticize, perhaps explaining her limited effort at rescuing them. 
 In her defence, Held sometimes moves beyond the either/or approach by repeatedly 
emphasizing the importance of both the values of care and justice.  She is also explicit in 
reminding readers that her critique of rights concerns the mainstream liberal approach, at 
least leaving the door open for a more substantive conception of rights.  She objects to the 
view that care should completely replace justice as the central concept of morality, insisting 
that rights, when viewed in the context of social practices, have a role to play in addressing 
discrimination and inequalities along with empowering women.33   
 As a distinctively moral notion, human rights have obtained global status in at least 
the rhetoric of world affairs.  The public discourse of rights serves as a reminder that people 
have justified and urgent claims to be treated in a dignified way irrespective of what society 
and the world have actually done about it.  It highlights the great importance and role of the 
things rights represent, as commonly expressed in lists, laws, charters, and declarations.  
Rights language also emphasizes the importance of choice and the requisite preconditions 
that must exist to make such choices meaningful.  Finally, the language of rights establishes a 
minimum threshold of basic entitlements and a sense of the terrain of agreement about that 
minimum.  Certainly rights continue to be debated and are subject to abuse, but the language 
and concept of rights demands a broad consensus concerning the core idea that individuals 
have rights that demand our protection.  While the language of rights plays a powerful moral 
role in contemporary political discourse, human rights remain conceptually ambiguous and 
continuing theoretical confusion and disagreement serves as a barrier to what might be called 
the human rights project.  Held’s rescuing of rights involves embracing the powerful role the 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 62-63, 67. 
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language of rights has.  In seeking to limit the dominance of that morality she nonetheless 
concedes the conceptual terrain to traditional mainstream liberal theory and practice.  
Pragmatically, she appears convinced by the power of rights rhetoric but fails to assertively 
reclaim rights as a powerful moral practice that transcends legalistic power politics. 
 In her attempt to mesh care and justice, Held considers assigning moral minimums 
and constraints to rights, “a floor of moral requirements beneath which we should not sink 
as we avoid the injustices of assault and disrespect.  In contrast, care deals with what is 
above and beyond the floor of duty,” informing our vision of the good life.34  Held thinks 
this solution, however, is unclear, noting that there also exist necessary minimums of care 
such as responding to the basic needs of children, which arguably set constraints on justice.  
For this reason she answers the question of how justice and care and their related concerns 
fit together by arguing that “caring relations should inform the wider moral framework into 
which justice should be fitted.  Care seems the most basic moral value.  As a practice, we 
know that without care we cannot have anything else, since life requires it.”35 
 Surprisingly absent from Held’s account is any explicit acknowledgment or 
exploration of a conception of rights that expresses both values simultaneously.  As Brennan 
insightfully argues, “[s]ometimes what it is to care for a person is to take on concern for their 
rights.  Concern for the rights of a loved one does not mean that one cares only for an 
abstract moral concept.  One can be concerned about rights because of a direct love for the 
other person.”36  A commitment to rights sometimes just is an expression of care.  Rights-
based practices often provide practical avenues to effectively channel our care for others.  
Although Held’s account hints at this, her ordering and division of justice and care as 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 71. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” 271. 
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concerning related but different considerations obscures this perspective and the 
concomitant conceptual and practical opportunities it entails.  Consider the way Brian 
Orend’s view mirrors Held’s suggestion: “the ethics of rights is designed to secure the floor 
and foundations, whereas the ethics of care is better thought of as constructing the ceiling, 
for the structures of our shared social life.”37  In Held’s haste to emphasize the limitations of 
a rights-based morality she adopts, like Orend, the assumption that rights embody one value, 
justice, distinct and separate from, and morally unequal to, care.  Contra Orend, she simply 
reorders the values such that care underlies a rights-based approach rather than rights 
establishing the minimum upon which the aspirations of care are built.  Instead of working 
within the realm of rights to articulate an alternative account of the content, practice, and 
motivation of rights, Held limits the role and meaning, not just the scope, of rights, leaving 
the development of rights in the hands of mainstream moral theory and practice.38  Held’s 
strategy resembles what Joy Kroeger-Mappes has called the necessary-base thesis in which 
care is the necessary base for an ethic of rights.39  This strategy rests on the view that, when 
taken alone, rights represent an extremely inadequate moral guide for human behaviour.  
This leads Held to focus on the limitations, and thus duly limit, a narrowly defined 
conception of rights.  Held often highlights the view that, “although there can be life 
without justice, there cannot be life without the care that has value,” repeating that, 
“[w]ithout care, however, there would be no persons to respect and no families to improve.  
Without care, there would be no public system of right – even if it could be just.”40  She 
argues that rights entail a presumption of care but that such care has normative priority over 
                                                 
37 Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context, 175. 
38 Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” 272. 
39 See Joy Kroeger-Mappes, “The Ethic of Care vis-à-vis the Ethic of Rights: A Problem for Contemporary 
Moral Theory,” Hypatia Vol. 9, No. 3, 1994. 
40 Held, “Liberalism and the Ethics of Care,” 302.  Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 72. 
118 
 
rights.  The evident tension, or inconsistency, that follows from her account is that a 
functioning conception of rights is necessarily care-laden, yet the notion of rights she 
employs to construct her ethics of care is limited to the legal realm of procedural justice 
because it is void of such value.  Rights both do and do not embody the value of care. 
 Focus on the fundamental importance of care need not force care ethicists to 
prioritize care over rights by limiting the meaning and moral practice of rights.  Care and 
justice are too important as allies in the struggle for a better world to allow the conceptual 
tensions and competing values they can occasion to unduly restrict our efforts.  As Hilary 
Putnam says, “the function of ethics is not, in the first instance, to arrive at ‘universal 
principles.’  The primary aim of the ethicist … should not be to produce a ‘system,’ but to 
contribute to the solution of practical problems.”41  Held aims to make such a contribution 
and the practical import of care ethics is part of what makes it so attractive, highlighting the 
importance of allying rights with care in a manner that builds upon Held’s increasingly global 
account.  The constructive approach I recommend avoids the false dilemma between care 
and rights not by denying existing tensions or by assigning normative priority to one or the 
other, but by insisting on the potential of a more integrated approach.  This requires further 
elaboration.  Just as knowledge and enactment of rights, however defective or incomplete, 
emerges cross-culturally through the apparently universal idea of social protection against 
standard threats, so too a working knowledge of care, neglect, and abuse appears to exist in 
all cultures.  Indeed, practices of direct personal care and support may be necessary 
conditions for cultural survival.42  While the expressions and requirements of care can be 
exemplified differently within and between cultures, “when it comes to identifying the most 
                                                 
41 Hilary Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2004), 4. 
42 Jay Drydyk, “Globalization and Human Rights,” in Christine M. Koggel, ed. Moral Issues in Global Perspective, 
2nd ed. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2006), 73, 79, 84. 
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important types of protection, and probably even to ranking the worst cases of neglect and 
abuse, there is remarkable convergence.  As a resource for moral understanding, this 
convergence is bedrock.”43  A double convergence, in which care and rights converge within 
cultures to establish social protections and these social protections converge cross-culturally 
to inform an increasingly global perspective on what constitutes a caring rights-respecting 
order, would appear to underlie what Jay Drydyk calls a global public sphere of moral 
deliberation.44  To the extent that this begins to accurately describe the dynamic relationship 
between care and rights globally, the moral practice of rights appears less adversarial and 
more integrated with care than Held suggests. 
 Just as rights without care are inadequate in the extreme, so too is care without 
rights.  Admittedly, Held frequently stresses this and nowhere denies it and I am hard 
pressed to actually disagree with Held’s account.  However, by too often associating rights 
with the value of justice, she maintains that without care there will be no human beings in a 
way that this is not true of a world absent rights.45  This strikes me as a conceptually 
confused position, separating the practice of caring from an implicit respect for the right to 
life, concerned and committed to securing a life entitled to a dignified level of well-being.  
The problem is that the world is sorely lacking in respect for and realization of rights, yet I 
can scarcely imagine, nor do I care to, a world without rights.  I am thus inclined to find fault 
with her account not for what it does wrong but for its focus, excluding from consideration 
the development of a richer conception of rights informed by care.  Offered as constructive 
criticism, what is missing is an in-depth historical understanding and nuanced account of 
rights that recognizes the role rights play as an expression of care, along with their potential 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 79-80. 
44 Ibid. 78. 
45 Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 125, 132-134. 
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for realizing Held’s transformative vision by helping reshape a cold, uncaring world.  A 
relational account of rights, coupled with a focus on moral character, represents one such 
approach, noted but unexplored by Held.46  Held might fairly object to this criticism by 
claiming that she has left the development of a relational account of rights, which she 
continues to support, up to others.  Such a relational account rejects the traditional 
dichotomy between care and justice and a view of rights as merely individualistic and 
abstract principles, noting that moral rights are at play in our personal as well as impersonal 
relationships.  Accounts of nonabsolute rights can directly attend to moral context.47  
Nedelsky insists that, “what rights in fact do and have always done is construct relationships 
– of power, of responsibility, of trust, of obligation.”48  Such accounts also emphasize the 
importance of care about self and others by caring about, recognizing, and respecting your 
own rights and the rights of others, be they close relations or distant strangers.  Brennan 
argues that, 
As feminists we will want to reject theories of rights that have built-in 
assumptions of complete independence and separation, but it is open to us to 
develop accounts of rights based upon a relational account of the self.  
Obviously further work is required in this area, developing such a relational 
account, but there is no good reason to throw out rights along with 
‘autonomous man.’49 
 
It is one thing to criticize Held for characterizing the role rights can play in too limited and 
unimaginative a light.  It is quite another thing to begin to supply the more substantive 
account I demand of care ethics.  How might a burgeoning theory of care respond to the 
feminist critique by rescuing rights?  A relational account that acknowledges and builds upon 
our interconnectedness, our vulnerability, and the plethora of existing power imbalances and 
                                                 
46 See, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship,” in Christine M. Koggel, ed. Moral 
Issues in Global Perspective, 2nd ed. (Peterborough, ON: Broadview, 2006).  Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics 
and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights.” 
47 Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” 262-264, 271. 
48 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship,” 100. 
49 Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” 266. 
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inequalities that exist in our increasingly global world rejects the central problematic 
assumptions of traditional rights theory.  We probably should not, and for the most part do 
not, restrict our concern for the rights of others to hyper-rationalistic calculations about our 
own autonomy and individual advantage.  Indeed, a relational, pluralistic, care oriented, 
capability-based conception of rights like the one I have very briefly sketched offers, among 
many other advantages, the prospect of more accurately reflecting what is decent about our 
everyday moral practices.  It also highlights the transformative potential rights have to foster 
the kind of caring social relationships we correctly fault traditional rights theory for ignoring 
or discouraging: 
[O]nce rights are conceptualized in terms of the relationships they structure, 
the problem of individualism is at least radically transformed.  There will 
almost certainly still be people who want the kind of relationships of power 
and limited responsibility that the individualistic liberal rights tradition 
promotes and justifies.  But at least the debate will take place in terms of why 
we think some patterns of human relationships are better than others and what 
sort of “rights” will foster them.50 
 
We need an account of rights that further cultivates the art of moral practice, that embodies 
the value of care without limiting or subordinating the potential role of rights, and that 
advances a practical integrative approach in line with Held’s transformative vision, if not her 
strategy.  Instead of pursuing this project Held largely relegates rights to the domain of law, 
collapsing a morality of rights into the descriptive practice of statehood, seeking to limit the 
conceptually imperialistic role that law has played in moral thinking.  Held rescues rights by 
seeking to contain and reform them rather than reclaim them with a richer and more 
relational account.51  Held’s particular vision is limited by her own reluctance to reclaim 
rights from their ‘autonomous man’ heritage.  As noted earlier, sometimes the fault is not 
with the concept of rights but with the dominant discourse and practice.  Held’s account of 
                                                 
50 Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship,” 101. 
51 Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, 145. 
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rights concedes authority to this dominant discourse and practice and I remain at pains to 
see why we should grant this. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 An advantage of adopting the kind of evaluative approach that capability theorists 
recommend is that it situates rights within a broader concern for human development and 
well-being, thereby challenging a limited view of rights as belonging solely to the domain of 
law and solely concerning the value of justice.  Indeed, a capability-based conception of 
rights in which rights are fundamental entitlements to capability to function appears to be a 
promising theoretical approach that captures the central role and value of care that care 
ethicists like Held see as lacking from traditional rights theories while offering a substantive 
alternative to dominant liberal conceptions of rights feminists rightly criticize as too narrow.  
Held’s account focuses too much on the differences between care and rights, stemming as it 
does from the feminist critique of rights, to effectively respond to that critique with the 
provision of a more substantive account of rights focused on the positive integration of the 
values of justice and care.  Certainly rights can be used by the powerful to entrench and 
reinforce their dominance, but such abuse highlights the importance of pressing for and 
defending rights rather than limiting consideration of rights to an emphasis on their practical 
faults or failings.  Rights should be fought for and a conception of rights reclaimed and 
shaped by a shared commitment to care and justice.  Held’s account concedes too much to 
authority and involves too little focus on the gulf that still exists between a substantive 
theory of rights and the existing political order.  Held’s ethics of care includes in its aim the 
cultivation of care for one’s own and others’ rights and I share her view that a rights-based 
morality includes a presumption of care.  A rescue effort that reclaims rights as moral 
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practice embodying the values of care and justice would better serve Held’s transformative 
strategy. 
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Chapter 31 
Rights and Well-Being in Amartya Sen’s Value Theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Surprisingly little has been written on the apparent connection between rights and 
well-being.  While philosophers such as Amartya Sen, James Griffin, and L. W. Sumner have 
written extensively on rights and on well-being, the nature of the relationship between rights 
and well-being remains largely implicit in their works.  We will consider the connection by 
exploring how rights connect to well-being in Sen’s value theory.  Looking at well-being 
through the lens of rights can help us address specifically moral and political concerns 
fundamental to the nature of well-being.  Sen’s capability approach helps us focus not just on 
what individuals have, including the proximate resources over which they may or may not 
have command, but on what they are free to do to successfully realize a life they have reason 
to value.  Capabilities provide us with an appropriate measurement for saying that a practice, 
policy, or society is just to the extent that the rights and well-being of individuals leave them 
empowered to enjoy a life of dignity that has at least a minimum set of opportunities in it. 
 
3.2 Capability and Well-Being 
 An advantage of the capabilities approach with respect to development issues and 
matters of global justice is that it allows us to develop what Hilary Putnam calls the 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the “How to Live a Good Life” conference hosted by the 
Center on Values and Ethics at Carleton University in Ottawa, March 2010.  I would like to thank Amanda 
Porter, Samantha Brennan, Gordon Davis, Jay Drydyk, two anonymous referees and Thomas Magnell, Editor-
in-Chief of the Journal of Value Inquiry for their thorough and extremely valuable discussions, questions, 
comments, and suggestions.  A version of this chapter was published as “Rights and Well-Being in Amartya 
Sen’s Value Theory,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2011, pp. 13-26.  Special thanks to the editors 
for kindly permitting me to use this article here. 
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entanglement of fact and value.  This serves as a corrective to a major shortcoming in 
modern economics, the ideological separation of economics from ethics.  This shortcoming 
is exhibited, for example, by the view of economics since Adam Smith in which human 
beings are thought of as motivated purely or solely by self-interest.2  The purpose of 
economic development and policy is to maximize, reflect, and reinforce this self-interest.  
Where the view of human nature as self-interested is identified with rational behaviour and 
rationality identified with the maximization of self-interest, questions of ethics have been 
viewed as non-rational and removed from the scientific analysis and application of economic 
theory.  According to Lionel Robbins: “It does not seem logically possible to associate the 
two studies [ethics and economics] in any form but mere juxtaposition.  Economics deals 
with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuation and obligations.”3  According to Milton 
Friedman, disagreements about economic policy can be eliminated by further economics, but 
when it comes to disagreements about value, “men can ultimately only fight.”4   
 Sen pioneered the capabilities approach in development economics and continues to 
elaborate it, sometimes in collaboration with Martha Nussbaum, who, since the 1980s has 
also significantly developed and expanded it.  The capabilities approach helps to encourage 
economists to recognize that well-being is not value free but a moral and political conception 
with important implications and consequences.  Capabilities theorists employ this perspective 
to measure well-being in terms of a person’s ability to perform certain acts or reach certain 
states deemed valuable: “The corresponding approach to social advantage – for aggregative 
                                                 
2 To be clear, my point here is that since Smith there has been a decisive tendency in economics to characterize 
human motivation as purely self-interested.  However, this would be an inaccurate characterization of Smith’s 
own view.  Indeed, economic and political thinkers like Amartya Sen and Noam Chomsky have written about 
the inaccurate selective interpretation of and ideological perversion of Smith’s work.  Thanks to Charles Jones 
for insisting on clarification of this point. 
3 Quoted in Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), 54. 
4 Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in his Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1953), 5. 
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appraisal as well as for the choice of institutions and policy – takes the set of individual 
capabilities as constituting an indispensable and central part of the relevant informational 
base of such evaluation.”5  Capabilities theorists use the language of people’s capabilities to 
refer to their freedom to function in certain ways and their ability and opportunity to be 
certain things that are deemed valuable.  A person’s capability concerns ways of functioning 
that someone can choose and achieve, while the ways of functioning concern the actual 
choosing and doing of the valued things. 
 The reason for focusing on capability rather than on functioning is to respect the 
choices of people in determining their meaningful lives, highlighting the value of individual 
agency.  The idea is that there are certain functions people should be empowered to achieve 
which, where a life developed and shaped by such opportunities constitutes a dignified life.  
It is not the case that a life lacks value per se if it does not feature one or other stipulated set 
of basic capabilities.  Instead, aiming to empower a life by ensuring that it meets or exceeds 
some capability threshold is how we respect the dignity of life.  What matters is having the 
capability to do a variety of things and then choosing for ourselves whether to exercise our 
capability to function.  Fasting when we have access to plenty of food, for example, 
highlights the importance of focusing on capability rather than functioning as the political 
goal.  Sen has focused on defending capabilities as the appropriate ethical space and the most 
fruitful approach for assessing and measuring quality of life globally, insisting that the set or 
list of capabilities we use depends on the type of social analysis, while Nussbaum has focused 
on fleshing out their substance by developing a list of central capabilities: “There is no escape 
from the problem of evaluation in selecting a class of functionings in the description and 
appraisal of capabilities.  The focus has to be related to the underlying concerns and values, 
                                                 
5 Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” in Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds. The Quality of Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30. 
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in terms of which some definable functionings may be important and others quite trivial and 
negligible.  The need for selection and discrimination is neither an embarrassment, nor a 
unique difficulty, for the conceptualization of functioning and capability.”6  Sen stresses that 
we should be able to adequately assess extreme poverty with a relatively short list which 
might include the ability to be well nourished and well sheltered and the capability of 
escaping avoidable morbidity and premature mortality, whereas more general problems of 
economic development may demand a longer more diverse list.  Importantly, Sen rejects the 
claim that freedom must be valued independently of the values and preferences of the 
person whose freedom is being assessed.  Otherwise freedom could be evaluated 
independently of evaluating the choices between which the freedom is exercised, when, 
instead, the well-being and freedom of a person have to be assessed simultaneously in an 
integrated way, since well-being is not merely a matter of what the person achieves but also 
of what options the person has the opportunity to choose from.  Judgment of a range of 
choice cannot be separated from evaluation of the elements of that range.  It would be odd 
to conclude that two people have an equal amount of freedom when the three options open 
to one of them are gruesome, while the options of the other are superb.7 
 Sen distinguishes promotion of the well-being of persons from the pursuit of their 
overall agency goals, which might include goals other than advancement of their own well-
being.  He draws a distinction between the notions of achievement and the freedom to 
achieve, both of which apply to the perspective of well-being and agency.  Taken together 
the two distinctions yield four different concepts of individual advantage: well-being 
achievement, agency achievement, well-being freedom, and agency freedom.  Depending on 
the context, the well-being of a person may be seen as more relevant than the agency success 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 32. 
7 Ibid. 34-35. 
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of the person.  We may then, for instance, have better grounds for offering support to a 
person for overcoming hunger or illness than for helping the person build a monument to 
her hero, even if she attaches more importance to building a monument.  Additionally, the 
well-being freedom of adult citizens may be more relevant than their well-being achievement, 
providing society with reason to secure opportunities for combating hunger without 
forcefully requiring citizens to act on such opportunities:  
The well-being achievement of a person can be seen as an evaluation of the 
‘wellness’ of the person’s state of being (rather than, say, the goodness of her 
contribution to the country, or her success in achieving her overall goals).  
The exercise then is that of assessing the constituent elements of the person’s 
well-being seen from the perspective of her own personal welfare.  The 
different functionings of the person will make up these constituent elements.8   
 
Ways of functioning are central to the nature of well-being, though the sources of well-being 
could be external to the valued capability to function of a person.  Seeing the well-being of 
another person enhanced, for example, may be a source of our own well-being. 
 Evaluating the well-being of persons may include assessing their well-being 
achievement and their well-being freedom, which concerns their actual freedom to live well 
and be well; their freedom to enjoy various possible states of well-being associated with 
different ways of functioning.  An integrated view that entails ways of functioning and the 
primary informational base of capabilities, which are defined derivatively as the space of ways 
of functioning, is required.  Capability to function highlights the value and relevance of 
choice behind actual functioning, which then helps us assess ways of functioning in a refined 
way.  Focusing on a person’s opportunity to do and be certain things deemed valuable rather 
than simply on what people do, independent of their reasons and options, allows us to 
distinguish between something like fasting and starving.  We may want to eliminate 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 36. 
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involuntary hunger but not wish to forbid fasting, even where the same means for 
achievement exist. 
 
3.3 Rights and Value in Sen’s Capabilities Approach 
 Sen argues that capability to function is highly relevant to well-being because it 
enables us to assess a person’s actual freedom to live and be well.  Being able to freely 
choose is, for Sen, directly conducive to well-being.  Rights are primarily ethical demands 
that generate reasons to promote or safeguard opportunities for meaningful free choice.9  
The process aspect of freedom concerns the exercise of such freedom by freely choosing it.  
Inasmuch as simply doing something or functioning is different from choosing to do 
something and doing it by acting on our capability to function, well-being achievement need 
not be independent of capability to choose to do a particular function.  In one 
straightforward sense, rights to a worked out set of capabilities can be thought of as rights to 
well-being where our well-being achievement involves successfully exercising such rights.  
Sen hints at this view noting: “The importance of rights and freedom can, of course, be 
combined with incorporating the significance of utility or well-being in ethical reasoning, but 
if such a ‘combined’ system is to be pursued, some consistency problems will have to be 
faced in devising a coherent and integrated social choice procedure.”10  Although Sen is 
optimistic concerning the viability of such a combined system, he does not explicitly work 
out the manner and the value of the connection between rights and well-being. 
 Sen states that a “moral theory would have to begin with some primitive diagnosis of 
value … I accept fully that one has to dig for foundations, but there is a substantial issue 
                                                 
9 Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 32, No. 4, 2004, 319. 
10 Ibid. 325 note 17. 
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involved in deciding where to stop digging.”11  Capabilities are defended as a space for 
evaluating quality of life and there is a deliberate incompleteness to the approach.  On Sen’s 
view, we are not required to take one specific route or adopt one particular list, and he holds 
that any view of human nature could be dangerously over-specified.  In apparent defence of 
the increased moral complexity involved, for example, in working out the connections 
between rights and well-being, he notes:  
It is also possible for an ethical theory to include more than one type of 
variables in the category of basal significance.  We may be concerned with 
both liberties and with levels of well-being.  We may attach intrinsic 
importance both to well-being and to agency.  We may value freedom as well 
as achievement.  Indeed, pluralist proposals make up much of practical ethics, 
even though descriptive homogeneity evidently appeals to many moral 
philosophers (utilitarians among them).12   
 
In discussing rights, Sen takes for granted a direct connection between rights and capabilities, 
regarding human rights as fundamental entitlements to a capability to function.  Sen’s 
elements of a theory of rights and his conception of rights as goals do not offer us any 
specified or systematic account of the connection.  People should be free to choose to act 
upon their capabilities and thus have a moral claim for such opportunities.  For this reason 
Sen also regards rights as political goals to be secured for each individual. 
 An acceptable quality of life measured in capability to function involves creating the 
requisite environment in which rights to capability to function are realized.  Thus, Sen asks 
whether the “realization of rights can itself be a fundamental goal, perhaps even the only 
fundamental goal?”13  He advances a system of rights as goals where realization of the 
specific content of rights is a major goal of moral philosophy.  Although he does not say so, 
                                                 
11 Quoted in David A. Crocker, “Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen’s and Nussbaum’s 
Development Ethic, Part 1,” Political Theory Vol. 20, No. 4, 1992, 589. 
12 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 132. 
13 Amartya Sen, “Rights as Goals,” in Stephan Guest and Alan Milne, eds. Equality and Discrimination: Essays in 
Freedom and Justice (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985), 11. 
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the content can include ethical attention to well-being by ensuring that a theory of rights 
helps us secure a person’s ability to perform certain acts or reach certain states of being 
deemed valuable.  Here the advantage of adopting a capabilities perspective is that it helps us 
further understand the potential of rights to protect and enhance well-being.14  In this 
context, goals entail states of affairs we have a reason to bring about.15  To understand rights 
as goals involves challenging any sharp theoretical distinction between respecting rights on 
the one hand and fulfilling them on the other.  To respect rights is to value the realization of 
rights, where some rights can be instrumental in achieving goals such as a right to food-
rationing credits while the intrinsic value of other rights, such as the right to not involuntarily 
starve, means desiring their fulfillment for their own sake.16 
 This focus on the central moral importance of rights, especially their connection to 
well-being, also has the distinct advantage of emphasizing the expression of a plurality of 
values in the very practice of rights.  Care ethicists have tended to juxtapose rights with the 
value of care and fault rights for their limited connection to well-being.  Rules, laws, and 
fairness are said to underlie rights commitments while meeting needs, concerns with well-
being, or even the development of civil society is grounded on care.17  By limiting the 
concept of rights to instruments for maintaining existing legal procedure and juxtaposing the 
value of such formal justice with the wider moral framework of care, care ethicists risk 
adopting the very notion of rights that feminists criticize.  Adopting such a limited 
conception of rights also risks limiting the role rights have in protecting and enhancing well-
being.  As Samantha Brennan argues: “Sometimes what it is to care for a person is to take on 
                                                 
14 Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” 333 footnote 30. 
15 Peter Jones, Rights (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave, 1994), 65. 
16 Sen, “Rights as Goals,” 18. 
17 Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 40-41.  
See also Fiona Robinson, “The Limits of a Rights-Based Approach to International Ethics,” in Tony Evans, ed. 
Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1998), 70. 
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concern for their rights.  Concern for the rights of a loved one does not mean that one cares 
only for an abstract moral concept.  One can be concerned about rights because of a direct 
love for the other person.”18  A commitment to rights sometimes just is an expression of 
care.  Although care ethicists hint at this possibility, focus on the hierarchical ordering of 
values and division of justice and care as concerning related but different considerations 
tends to deny this perspective and the conceptual opportunities it entails. 
 Sen argues that an acceptable theory of rights should include right fulfillment as goals 
and that certain advantages follow by understanding rights as fundamental goals.  If rights 
are indeed examples and expressions of fundamental moral values and not just derivative of 
such values, the goal of realizing rights appears to be implicit in any rights-based theory.  To 
construe the realization of rights as goals is to render explicit a view already present in the 
basic point of claiming rights as fundamental entitlements.  Sen claims that the goal of 
realizing rights ought to be implicit in a conception of rights as fundamental entitlements.  
Sen changes the focus of a theory of rights from simply refraining from violating rights to 
the actual fostering of the realization of rights, and he makes his case by considering the 
problems with a conception of rights that lacks sensitivity toward the consequences of 
upholding some rights at the expense of realizing others.  Again, the advantage of our 
adopting such an evaluative approach is that it situates rights within the broader concern for 
human well-being, challenging a limited view of rights as belonging solely to the domain of 
law and solely concerning the value of justice. 
 Since Sen’s focus on goals concerns the realization of rights, and rights can be 
construed as rights to achieve a state of capability to function, his theory connects rights with 
capabilities as a combined basis for measuring and valuing states of affairs.  As Peter Jones 
                                                 
18 Samantha Brennan, “Reconciling Feminist Politics and Feminist Ethics on the Issue of Rights,” Journal of 
Social Philosophy Vol. 30, No. 2, 1999, 271. 
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notes: “Respect for rights would then form part of the state of affairs that ought to be 
brought about.”19  Sen’s starting foundation or primitive diagnosis of value is from the 
acknowledgment of rights as fundamental entitlements.20  His early focus is on the normative 
demands of rights, implicitly connected with capabilities, rather than on justifying or 
specifying rights.  He notes that the historical association of utilitarianism with goal-based 
theorizing makes anti-utilitarian rights as fundamental goals seem peculiar.21  Sen claims that 
any “consequence-independent way of seeing rights is fundamentally defective.”22  This 
criticism involves a nuanced position between any rigid account of rights as deontological or 
consequentialist.  It also involves a direct focus on the contribution a rights-based approach 
can make to well-being without simply instrumentalizing rights.  Though realizing rights is a 
goal to be achieved, Sen does not understand rights as existing only as goals, preferring to 
argue for the importance of consequence-sensitivity:  
Consequentialism demands that actions (and also rules, motives, etc.) have to 
be judged exclusively by the goodness of the consequent state of affairs.  
This can be seen as implying that the rightness of action is ultimately just a 
matter of fulfillment of goals.  The question as to whether rights should be 
seen as goals is clearly a different issue from that.  Goals could be the 
exclusive basis of rightness of actions whether or not they include (inter alia 
or alone) the realization of rights, and equally goals can fail to provide such 
an exclusive basis for the rightness of actions whether or not rights figure as 
goals.  The question of the content of goals has to be distinguished from the 
power that goals – whatever their content – exercise over judgments 
regarding the rightness of actions.23 
 
Respecting the intrinsic value of basic rights entails a desire to see them realized and the 
responsibility to secure their fulfillment.  Such consequence-sensitivity is important when 
considering the value and status of various rights and what it means to realize a right.  
                                                 
19 Jones, Rights, 116. 
20 Amartya Sen, “Rights and Capabilities,” in his Resources, Values and Development (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1984), 310. 
21 Sen, “Rights as Goals,” 13. 
22 Sen, “Rights and Capabilities,” 311. 
23 Sen, “Rights as Goals,” 17. 
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However, it still leaves us with the challenging task of actually specifying the content of 
rights.  It also provides minimal guidance for concretely addressing possible conflicts 
between rights.  Referring to his research on famines, Sen notes that in instances where 
millions of people died, over-all food availability did not decline, yet “famines occurred 
precisely because of shifts in entitlements resulting from exercises of rights that are perfectly 
[legally] legitimate.”24  His conception of capability-based rights is compatible with a critical 
position on rights construed as rules to be obeyed and if necessary enforced by the legal 
system of property rights and market exchange.  By this account, sensitivity to the 
consequences of securing certain rights helps us determine what rights are fundamental and 
should be realized because of certain consequences and what rights result in unacceptable 
consequences when set in priority and fulfilled. 
 Sen rejects a system where rights are to be respected without any obligation to 
maximize their fulfillment or minimize their violation.  He presents as paradigmatic of such a 
non-goal based system Robert Nozick’s conception of rights.  Sen explains that in Nozick’s 
deontological constraint-based approach: “Rights do not determine a social ordering but 
instead set the constraints within which a social choice is to be made, by excluding certain 
alternatives, fixing others, and so on.”25  If rights are constraints to be obeyed rather than 
goals to be secured, where respecting rights simply involves not directly violating them but 
not the goal of seeing them fulfilled for others, acting to realize rights can conflict with such 
a theory.  For instance, Sen claims that when rights are so construed, we are under no 
obligation to snatch away a person’s phone in order to warn another person about an 
imminent threat to her survival.  However, we are obligated to respect the rights of the 
person who owns the phone by not taking her phone.  It follows that we are under no 
                                                 
24 Sen, “Rights and Capabilities,” 311. 
25 Sen, “Rights as Goals,” 15.  See Robert Nozick’s Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). 
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obligation to warn the threatened person, however easily it could be done, since respecting 
rights simply means not directly violating them. 
 Instead, Sen argues that it is “more plausible to argue that if rights are fundamental, 
then they are also valuable, and if they are valuable intrinsically and not just instrumentally, 
then they should figure among the goals.”26  Valuing the fundamental rights of the individual 
whose survival is imminently threatened therefore includes the goal of seeing the rights 
realized out of a direct concern for the immediate well-being of the individual.  Sen’s theory 
of rights-realizations as goals therefore challenges the dichotomy between negative and 
positive rights, recasting the debate between duties of non-interference and obligatory action 
with a value-laden notion of responsibility that takes the relative priority and status of 
individual well-being into account as part of the evaluative exercise of determining and 
prioritizing rights.  Respecting the intrinsic value of fundamental rights involves prioritizing 
basic capability-based rights over certain less important property rights.  In the context of 
Sen’s example, our responsibility is not to obey a designated system of rights per se by not 
interfering with a person’s right to be secure in the possession of her cell phone, but to 
actively realize the most important rights with sensitivity to the consequences by interfering 
to save a life. 
 As with his example of the famine, in criticizing Nozick, Sen takes issue with the 
prioritized set of legal rights people have.  This emphasizes the primacy of ethics when it 
comes to rights and their relation to well-being.  Sen’s suggestive sketch of a capability-based 
theory of rights signifies a crucial definitional contribution:  
Rights, then, are defined as basic not because they are indispensable to the 
fulfillment of any other right but because they are a way of formulating the 
urgency of minimal levels of eminently valuable human (actual and possible) 
functionings.  It is intrinsically good for humans to be and do in certain ways 
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and to have the freedom to so function, to be above the ‘threshold’ that 
enables them to so function.  To justify something as a fundamental right is 
to identify a human functioning as basic, as intrinsically and supremely good.  
Rights are grounded in the good in the sense that they are justified with 
reference to valuable human functionings.27 
 
Basic rights secure central human capabilities to function and are intrinsically valuable with 
respect to human dignity.  Capability-based rights understood as fundamental entitlements 
thereby help define what a rights-holder must minimally have the opportunity to be, 
establishing a threshold above which the rights-holder is empowered with genuine 
opportunities to function in ways deemed valuable.28  Sen emphasizes that respecting rights 
involves more than simply not directly violating them.  He acknowledges that a threshold-
based constraint system could be conceived in which the absolutist quality of non-
interference is removed while consequence-sensitivity is added.29  The key to such a system is 
establishing the correct set of capabilities and rights that should be secured no matter what 
else we pursue.  While there are challenges to be faced in working out a consistent, coherent, 
and integrated theory, a number of fruitful connections that emphasize the moral 
importance and the evaluative space concerning the relationship between rights and well-
being are worth further exploration. 
 
3.4 A Valuable Life 
 Sen evaluates a person’s well-being or quality of life by assessing her capability to 
function.  By valuing the dignity and freedom of a life guided by choosing a range of the 
valued functions, he characterizes a truly valuable life as a life that involves the secured basis 
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of well-being.  Such an evaluative endeavour situates concern for well-being at the center of 
moral and political debate within the realm of economics and democratic policy formation.  
The informational base of the evaluative process concerns a person’s abilities to perform 
certain acts or reach certain states deemed valuable. 
 The capability of a person to act freely depends on a variety of factors, including 
personal characteristics and social arrangements.  For Sen, well-being concerns what options 
she has the opportunity to choose from: “An agent’s well-being is based only on the quality 
of her life, and not on how well the world in general conforms to her desires and values.”30  
We focus our conception of rights on ensuring that people remain free to make decisions 
and act on opportunities that may enhance or diminish their own well-being: “freedom may 
have intrinsic importance for the person’s well-being achievement.  Acting freely and being 
able to choose may be directly conducive to well-being, not just because more freedom may 
make better alternatives available.”31  Thus, both well-being achievement and well-being 
freedom are assessed in terms of capability.32  Sen’s emphasis on the characteristics of 
individual advantage when it comes to well-being is a strength of his approach.  Another 
upshot is that Sen analyzes the evaluative space of capabilities to encourage us to directly and 
explicitly assess the nature, manner, and potential of rights to protect and enhance well-
being.  It remains up to us to incorporate, for example, a practice of rights that, among other 
things, helps us address the fairness of conventional and institutional processes with respect 
to their ability to secure capability to function.  Inasmuch as rights effectively secure valued 
capabilities, a rights-based approach to well-being helps us secure opportunities for well-
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being.  It is worth critically assessing this account in light of some concerns raised by Griffin 
and Sumner. 
 In his discussion of objective accounts of well-being, Griffin suggests that one 
attractive position “is that ‘well-being’ includes both basic needs and mere desires, but that 
needs have priority over mere desires.”33  He assigns this eclectic position to Sen.  He then 
suggests that the job of describing and clarifying an acceptable notion of well-being changes 
when we depart from broad prudential notions to narrower notions that help provide the 
basis for determining what is just.  Thus, start with an account that fits inside morality and 
then move outward to see if the account is adequate in other domains of value.  An 
objective account allows us to determine the minimal ingredients that ought to feature in a 
life so that we can say the well-being of that life is morally acceptable, the dignity of that life 
is sufficiently honoured and respected.  Where such minimal ingredients are lacking that life 
is seen as less than fully human because one or more central basic capabilities, what all 
individuals should be able to do and be, is absent.  Ensuring that a life has such objective 
ingredients, according to Sen, involves valuing more than just the basic needs of that 
individual.  When a life has the objective ingredients, they make the life better.  Such 
ingredients, which are needed for a dignified life, can be thought of as objective values in the 
sense that they are whatever capabilities we ought to insist a life have in order for it to be 
sufficiently valuable.  The evaluative nature of this approach gives rise to two distinctions.  
One is a distinction primarily concerning moral value between conceiving life per se as 
valuable and then trying to determine what ingredients are essential for respecting its value.  
The other is a distinction primarily concerning prudential value between a life that can be 
sufficiently characterized as valuable because it contains those minimum ingredients and a 
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life that, additionally, fulfills many meaningful choices beyond basic needs and objective 
criteria. 
 Griffin argues that well-being is best explained in terms of the fulfillment of desires, 
including the desires we would have if we understood the true nature of the objects we 
might desire.  According to Griffin, although it might appear on the surface that the values 
of autonomy, liberty, and equality expressed by rights are external to the prudential value of 
well-being, the preferences concerning the values expressed by rights should be included in a 
conception of well-being.34  Griffin also insists that conceptions of rights and well-being can 
entail a plurality of values and therefore rejects as false the dichotomy between rights based 
on well-being and rights based on personhood.  Although he does not explore the 
connection any further, Griffin also leaves room for rights to play a positive role concerning 
well-being.  We need an account that includes both moral and prudential values to work out 
what it is that any life we consider sufficiently valuable ought to have.  Trying to determine 
the specifics pertaining to the prudential value, however, may hinder focus on moral value.  
An account of what objectively constitutes a valuable life focused on determining the 
minimal ingredients necessary for a sufficiently dignified existence will have to leave 
determination of what constitutes a valuable life from a prudential point of view up to the 
individual.  Sen takes this approach, since it accounts for the value we rightfully place on a 
life being an individual’s own without taking a further position on what ought to be done 
with that life once it exists above a minimum threshold. 
 The criticism we can draw from Griffin’s account is that Sen is not primarily focused 
on clarifying an acceptable notion of well-being, in part because he neglects a whole range of 
prudential value that constitutes a significant part of well-being.  This is an important 
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criticism that, with qualifications, should be accepted.  Sen does not provide a 
thoroughgoing conception of well-being and, despite the connection between rights and 
well-being, the two concepts concern different things.  Part of the task of working out this 
relationship involves recognizing the limits of a rights-based approach.  While rights-based 
approaches to justice, for example, will tend to focus on the means of obtaining and/or 
securing well-being rather than working out and directly focusing on well-being itself, some 
consideration and guiding conception of well-being must nonetheless inform the kind of life 
we think it just that rights enable.  Sen’s theory is best understood as a hybrid theory, 
including objective and subjective elements.  As Brennan notes, “it may be that we are 
objectivists when we are concerned about the sort of lives there are, subjectivists when we 
think about the lives of actual people.”35  When our focus changes from trying to realize a 
minimally valuable life per se to trying to realize the most valuable kind of individual life, our 
guiding question changes from “What is the right theory of well-being for political 
purposes?” to “What moral obligations do we have to promote what is good?”.  Sen’s 
approach does take subjective experiences of people into account by including the values, 
desires, and preferences of particular agents.  Rights as goals entail desirable outcomes, 
including states of affairs we have a reason to bring about.  Respect for rights and the well-
being a theory of rights ought to help foster and protect form part of the desired states of 
affairs.  For this reason, Griffin suggests “the most important appearance of rights will be on 
the political level: they will define how society ought to be arranged to protect certain central 
values.”36  Thus, a rights-based approach to well-being does leave a range of prudential value 
up to the lives of actual people by respecting their choices in determining their own 
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meaningful lives.  The extent to which an individual is free to live and be well signifies the 
extent to which her rights and well-being leave her empowered to enjoy a sufficiently 
valuable life. 
 Sumner has expressed pessimism at the prospect of constructing a descriptively 
adequate objective theory of welfare.  It seems an account of well-being or welfare is going 
to have to feature a certain amount of subject-relativity, unless we exclude how a person’s 
life is going for her from an assessment of her welfare.  Yet a substantive theory must also 
account for that which is of value or has value whether or not it is an object of interest, or 
with Sumner’s further specification, whether or not we have positive attitude toward or are 
favourably disposed toward it.  Being able to enjoy a nutritional diet conducive to a healthy 
life is objectively valuable despite any disinterest in food we might have.  Given Sen’s 
approach, we are likely to be hesitant to agree with Sumner that we should work with a strict 
dichotomy rather than a continuum.37  A subjective theory of welfare is going to be useful to 
us when comparing and assessing actual lives.  For political reasons, however, we will want 
to include criteria that approximate objective values for comparative purposes and to avoid 
the problem of adaptive preferences.  A wealthy, privileged free person with every 
opportunity before her can be discontented, while someone lacking opportunity in a violent 
world of abject poverty can sometimes adjust her attitude to achieve a relative sense of 
contentment.  By including more objective criteria, we avoid ranking the chronic underdog 
who has learned to normalize and take pleasure in small mercies as having a greater level of 
well-being than the gloomy millionaire whose discontent leaves her stifled in the midst of 
unparalleled freedom and opportunity.  With the subjective account, someone’s life might be 
going well for her, though she lacks the opportunity to enjoy a minimally nutritional diet, is 
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afflicted with a debilitating but preventable illness, or perhaps has a terminal illness she does 
not yet know of.  With an objective account, we can then say, comparatively, that her life is 
not going sufficiently well, since her well-being is about to be cut short and her freedoms 
and opportunities reduced, perhaps radically so.  In this sense, we can say that a person’s 
well-being is poor or is worsened, even if she is not upset about it or does not know it.  
Given that rights to capability to function so often concern basic needs central to forming 
the basis of our well-being, it will follow that many of our values, preferences, and desires 
will be in pursuit of such opportunities to freely pursue our meaningful choices. 
 We will want to avoid adopting an overly subjective account that ranks the gloomy 
millionaire as worse off than the contented yet unhealthy underdog for political purposes.  
When it comes to institutional design, political practices, and social policy, we should aim to 
secure a set of basic central capabilities for every individual.  This ensures that our focus is 
on raising the contented yet unhealthy underdog up to a minimum threshold rather than on 
helping the gloomy millionaire feel more personally satisfied despite functioning well above 
the threshold.  This point draws on the important distinction between capabilities and 
functioning discussed by Alan Gewirth with respect to rights: “All persons have an equal 
right that their abilities of action and successful action be developed and protected.  But 
what they then do with these abilities is up to them, as matters of their own personal 
responsibility, and they are to be rewarded (or punished) accordingly.”38  Capability to 
function is a political goal while functioning is an ethical ideal.  Sen’s focus is on helping 
individuals develop their capabilities for meaningful action in order for them to be free to 
live and be well.  What they then do with the abilities and opportunities present in their life 
is, from a political point of view, up to them.  We should care about the mental health of the 
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gloomy millionaire, especially if the millionaire becomes too stifled to be capable of 
flourishing and drops below the threshold, but the example accounts for this.  Since our 
focus is on raising individuals up to achieve a sufficient level of well-being, the capabilities 
perspective will inform policy formation and resource allocation to reflect this focus.  The 
chronic underdog who perseveres while continuing to function below the minimum 
threshold by lacking basic opportunities everyone should have will thus rank as having much 
less objective well-being than the gloomy unsatisfied millionaire. 
 Sumner regards his highlighting of Sen’s rejection of utility accounts of welfare on 
the ground of their subjectivity as a fatal objection.  Having rejected subjectivity, Sen’s 
approach to well-being, Sumner argues, has a glaring inconsistency, since it nonetheless 
features the subjective role of individual and social valuings.  Sen responds by observing: “In 
doing a scrutinized valuation – central to the account I am concentrating on – the need for 
scrutiny is built in, but scrutiny does not get its due when pleasures or desires are simply 
taken as the basis of moral and political calculation.  The difference lies in the need for 
critical assessment and scrutiny for reasoned valuation, which differs, in this respect, from just 
tallying pleasures or desires.”39  Sen argues that when it comes to the moral obligations we 
have toward the well-being of others, there must exist some test of open and informed 
scrutiny akin to what John Rawls has called public reasoning and its role in ethical 
objectivity.40  Rights to choose and act upon valued ways of functioning constitutive of well-
being are endorsed in this sense in the evaluative space of the capabilities approach.41  
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Sumner’s overly dichotomous perspective and insistence on a subjective account of welfare 
appears to close him off from considering more nuanced hybrid accounts. 
  
3.5 Conclusion 
Working out an account of the relationship between rights and well-being involves 
working out what constitutes a valuable life.  The strength of a rights-based approach to 
well-being lies in its ability to help us address specifically moral and political concerns 
fundamental to the nature of well-being.  The concerns center on establishing the 
appropriate evaluative space for determining rights.  A rights-based approach to well-being is 
properly suited to the moral and political issues entailed in working out a practical theory 
that informs our collective efforts to promote the well-being of others.  Such a theory 
features both subjective and objective components comprising both moral and prudential 
value.  Although Sen points in the direction of establishing priorities for a set of fundamental 
rights, he offers little further guidance on this matter.  However, his theory highlights the 
importance of infusing responsibility for the predictable consequences of our actions into a 
conception of rights.  This rights-based approach to well-being requires us to act on our 
decent impulses to effectively prevent violations of rights, while supporting the realization of 
rights when we are in a plausible position to do so.42  The key challenge for us is to develop 
social policies and political institutions along with a culture that empowers people to support 
and enhance individual well-being through the practice of rights. 
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Chapter 41 
The Grotian Rights Tradition and The Capabilities Approach 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I focus on the source and subject of rights in Hugo Grotius’s The 
Rights of War and Peace.  By “source” I mean the origin and authority of rights, where they 
come from.  By “subject” of rights I mean to whom do rights apply or might they apply, who 
qualifies as a bearer or possessor of rights.  Specifically, I ask what makes someone a bearer 
of rights according to Grotius and what according to Grotius is the source of the rights she 
or he has.  I do this primarily through a critical textual analysis of his preliminary remarks 
where he establishes rights as the moral foundation of international justice.  My aim is to 
work out and clarify what Grotius himself argues to be the source and subject of rights in his 
preliminary remarks and then assess this account in light of Martha Nussbaum’s recent 
endorsement of the Grotian rights tradition.  My focus on the Grotian rights tradition is 
motivated by an interest in refining and reinforcing the conceptual relationship between 
rights and capabilities that appears to be the underlying basis for the kind of substantive 
theory of global justice contemporary political philosophers are pursuing. 
 I start with some brief background on the person and his influence.  I then draw out 
and interpret Grotius’s rights theory in response to my guiding questions.  Next, I examine 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the International Conference on Human Rights.  Commemorating 60 
years of the Declaration of Human Rights / Colloque international sur les droits humains.  Commémoration des 60 ans de la 
Déclaration sur les droits de l’homme, Dominican University College / Collège universitaire dominicain, Ottawa, 
December 2008 and the Canadian Philosophical Association (CPA) Congress, Carleton University, May 2009.  
Thanks to Mark Nyvlt at the Dominican University College for his support and for organizing the human rights 
conference.  Thanks also to Amanda Porter, Dennis Klimchuk, Samantha Brennan, Michel Hebert, and William 
Sweet for their critical feedback on various drafts of this paper.  Finally, thanks to Thomas Heyd for his 
insightful and constructive commentary at the CPA and to an anonymous reviewer for several comments on 
style and substance that challenged me to refine and clarify my position.  A version of this chapter was 
published as “The Grotian Rights Tradition and The Capabilities Approach,” Science et Esprit, Vol. 62, No. 2-3, 
2010, pp. 275-291.  Special thanks to the editors for kindly permitting me to use this article here. 
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three contentious aspects of Grotius’s position that arise out of an interpretation by Martha 
Nussbaum from her recent book Frontiers of Justice.  These contentious aspects concern the 
nature of Grotius’s foundational claims, the place of moral value in his theory, and the 
question of who or what according to Grotius demands inclusion in the sphere of justice.  
Finally, I consider the kind of substantive capability-based theory of rights to which the 
Grotian rights tradition lends itself.  Nussbaum herself has undertaken much of this initial 
work.  My own evaluation and critical textual analysis is offered as a sympathetic 
contribution, intended to further the capabilities approach along as a burgeoning theory of 
global justice. 
 Grotius’s theory of rights emphasizes reasoned on-going debate toward securing 
international justice.  It appears to rest on judgments concerning the moral value of species, 
including approximations of species norms, as potential rights holders demanding inclusion 
in the sphere of justice.  According to Grotius the natural goodness or fundamental moral 
value of animal nature makes someone (or something) a candidate for rights.  That is, beings 
that qualify as possessors or potential possessors of rights are judged to exhibit in their 
nature and according to their species norms a fundamental value that involves moral 
demands, in the form of justified claims and/or entitlements.  While the source of the rights 
she or he has originate from this fundamental value, the authority of rights stems from a 
combination of value judgments and reasoned assessment of these moral demands.  
According to Grotius there are rights and the project of securing international justice is a 
creative, evaluative, and reflective one based on right reason.  It aims at a consistent non-
arbitrary rights-based justice that reflects our social nature. 
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4.2 The Person and his Influence 
 Hugo Grotius is regarded as a significant precursor to our modern international 
order.  Knud Haakonssen insists that Grotius should be credited for founding the modern 
school of natural law while Hersch Lauterpacht regards Grotius, in terms of authority and 
influence, as the founder of the modern system of international law.2  Richard Tuck sees 
Grotius as the most important figure in the history of natural rights theories and, with 
Descartes, sees him viewed as having created the Enlightenment.3  R. J. Vincent sees Grotius 
as providing one of the earliest statements of rights as moral possessions.4  It is sufficient 
that his philosophy is integral to the development of modern rights theory and international 
law to warrant critical engagement with his ideas. 
 Hugo Grotius was an influential Dutch scholar who was imprisoned for life in 
Loevestein Castle for his political and religious liberalism.  In 1612, in his late twenties, he 
famously escaped and fled to France where, in exile, he published his magnum opus in 1625.  
While the general focus of the book is on the definition, causes, and nature of war, from the 
outset Grotius takes issue with the sceptical view that no justice exists to regulate the 
conduct of states.  His rights-based philosophical foundation is largely espoused in his 
prolegomena or preliminary remarks.  In particular we find one of the first modern 
articulations of the concept of rights, which according to Grotius are grounded in animal 
nature including shared impulses and capacities.  Grotius’s aim, originating from the need to 
regulate the new sovereign states arising after the Reformation, is to wrest nations and 
                                                 
2 Knud Haakonssen, “The Grotian Tradition in International Law,” Political Theory Vol. 12, No. 2, 1985, 239.  
Hersch Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations, the Law of Nature, and the Rights of Man,” Transactions of the Grotius 
Society Vol. 29, 1943, 21, 25. 
3 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 58, 66. 
4 R. J. Vincent, “Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention,” in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam 
Roberts, eds. Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 241. 
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international affairs under the moral guidance provided by the law of nature.5  Importantly, 
Grotius claims this law of nature is discoverable by reason and is equally valid even if God 
does not exist, insisting that the law of nature “would still have great weight, even if we were 
to grant, what we cannot grant without wickedness, that there is no God, or that he bestows 
no regard on human affairs.”6  With this separation of morality and jurisprudence from 
theology Grotius defends what he calls right reason, a moral faculty enabling us to determine 
right conduct and to assess the goodness or badness of things based on their nature, as the 
basis of a just society. 
 
4.3 Grotius on the Subject and Source of Rights7 
 In his preliminary remarks Grotius takes issue with the under examined state of 
international law.  He sets out to give a comprehensive treatment by first establishing the 
right method and foundation.  Against the notion that law is but a means to an end, just to 
the extent it is useful for protecting powerful interests, Grotius advances and defends rights 
as a check and arbiter of power and violence.  By juxtaposing rights with war Grotius makes 
it clear he regards rights-based international justice as integral to securing peace, warning that 
it is a grave error to deny rights.8  Grotius contrasts his strict standard of justification against 
the representative view of Carneades who rejects justice on the grounds that it either does 
                                                 
5 Lauterpacht, “The Law of Nations, the Law of Nature, and the Rights of Man,” 21. 
6 Hugo Grotius, Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace, An abridged translation by W. Whewell. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1853), xxvi preliminary remarks paragraph 5. 
7 As an aside it is important to note that significant disparities exist between different editions and translations, 
in terms of both meaning and completeness, which further exacerbate the task of deciphering and interpreting 
the not widely available work of Grotius.  On this matter see Lauterpacht, “The Grotian Tradition in 
International Law,” British Year Book of International Law Vol. 23, 1946, 52 and Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their 
Origin and Development, 73 footnote 31.  Throughout I have stuck to Whewell, noting other translations where 
inclusion of a Grotius quote found in a contemporary source serves the inquiry.  Amongst the defenders and 
critics of Grotius there exists a broad consensus that The Rights of War and Peace is a difficult book to 
comprehend, full of obscurity, ambiguity, and inconsistency that results in conflicting readings of Grotius as a 
liberal defender of individual rights versus Grotius as an authoritarian defender of the state. 
8 Grotius, Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace, An abridged translation by W. Whewell, xxiv preliminary remarks 
paragraph 5. 
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not exist, or exists in a calculating manner that is arbitrary, inconsistent, and self-interested.  
While Grotius conceives rights as the foundation of international law in response to such a 
view, and he explicitly indicates that his preface is focused on the origin of rights and law, his 
account of the subject and source of rights is at times obscure. 
 Curiously, he starts by recognizing humanity’s unique animal nature stating that “man 
[sic] is an animal of an excellent kind, differing much more from all other tribes of animals 
than they differ from one another; which appears by the evidence of many actions peculiar to 
human species.”9  We are animals and we have an animal nature.  We are a part of rather than 
somehow outside, separate from, or superior to nature and its governing laws.  Our particular 
animal nature, however, differs from other animals more than they differ from one another, 
suggesting we are uniquely situated with respect to rights, the concept Grotius has just set 
out to explain and justify.  Additionally, the manner in which we identify both our 
differences from other animals and our unique nature is by referring to experience and the 
empirical evidence.  We can see and identify what is peculiar to the human species by 
observing and assessing the species norm which, according to Grotius, includes an evident 
“desire for society; that is, a desire for a life spent in common with fellowmen [sic]; and not 
merely spent somehow, but spent tranquilly, and in a manner corresponding to the character 
of his intellect.”10  Grotius is not denying that people sometimes behave in a self-interested 
manner, or that large numbers of people can betray a desire for tranquility and social 
stability.  Instead he is simply claiming that, if the way most humans behave most of the time 
is observed, “the assertion, that, by nature, every animal is impelled only to seek its own 
advantage or good, if stated so generally as to include man [sic], cannot be conceded.”11 
                                                 
9 Ibid. xxiv preliminary remarks paragraph 6. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
154 
 
 Grotius argues that we also observe in other animals a tempering of individual self-
interest through regard for offspring and other members of the species.  He likens non-
human animal concern for the survival and well-being of their kin as equally natural to 
human infants, “in which, previous to all teaching, we see a certain disposition to do good to 
others … as for example, compassion breaks out spontaneously at that age.”12  Non-human 
animals, like human infants, thus possess a certain natural goodness and are not simply and 
solely individually self-interested.  In this regard Grotius sees the difference between non-
human animals or human infants and rational adult humans as one of degree rather than 
kind: 
But inasmuch as a man [sic] of full age has the knowledge which enables him 
to act similarly in similar cases; and along with that, a peculiar and admirable 
appetite for society; and has also language, an instrument of this desire, given 
to him alone of all animals; it is reasonable to assume that he has a faculty of 
knowing and acting according to general principles; and such tendencies as 
agree with this faculty do not belong to all animals, but are peculiar attributes 
of human nature.13 
 
I read Grotius as holding that adult humans possess a faculty of knowing and acting 
according to general principles in addition to the natural goodness they, like human infants 
and non-human animals, possess.  That is, all animals possess natural goodness.  The 
manner in which animals differ in ‘kind’ from each other pertains to their different abilities 
and capacities according to an informed yet fallible assessment of their species norm.  The 
difference in what we might call their moral value, however, is one of degree.14  The 
implication – of human and non-human animals equally possessing this intrinsic moral value 
– is not so much one of ranking species according to more or less value, but rather 
                                                 
12 Ibid. xxv preliminary remarks paragraph 7. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Values are often used interchangeably with morals but should be understood in their most substantive form 
as including moral, aesthetic, epistemological or cognitive values, along with other types of value such as 
economic or religious value.  As a first approximation moral value concerns action-guiding commitments and 
demands based on judgments about contingent or inherent worth, right and wrong, good and bad. 
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qualifying all animal species, based on their natural goodness and approximations of their 
species norm, as subjects of moral value and hence, as I will speculate, potential subjects of 
rights.  On this matter Grotius’s claims are rudimentary and his arguments thin.  He is 
claiming that right reason, possessed alone by yet common to adult humans, enables us to 
determine right conduct and to assess the goodness or badness of things based on their 
nature.  Grotius himself exercises his reasoned judgment in claiming the existence of a 
certain natural goodness or moral value in all animal species as exhibited by their behaviour.  
Our peculiar human attribute involves the capacity to use language to act in a consistent 
manner in accordance with general principles in the interest of social cohesion.  This moral 
faculty uniquely qualifies humans among all the animals to establish an orderly society 
according to rational evaluation.  What it does not do is uniquely qualify adult humans as 
possessors or subjects of value.  Grotius is neither explicit nor thorough on this point, yet 
this reading is consistent with his position in the text. 
 By ‘Right’ it seems Grotius means a kind of moral possession held by animals that 
are subjects of moral value rather than the adjective ‘right’ which means being in accordance 
with the dictate of right reason.15  To assess this interpretation we must depart from the 
preface and examine Grotius’s remarks in his section ‘What are Rights’ in chapter 1 of book 
1: 
In this sense Right is a moral Quality by which a person is competent to have 
or to do a certain thing justly.  Right in this sense belongs to a person, 
though sometimes it follows a thing: as one piece of land may have a right of 
way, or other easement, over another piece of land.  In this case the Right 
still belongs to a person, namely, to the person who possesses the first 
piece.16 
 
                                                 
15 Ibid. xxix preliminary remarks paragraph 41. 
16 Ibid. 2 paragraph IV. 
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A being owed restitution is a being that has a right.  Such rights include rights of non-
interference, restoration and/or reparation when possessions have been interfered with, and 
the enforcement of promises and warranted punishments.  A right is a kind of moral 
possession in the manner Grotius indicates, namely, it is an individual attribute.  It belongs 
to the individual as a moral feature of what they should justly be able to do and be.  In this 
sense a right is a kind of justified claim and/or entitlement that places demands on others.  
Grotius emphasizes this pre-legal moral quality of rights by insisting that, “Rights, even 
unsupported by force, are not destitute of all effect: for Justice, the observance of Rights, 
bring security to the conscience.”17  Rights extend beyond state boundaries and involve a 
kind of moral commitment necessary for preserving society.18  They also continue to exist 
during war and unlike civil laws cannot be silenced or extinguished.  See, for example, 
Grotius’s preliminary remarks paragraph 25 where he denies the claim that all rights cease in 
war and paragraph 26 where laws, understood as civil and judicial are silenced in the conflict 
of arms while Natural Law, “those laws which are perpetual and accommodated to all time,” 
are not.  This interpretation is further reinforced by Grotius’s uncharacteristically clear 
statement in which he recollects for the reader his purpose for justifying rights in the first 
place: “I, for the reasons which I have stated, [hold] it to be most certain that there is among 
nations a common law of Rights which is of force with regard to war, and in war, saw many 
and grave causes why I should write a work on that subject.”19  From what he has already 
said, Grotius gives us good reason to see rights as justified claims and/or entitlements based 
on our reasoned judgment of a species’ natural and inherent moral value, but more needs to 
be said. 
                                                 
17 Ibid. xxviii preliminary remarks paragraph 20. 
18 Ibid. xxix preliminary remarks paragraph 22-23. 
19 Ibid. xxix preliminary remarks paragraph 28. 
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 There is an important difference between what it means for an individual to qualify 
as a subject of rights and the ability to rationally judge who or what qualifies.  In arguing that 
animals are not solely concerned with their individual good Grotius suggests, “[t]he same is 
to be said of infants, in which, previous to all teaching, we see a certain disposition to do 
good to others.”20  It is this perceived moral value intrinsic to non-human animals and 
human infants that is the source of rights according to Grotius.  It is the peculiar attribute of 
human nature latent in the child and usually developed in the adult that uniquely qualifies us 
to exercise our moral faculty with reasoned judgment to determine the nature and extent of 
rights.  This distinction between the natural goodness of species being the source of their 
rights and right reason being the basis for establishing such rights rests on a view about why 
individuals have rights and how we learn what those rights are.  The natural goodness of the 
individual as it relates to their species norm is the source of rights and right reason is what 
adult humans exercise to establish these rights.  Without this distinction only rational human 
adults could ever be fully qualified subjects of rights.  However, since the capacity for 
rational judgment is not a requisite feature of a rights holder, non-rational human adults, 
children, and non-human animals are all, according to Grotius’s rights theory, potential 
subjects of rights.  Humanity’s ability to evaluate such rights signifies its unique authority to 
identify the demands of justice as specified by the law of nature.  In this manner the specific 
rights a subject of rights may be judged to have is contingent on a general approximation of 
its specific nature.  It follows that different species are entitled and/or have moral claims to 
different rights, depending on their species norm.  To illustrate the point consider the 
widespread recognition of animal rights by systems of justice that legally protect animal 
entitlements to basic health, habitat, and humane treatment, while, given their nature, 
                                                 
20 Ibid. xxv preliminary remarks paragraph 7. 
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denying them rights to things we are typically entitled to, such as free speech or political 
participation. 
 
4.4 Nussbaum’s Interpretation and The Grotian Rights Tradition 
 On the final page of his preliminary remarks Grotius states that throughout his work 
he has endeavoured to make both the definitions and his reasons as clear as possible.  He is 
not always successful in this regard, leaving room for debate as to his precise position.  I 
have asked what makes someone (or something) a bearer of rights according to Grotius and 
what according to Grotius is the source of the rights she or he has.  In fairness I must 
conclude that Grotius does not provide a clear, decisive or thorough answer to these 
questions in his prolegomena.  However, critical interpretation of his preliminary remarks 
has provided some indication, however tentative and incomplete, of his underlying rights 
theory.  This helps us understand how rights-based theories of justice, in the Grotian 
tradition, can both inform and direct contemporary work in this area.  I now wish to 
consider three contentious aspects of that theory that arise in light of Nussbaum’s recent 
interpretation.  These concern debate about the nature of Grotius’s foundational claims, the 
place of moral value in his theory, and the question of who according to Grotius should be 
included in the sphere of justice. 
 Martha Nussbaum sees the Grotian rights tradition as directly connected to the 
capabilities approach she espouses.  She argues that subjects of justice should be free and 
able to function in certain ways deemed valuable and that there are certain functions that 
beings should be empowered to do such that a life developed and shaped by choosing and 
doing a range of these functions constitutes a dignified life: 
The general idea of Grotius’ natural law theory is that [the dignity or moral 
worth and sociability] of the human being, and their ethical value, suggest a 
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good deal about the treatment to which every human being is entitled.  Thus 
political theory begins from an abstract idea of basic entitlements, grounded 
in the twin ideas of dignity (the human being as an end) and sociability.  It is 
then argued that certain specific entitlements flow from those ideas, as 
necessary conditions of a life with human dignity.21 
 
Nussbaum is interested in the general idea underlying Grotius’s natural law approach to 
international justice.  As a major source of her own thinking she regards it as similar in its 
basic structure to the view she defends, and an important template worth reviving for 
contemporary purposes. 
 In Nussbaum’s capabilities approach the idea of a law of nature is replaced with an 
evaluative and interpretive commitment that is historically grounded and empirically 
supplemented, aimed at working out a set of basic capabilities necessary for a dignified life.  
In Grotius’s rights theory much rests on his foundational claims about human and non-
human animal nature.  Nussbaum takes it as given that Grotius connects them to a 
metaphysical theory and advises we instead view them as freestanding ethical claims upon 
which a political conception of a subject of justice will be acceptable to people with different 
religious and metaphysical views.  However, Grotius himself provides reasons for moving in 
this direction and for viewing Nussbaum’s proposal as consistent with the spirit if not the 
letter of his rights theory.  His ambiguities and inconsistencies allow us to question and 
doubt whether the underlying claims about animal nature must necessarily be metaphysical 
ones rather than freestanding ethical ones.  In paragraph 13 of his preliminary remarks he 
appears to insist that the principles of natural law are metaphysical in nature, discoverable 
and understandable by weaker minds to the extent they are made manifest by God.22  Recall 
elsewhere, however, that he says they still apply even if there is no God, discoverable as they 
                                                 
21 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University, 2006), 36. 
22 Grotius, xxvi preliminary remarks paragraph 13. 
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are by reason.  These and other noted statements about reason and method lend themselves 
to view the foundational claims of his theory as freestanding rather than metaphysical, 
emphasizing as they do a fallible, empirical, and on-going process. 
 Grotius appears to regard basic species norms as deeply natural yet endeavours to 
argue the matter as subject to debate and verifiable observation.  However much he may 
personally regard animal nature as fixed and woven into the fabric of reality, the project of 
establishing international justice will ultimately be the product of a cross-cultural enterprise 
between those that otherwise hold very different views in metaphysics and religion, open to 
change and evaluation over time: “for Natural Law, as we have said, is in a certain measure, 
to be proved by such consent; and as to the Law of Nations, there is no other way of 
proving it.”23  According to Grotius laws of nature are ‘discoverable’ by reason, yet they also 
appear to be a product of reason and at times Grotius refers to the natural law as the natural 
human law and indicates that it proceeds from the internal principles of humanity.24  This 
suggests we can in good conscience proceed with ethical claims about animal nature without 
having to take a strong position as to their metaphysical status. 
 Recall that Grotius insists human infants and non-human animals alike possess an 
evident natural goodness or moral value.  I have suggested that Grotius’s equal assignment 
of moral value to pre or non-rational animals is akin to seeing in such beings some kind of 
inherent worth that presumably involves either an entitlement demanding our recognition 
and respect and/or a claim on us to honour and even protect that value: 
What I want to bring out about Grotius’ theory is that it begins with the 
content of an outcome, in the sense of an account of basic entitlements of 
human being whose fulfillment is required by justice; if these entitlements are 
fulfilled, then a society (in this case, “international society”) is minimally just.  
The justification of the entitlement set is not procedural, but involves an 
                                                 
23 Ibid. xxxvi preliminary remarks paragraph 46. 
24 Ibid. xxv preliminary remarks paragraphs 9 and 12. 
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intuitive idea of human dignity.  Grotius argues explicitly that we must not 
attempt to derive our fundamental principles from an idea of mutual 
advantage alone; human sociability indicates that advantage is not the only 
reason for which human beings act justly.  Grotius evidently believes that a 
society based upon sociability and respect rather than upon mutual advantage 
can remain stable over time.25 
 
The claim that there is in his theory an intuitive idea of human if not animal dignity seems to 
cohere with my interpretation. 
 Nussbaum has noted that ethical claims about the moral value of a being and its 
species norm combine to give us an idea of what specific entitlements justly demand our 
respect as necessary conditions of a life with dignity.  For now it is enough that, with 
Nussbaum, my account sees in Grotius’s theory an emphasis on a species’ moral value as the 
source of its rights. 
 Nussbaum thinks that Grotius’s distinction between humans and non-rational non-
human animals is too strong but recognizes in the structure of his theory room for broad 
inclusion.26  Though limited to humanity in Grotius’s own thought, nothing in the theory he 
advances in his preliminary remarks limits the possession of rights to humans.  Grotius 
appears to exclude non-human animals from his own practical consideration of justice 
because they lack the capacity to reason, including the faculties of speech and understanding.  
He was uniquely set on a rights-based approach to the subject of justice, regarding a right as 
a moral quality that enables a being to have or do something according to the law of nature.27  
As previously noted, I contend that Grotius’s emphasis on rights as referring to persons is 
idiosyncratic and not a necessary feature of the theoretical structure he adopts for analyzing 
justice.  His focus, of course, is on protecting individual human rights in international affairs.  
His aim, however, is not to establish a theoretical basis that determines and presupposes what is 
                                                 
25 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 37. 
26 Ibid. 38. 
27 William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 18. 
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necessarily included in the sphere of justice.  Rather, as I have attempted to show, his aim is 
to establish a theoretical basis for working our principles of justice based on approximations 
of animal nature and value, approximations that Nussbaum advises us to view as 
freestanding ethical claims that are fallible, empirically informed, and perpetually revisable. 
 Grotius was neither committed to nor concerned with non-human animal rights, and 
my point is only that his theoretical structure does not in principle appear to exclude them 
from being subjects of rights.  Against the view that only those with the capacity to reason 
possess the dignity and intrinsic worth that gives rise to their status as moral agents, and only 
these moral agents are subjects of justice, the structure of Grotius’s theory of rights leaves 
room for inclusion of non-human animals.  Grotian subjects of rights equally possess moral 
value and thus demand moral equality, including equal respect and entitlement.28  A Grotian 
subject of rights places demands of justice on others.  An animal demands inclusion in the 
sphere of justice when it is entitled to be treated in a particularly urgent or basic way, ways 
necessary for it to approximate its species norm.  To act unjustly towards any animal is thus 
to mistreat it in a particularly urgent or basic way.  Such mistreatment is a matter of injustice 
because it is both wrong of us and unfair to them.  Grotius’s theory gives us good reasons to 
view non-human animals as potential subjects of rights.  Those good reasons include 
Grotius’s distinction between the method by which principles of justice are established and 
what qualifies an individual for inclusion in the sphere of justice. 
 It is not clear, however, that Grotius actually thought non-humans are and should be 
viewed as rights holders.  Later in his book, for example, he provides grounds for objecting 
to my interpretation when he states: “If we ever assign justice to brute animals, it is 
improperly, when we see in them some shadow or vestige of reason.  There being acts which 
                                                 
28 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 38. 
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we have in common with brutes, as the rearing of offspring, and others which are peculiar to 
us, as the worship of God, has no bearing on the nature of Jus.”  Here three responses are 
warranted.  First, it must be remembered that in his preliminary remarks, the section 
dedicated to establishing the existence of and providing a justification for rights, there is no 
exclusion of non-human animals from the sphere of justice.  Rather, there is an explicit 
emphasis on their equal intrinsic moral value amidst a sharp distinction between having the 
ability to exercise right reason and possessing natural goodness.  Second, it is remarkable that 
Grotius’s rights theory should allow for the inclusion of non-human animals within the 
sphere of justice given his stated preoccupation with the rights that exist in conditions of 
lawlessness and warfare.  Finally, it is certainly plausible that Grotius thought non-human 
animals should be excluded from the sphere of justice, even if his initial justification of rights 
allows for their inclusion.  It is also plausible, however, that the above statement actually 
squares with my interpretation.  Consider his meaning.  Assigning justice to brute animals is 
different than including them in consideration of the demands of justice in the following 
straightforward way: we must take care not to assign the capacity for justice to those who 
lack right reason.  Again, infant humans and numerous adults lack the capacity for right 
reason and there is no suggestion they either be assigned justice or excluded from the sphere 
of justice.  Instead, Grotius’s warning appears to be motivated by his strong distinction 
between humans and other animals emphasizing rationality as a species norm in the former 
but not the latter.  Recall earlier that, according to Grotius, a being owed restitution is a 
being that has a right.  While justice is an expression of our nature in the sense noted above 
– that a species norm of humanity is the capacity to exercise right reason in establishing the 
fundamental principles of justice – rights are an expression of animal nature in a different 
manner, namely as an expression of a being that possesses fundamental moral value entitling 
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it to certain just treatment.  That we do not have to be capable of justice to qualify for 
inclusion in the sphere of human justice, in this light, squares with Grotius’s warning not to 
assign justice to brute animals.  If Grotius did intend to restrict rights to humans, this is by 
no means obvious in his preliminary remarks where he has endeavoured to provide the 
philosophical justification of rights by grounding them in animal nature.  Nor does he 
provide any compelling reasons to necessarily restrict rights to exclude those lacking rationality 
as an ability, capacity, or species norm.  What surprises and delights me about Grotius’s 
preliminary remarks is that, given what I defend as a fair critical interpretation of his theory 
of rights, the conclusions I draw concerning the distinction between subjects of morality and 
moral agents seems consistent with and arguably explicit in Grotius’s preliminary remarks.  I 
willingly concede that my conclusions are not definitive.  As I have noted, it is hard to 
establish a conclusive position given both the lack of clarity and translation issues.  
 To dispel any fear that a contemporary view may have been inadvertently imputed 
into my interpretation of Grotius I refer the reader to the thought of the ancient Epicurean 
philosopher Porphyry who maintained that the dictate of right reason and not law should 
inform our moral consideration of non-human animals, non-human animals should be 
included in the sphere of justice, social contract approaches are ill-advised in their exclusion 
of non-human animals, and non-human animals exhibit in their species norm a kind of 
rational judgment.  Even though Porphyry, unlike Grotius, assigned a kind of reason to non-
human animal behaviour, he explicitly warned, like Grotius, that we must take care not to 
assign justice to animals in the sense of holding them capable of upholding laws or 
submitting them to legal proceedings.29 
                                                 
29 See, for example, some of the selected writings of Porphyry in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds. The 
Hellenistic Philosophers.  Volume 1.  Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary (Cambridge: 
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4.5 A Capabilities Theory of Rights and its Grotian Roots 
 Three concerns make me hesitant to embrace Nussbaum’s take on Grotius.  First, 
Grotius never makes such a claim explicit about dignity.  Even if it is likely that he held such 
a view, which I think it is, he provides the reader with no obvious example to settle the 
matter.  Second, the connection or relationship between inherent moral value, the 
fundamental moral value of species norms, and the concept of dignity remains as yet too 
unclear and undeveloped to readily and confidently accept such a reading.  Third, not all 
people share the same intuitions about human and non-human animal value.  We do well 
when we endeavour to provide reasons beyond intuitive appeal for accepting certain moral 
claims.  Grotius does this by claiming the inherent goodness of human infants and non-
human animals is evident in their apparently natural tendencies to behave in ways that are 
not self-interested.  However, what inclines me to endorse Nussbaum’s embrace of Grotius 
is that, with each of the pressing issues I have discussed and the concerns I have noted, the 
debate may be addressed in the manner Nussbaum proposes, namely, distinguish a 
resolution for contemporary purposes from one based on a definitive judgment of Grotius’s 
own meaning.  Given my interpretation I argue that we can confidently read Grotius as 
advancing a theory of rights that does indeed supplement and lend itself to Nussbaum’s 
reading by distinguishing between Grotius’s actual position, which remains contentious, and 
what we might call the Grotian rights tradition which speaks to the spirit if not the letter of 
Grotius’s thought.  Influential ideas found in works such as Grotius’s The Rights of War and 
Peace, after all, should be taken as helpful guides connected to us by a continuing 
commitment to justice and peace, not as idols to be fought over or authorities to be strictly 
                                                                                                                                                  
Cambridge University Press, 1987) and M. A. Fox’s writings about Porphyry in his Deep Vegetarianism 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999). 
166 
 
obeyed.  Nussbaum is right to claim and explicate a rich philosophical heritage connecting 
the Grotian rights tradition with the capabilities approach, but Grotius is not being claimed 
as the exclusive property of the capabilities theorist nor does the success of a capability-
based theory of rights rest on Grotius’s position.  Rather, rich parallels in substance and 
method make the Grotian rights tradition, broadly construed, ripe for intellectual 
investigation and comparative research.  Indeed, numerous theories of rights appear well-
suited to comparative investigation, and such inquiry should focus on what, specifically, the 
theory consists of, to what extent it reflects, supports, and enriches the capabilities approach, 
and, most importantly, how it contributes to the working out and refining of a compelling 
and substantive capability-based theory of global justice. 
 Like other cosmopolitan approaches the capabilities approach features an account of 
the informational basis that constitutes an individual’s good.  It is an ethical theory with 
political implications, offering a standard for aggregative appraisal, informing our choice and 
evaluation of institutions, and serving as a guide to policy.  Developed by Nobel-laureate 
economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum, the capabilities approach 
advocates a theory of well-being that answers the question: What should an individual be able to 
do and be? in terms of one’s freedom to function in certain ways and ability to shape one’s life 
by choosing and doing a range of valuable things that constitute an empowered life.  
Nussbaum’s version offers an objective list of capabilities, the securing of which constitutes 
a dignified life.  Examples include being able to be adequately nourished, exercise reason and 
the imagination through education, and being able to participate in political choices.  
Accordingly justice demands that these and other central capabilities be secured. 
 Nussbaum has noted that while the language of rights plays a powerful moral role in 
political discourse, rights remain conceptually ambiguous.  She has insisted that assessing the 
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as yet underexplored relationship between rights and capabilities is an urgent task given both 
their apparent connections and possibilities for mutual reinforcement.  Amartya Sen 
maintains that the combination of the two gives us something that neither perspective can 
provide alone, arguing that the capabilities approach adds to a theory of justice an important 
focus on the freedom to choose particular levels of functionings.  Although their recent 
work, and the growing literature in this area, suggests a capability-based approach to global 
justice entails a strong commitment to rights, working out what such a burgeoning theory 
specifically tells us about the fairness or equity of the processes and procedures required of 
just institutions remains ongoing.  In recent years much attention has been paid to the 
contributions the capabilities approach makes as a measure of human development, 
including its crucial advantages over GNP, utilitarian, and resource-based measurements 
used to measure quality of life.  Unlike these other measurements, the capabilities approach 
directly focuses on the abilities and opportunities each person has to convert available 
resources into valuable functionings, leading to its adoption by the United Nations Human 
Development Report.  The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a focal point 
for the pursuit of global justice since rights secure our capabilities to function, safeguard the 
value we attach to our freedom and well-being, and infuse into a theory of justice a 
conception of moral entitlements that have political significance above and beyond the 
enhanced personal advantage they help secure. 
 Rights are central to the language and issues of justice though rights and justice are 
sometimes characterized as conflicting ideals.  Rights-based approaches to justice attempt to 
connect our understanding of these concepts by making equality of rights a primary 
requirement of any just order.  How rights are conceived to empower individuals directly 
informs the requirements we place on political institutions to achieve and reflect the 
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demands of justice.  This requires on-going evaluation of the comparative advantages, 
disadvantages, and differences an alternative or combined capabilities approach might have.  
Philosophers have been reluctant to explore the connection between capabilities and rights, 
either because they regard capabilities as restricted to human development, as moving too far 
towards an overly specified account of human perfection, or because capabilities theorists 
have thus far failed to provide the kind of institutional analysis that rights-based approaches 
tend to demand.  While rich in detail, it as yet remains unclear how the capabilities approach 
can or might generate political principles to address pressing issues of global justice.  The 
Grotian rights tradition helps exemplify the rich connection, as yet relatively untapped in the 
history of philosophy, between the concept of capabilities and the concept of rights.  It also 
supplies an important historical heritage to a capabilities theory of rights that, along with its 
refined theory of well-being and its cosmopolitan commitments, may help capabilities 
theorists develop the kind of substantive theory that promotes the same global justice 
Grotius himself sought to facilitate with his own work. 
 Accordingly, a capabilities theory of rights – in which a capabilities perspective is 
conceived as a species of a rights-based approach to global justice given many of the same 
valuable entitlements central capabilities and basic rights emphasize – will highlight a rich 
moral set of goals for development.30  This position construes rights as justified by an ethical 
argument about the valued capabilities of the individual and will entail, as well as emphasize 
the interdependence of, civil and political liberties and economic and social rights.  As 
fundamental entitlements rights are prepolitical moral claims, not merely artefacts of laws 
and institutions, based on our reasoned judgment of a species’ natural and inherent moral 
value grounded in a being’s evident self-awareness and capacity to suffer: “Sentience is not 
                                                 
30 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 284. 
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the only thing that matters for basic justice; but it seems plausible to consider sentience a 
threshold condition for membership in the community of beings who have entitlements 
based on justice.”31  A capabilities theory of rights recognizes that securing a right is an 
affirmative task, not simply a matter of negative liberty where rights are simply regarded as 
secured if the state – or anyone in a position to help – refrains from interference on the 
matter.32  Having a right means having a justified claim to a certain level of capability to 
function.  Considering how to secure capabilities to function and thus secure the content of 
rights helps determine the manner in which individuals therefore have claims to a certain 
treatment, level of well-being, resources, and opportunities. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 Grotius’s theory of rights emphasizes reasoned on-going debate toward securing 
international justice.  It appears to rest on judgments concerning the moral value of species, 
including approximations of species norms, as potential rights holders demanding inclusion 
in the sphere of justice.  As I have noted it is not possible to gain a much clearer, more 
decisive and thorough answer to my original guiding questions.  As I have also suggested, we 
can confidently read Grotius as advancing a theory of rights that does indeed supplement 
and lend itself to Nussbaum’s reading by distinguishing between Grotius’s actual position, 
which remains contentious, and what we might call the Grotian rights tradition which speaks 
to the spirit if not the letter of Grotius’s thought.  I interpret Grotius’s theory as not limiting 
an intuitive freestanding commitment to and assignment of dignity to humanity alone.  
Rather, in agreement with Nussbaum’s interpretation I see Grotius combining a claim about 
                                                 
31 Martha Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
Vol. 24, www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/volume24/nussbaum_2003, 29/09/2004, 494. 
32 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 286-287. 
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the moral value of a being and its species norm, to give us an idea of what specific 
entitlements justly demand our respect as necessary conditions of a life with dignity.  Like 
Nussbaum’s account, mine sees in Grotius’s theory an emphasis on a species’ moral value as 
indicative of the fundamental entitlements owed individuals of that species.  It is only by 
juxtaposing human dignity with the lesser non-human animal nature that a formidable wedge 
can be driven between the rights bearing subjects of justice that are members of the human 
species and non-human animals.  Yet Grotius provides no decisive textual evidence in his 
preliminary remarks for us to confidently limit the assignment of dignity to humans alone, 
from which we might then be tempted to limit rights to only those animals with the capacity 
to identify and respect rights in the tradition of the Stoics, Kant, Rawls, and the like.  Neither 
Nussbaum nor I attribute to Grotius the view that animals have rights.  I have simply gone 
beyond Nussbaum in noting that the structure of Grotius’s theory of rights, as laid out in his 
preliminary remarks, does not exclude, and appears to leave room for, non-human animals 
as potential rights holders.  I do not interpret Grotius as dissuading us from the assumption 
of human exceptionalism, but rather see the structure of his theory as reinforcing, not 
denying, the distinction between rights holders and rights adjudicators.  This distinction or 
difference explains both our special role with respect to rights, and the special rights to 
which we are entitled, given identifiable norms unique to the human species. 
 We should be concerned about the source and subject of rights in Grotius because it 
informs contemporary rights theory and because it advances both our understanding and 
pursuit of global justice.  Grotius’s view on the so called laws that govern our nature is a 
compelling one.  His positive and fallible conception of human nature involves the 
observation of a shared impulse and capacity for civil society governed by moral reason.  He 
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is optimistic that the method he adopts for determining rights will yield a broad consensus.33  
In contemporary terms what is thus unique to our nature is the shared desire to establish a 
just social and political order and the ability to exercise our intelligence towards working out 
the demands of justice: “Sociability and understanding combine in humans to make justice, 
as contrasted to mere sympathy, possible.  Justice is therefore an expression of a human 
nature that Grotius believed to be sufficiently determinate to allow him to speak of laws 
governing that nature.”34  The most valuable and relevant contribution to be taken from 
Grotius’s preliminary remarks is not only or primarily his progressive view of human nature 
but his remarkably modern theory of rights.  The Grotian rights tradition, as interpreted 
above, helps reinforce and supplement the basis for developing a substantive capability-
based theory of rights in which capabilities are not a rival, competitor, or alternative to 
rights, but rather a particularly fine species of a rights-based approach to global justice that 
resolves many of the sticky theoretical issues in what I, and many others, regard as the right 
                                                 
33 “In order to give proofs on questions respecting this Natural Law, I have made use of the testimonies of 
philosophers, historians, poets, and finally orators.  Not that I regard these as judges from whose decision there 
is no appeal: for they are warped by their party, their argument, their cause: but I quote them as witnesses 
whose conspiring testimony, proceeding from innumerable different times and places, must be referred to some 
universal cause; which, in the questions with which we are here concerned, can be no other than a right 
deduction proceeding from the principles of reason, or some common consent.  The former cause of 
agreement points to the Law of Nature; the latter, to the Law of Nations: though the difference of these two is 
not to be collected from the testimonies themselves, (for writers everywhere confound the Law of Nature and 
the Law of Nations,) but from the quality of the matter.  For what cannot be deduced from certain principles 
by solid reasoning, and yet is seen and observed everywhere, must have its origin from the will and consent of 
all.”  Grotius, xxxiv preliminary remarks paragraph 40.  See also a similar remark of Grotius’s, perhaps the same 
one differently translated, (as quoted in Edmundson, 18) from pages 21-23 of a 1646 edition of Grotius’s 
treatise: “[T]he principles of the law of nature, since they are always the same, can easily be brought into a 
systematic form; [unlike] the elements of positive law, [which,] since they undergo change and are different in 
different places, are outside the domain of systematic treatment.  […] I have made it my concern to refer the 
proofs of things touching the law of nature to certain fundamental conceptions which are beyond question, so 
that no one can deny them without doing violence to himself.  For the principles of law […] are in themselves 
manifest and clear, almost as evident as are those things that we perceive by the external senses.  […] I have, 
furthermore, availed myself of the testimony of philosophers, historians, poets, and finally also of orators […] 
[for] when many at different times, and in many different places, affirm the same thing as certain, that ought to 
be referred to as a universal cause …”  With respect to Grotius’s method for establishing a consensus about 
rights, Lauterpacht explains that “[i]t is a law of nature largely based on and deduced from the nature of man 
[sic] as a being intrinsically moved by a desire for social life, endowed with an ample measure of goodness, 
altruism, and morality, and capable of acting on general principles and of learning from experience.”  
Lauterpacht, 1946, 24. 
34 Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, 17. 
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way.  As ever the significant task of working out and refining those rights remains on-going.  
Recent developments in the areas of rights and global justice, including the capabilities 
approach, are a testament to Grotius and the Grotian rights tradition. 
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Chapter 51 
Nonhuman Animals and Global Justice 
Though not homosapiens, [animals] are also beings entitled to dignified existence and human treatment sans 
cruelty and torture … Therefore, it is not only our fundamental duty to show compassion to our animal 
friends, but also to recognize and protect their rights … If humans are entitled to fundamental rights, why not 
animals? 
 
- Nair V. Union of India, Kerala High Court, no. 155/1999, June 20002 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Members of the Kerala High court might ask of John Rawls’s theory, ‘if humans are 
entitled to fundamental rights, why not animals?’  I ask of Rawls’s theory the more modest 
question: why are animals excluded from the sphere of justice?3  Predictably, answers to both 
questions are connected, and I argue that Rawls does not adequately answer either question.  
I also critically engage Martha C. Nussbaum’s recent criticisms of Rawls.  Focus on his 
exclusion of animals from the sphere of justice highlights how Rawls’s theory is a theory of 
justice and not a theory of rights.  It also helps me isolate two underlying problems with 
Rawls’s theory of justice, namely his conception of the moral agent and his social contract 
doctrine.  This is not to suggest, of course, that Rawls’s theory is not a major and original 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter under the title Accepting Nonhuman Animals into the Sphere of Justice was 
presented at the Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Association Conference, York University, June 2009.  
Thanks to Amanda Porter, Samantha Brennan, Mark Schranz, and conference participants for your valuable 
comments and feedback.  
2 Quoted in M. C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 325. 
3 I ask this because it strikes me as a serious shortcoming and because Rawls’s theory is regarded as a signpost 
in moral and political philosophy.  “His theory dominates the field, not in the sense of commanding agreement, 
for very few people agree with all of it, but in the sense that later theorists have defined themselves in 
opposition to Rawls.  They explain what their theory is by contrasting with Rawls’s theory.  We will not be able 
to make sense of later work on justice if we do not understand Rawls.” Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Philosophy: An Introduction Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 55.  “… the world we live in is 
post-Rawlsian … A Theory of Justice is the watershed that divides the past from the present.”  Quoting Brian 
Barry in P. Pettit, ‘Analytical philosophy’ in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds. A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 11. 
174 
 
philosophical contribution.  Indeed it has enormous practical import and is arguably one of 
the most influential moral theories of the twentieth century.  I accept Nussbaum’s view that 
the best way to advance in our philosophical endeavours is to consider urgent matters of 
moral concern in light of the strongest theories we have, such as Rawls’s.  However, I argue 
that his social contract doctrine makes it impossible to include animals within the sphere of 
justice.  That is, the status and treatment of nonhuman animals is something a theory of 
justice ought to be able to address, yet is not and cannot be a matter of justice within the 
structure of Rawls’s theory.4  Typical of the strategy of Rawls’s critics, I argue that his theory 
of justice is inadequate to the extent it fails to address, and equip us with means to address, a 
central issue of justice, namely, the status and treatment of nonhuman animals. 
 
5.2 Nussbaum’s Critique 
While Rawls agrees with the claim that we have a duty to show compassion to our 
animal friends, he is very clear in his view that issues concerning the status and treatment of 
nonhuman animals are not a matter of justice.  The idea behind his theory is that principles 
of justice are the object of an original agreement arrived at by free and equal rational persons 
behind a veil of ignorance.  The original position corresponds to the state of nature and is 
purely hypothetical.  He calls this justice as fairness because it conveys the idea that the 
principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.  Rawls considers his view a 
contract theory that yields agreement and acceptance of certain moral principles that underlie 
liberal democratic political institutions.  The purely hypothetical procedure produces 
principles of justice that would be chosen by rational persons.  The agreed to principles 
                                                 
4 Justice for nonhuman animals is, for my purposes, a baseline assumption, foundational claim, or guiding value 
judgment.  With Nussbaum I think that because animals are active beings that have a good they have a 
reasonable claim to pursue it, involving claims of justice. 
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would be a matter of public knowledge.  By introducing the veil of ignorance into the 
original position, Rawls hopes to secure the voluntary cooperation of every member of 
society and nullify arbitrary differences in ability and social circumstance.  The obvious 
question then is who are the parties to the contract?  Rawls informs us that the parties to the 
original position are moral equals in that they have equality of rights and have the requisite 
capacity for reason:  
It seems reasonable to suppose that the parties in the original position are 
equal.  That is, all have the same rights in the procedure for choosing 
principles; each can make proposals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and 
so on.  Obviously the purpose of these conditions is to represent equality 
between human beings as moral persons, as creatures having a conception of 
their good and capable of a sense of justice.  The basis of equality is taken to 
be similarity in these two respects.  Systems of ends are not ranked in value; 
and each man [sic] is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and 
to act upon whatever principles are adopted.  Together with the veil of 
ignorance, these conditions define the principles of justice as those which 
rational persons concerned to advance their interests would consent to as 
equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social 
and natural contingencies.5 
 
Rawls summarizes, “[a]s the argument now runs, the principles of justice cover all persons 
with rational plans of life, whatever their content, and these principles represent the 
appropriate restrictions on freedom.”6  That is, principles of justice directly cover those 
beings who can participate in their formation.  The principles of justice, determined by 
contracting parties to the original position behind the veil of ignorance, apply to those who 
are capable of understanding and acting upon them.   
Rawls is forthcoming with the concession that his theory cannot adequately address 
the question of what is owed to nonhuman animals and the rest of nature because he denies 
that such issues are matters of justice: 
                                                 
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 19. 
6 Ibid. 254. 
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Certainly it is wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole 
species can be a great evil.  The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and 
for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of 
compassion and humanity in their case.  I shall not attempt to explain these 
considered beliefs.  They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it 
does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them 
in a natural way.7 
 
Over twenty years later, in his Political Liberalism, Rawls again expressed doubt that the social 
contract argument that underlies his theory of justice could address the problem of what is 
owed to nonhuman animals and the rest of nature.8  Nonhuman animals are excluded from 
justice in Rawls’s theory, a fact that might deter some from turning to theory as an aid in 
addressing pressing issues of justice.9  Rawls’s failure to address the issue of justice for 
nonhuman animals demonstrates that the social contract doctrine may not be an effective 
tool for building a substantive theory of global justice.  In revealing the weaknesses of the 
contract approach, I argue that the plight of animals is an urgent matter of justice, and point 
in a direction that better enables us to address the issue.  To be clear, I agree with Rawls that 
justice is not the full range of morality.  The issue here is not whether nonhuman animals 
warrant moral concern, as Rawls admits.  Certainly duties of compassion and humanity have 
normative force.  Rather, my challenge is directed at Rawls’s structural exclusion of non-
human animals from the domain of justice.  Rawls’s strategy is often criticized because it 
seems to rely on implausible premises involving an imagined state of nature in which parties 
hypothetically consent to the contractual agreement.  Of course a hypothetical agreement is 
no contract at all but, as Rawls indicates, he wants us to think of his social contract argument 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 512. 
8 John Rawls, Political Liberalism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 21. 
9 Will Kymlicka, for example, has argued that the contract device adds little to Rawls’s theory and that its 
strength instead lies in its intuitive notions of justice.  Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 
Second Edition, 69-70. 
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as a device for working out certain moral premises concerning people’s moral equality and 
reflecting, testing, and confirming our strongest intuitions and moral convictions. 
 With reference to three pressing issues of justice – disability, nationality, and species 
membership – Nussbaum argues that Rawls’s theory is ill equipped to handle such issues and 
contends that this is because of the social contract doctrine at the heart of his theory.  What 
is different about the question of justice for nonhuman animals, however, is that Rawls 
thought this question was outside the scope of a theory of justice.  I regard justice as a key 
subset of morality concerning the sphere of basic entitlements.  Denying animals a dignified 
existence is an urgent issue of justice and there is no obvious reason why our morals and 
institutions cannot be extended to include nonhuman animals.10  Why then are animals 
excluded from justice in Rawls’s theory?  A common defence for excluding animals from 
considerations of justice rests on distinguishing humans from other species, given our 
possession of reason.  This perspective has a rich history in Western philosophy.  Nussbaum 
rightly points out the significant influence of the Judeo-Christian view that humans have 
dominion over nature, but she also argues that it is the ancient ethical thought of Stoicism 
that has most influenced the tradition on the question of nonhuman animals.11  The Stoics 
advocate “[t]he idea of universal respect for the dignity of humanity in each and every 
person,” but because they ground this dignity on a capacity for reason, animals were 
                                                 
10 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 326.  Here I do not develop in greater 
detail a political theory of animal rights, beyond claiming nonhuman animals have fundamental entitlements 
and that the sphere of basic entitlements is a particularly urgent subset of morality concerning the domain of 
justice.  The sheer presence and central place of nonhuman animals in virtually all aspects of life, especially 
cultural traditions, political economy, and other just/unjust behaviours, processes, and institutions, is part of 
what makes this urgent matter political.  For a recent detailed exploration and defence of animal rights as 
decidedly political see Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), especially 112-116 where presence, the exercise of agency in the public realm, 
companionship, protest and dissent, and institutional involvement all constitute forms of political participation.  
Thanks to Tracy Isaacs for encouraging me to address this important point. 
11 Ibid. 328. 
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excluded from direct moral consideration.12  This explains why the Stoics were the least 
sympathetic of all the ancients to the view that animals have moral standing. 
 The view that the status and treatment of animals involves no direct harm since they 
lack the requisite capacities for moral agency is also evident in Kant and Rawls.  Nussbaum 
thinks that Rawls is, to some extent, led to his conclusion by his Kantian emphasis on 
rationality and the capacity for moral choice.  But that, she continues, the very structure of 
his social contract argument requires such exclusion, even in the absence of that heavy 
commitment to rationality.  For Kant, direct moral duties have to be toward self-conscious 
beings and since animals lack self-consciousness they are simply means to our ends.  For 
Kant, any care owed to animals is really just an indirect duty toward humanity.13  His 
distinction between ethical status and ethical consideration rests on a fragile psychological 
claim that mistreating animals gives rise to or further facilitates immoral behaviour.  
Nonhuman animals do not possess intrinsic worth so our treatment of them is at best 
instrumental to cultivating our own moral development. 
 Rawls calls our duties to animals duties of compassion and humanity but is explicit in 
his view that issues of justice do not apply since animals are incapable of understanding and 
acting upon such principles.  For Rawls, the two moral powers that define a being as a moral 
agent are the capacity for a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of justice.  
Dignity and intrinsic worth are thus defined by membership in the moral community and the 
moral agents who constitute this community possess “an inviolability founded on justice that 
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.”14  The difference between having 
moral duties regarding nonhuman animals and having direct duties of justice towards them 
                                                 
12 Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 12. 
13 See, for example, Immanual Kant, “Our Duties to Animals” in James E. White ed. Contemporary Moral Problems 
Eighth Edition (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006). 
14 Quoting Rawls in Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 332. 
179 
 
concerns their moral status.  According to Rawls, sentience gives rise to certain duties of 
compassion and humanity, but only intrinsic worth gives rise to duties of justice.  Rawls’s 
Kantian conception of the moral agent as a being who possesses self-conscious reason 
necessarily excludes animals from the sphere of justice.15   
 Even if we change this conception of the moral agent, which would involve 
abandoning Rawls’s position, the contract doctrine remains structurally inadequate to deal 
with the moral status of nonhuman animals.  This raises the question, why start with a 
theoretical basis that determines what will count as matters of justice when action-guiding 
principles can instead be constructed out of initial considerations of what should be included 
in and addressed by a theory of justice?  As Hilary Putnam says, ‘the function of ethics is 
not, in the first instance, to arrive at ‘universal principles.’  The primary aim of the ethicist … 
should not be to produce a ‘system’ but to contribute to the solution of practical 
problems.”16   
The idea of bargaining or contracting between humans and nonhumans is 
nonsensical and the asymmetry of power across the species barrier too great for the notion 
of bargaining to offer any assistance to our thinking.  The Rawlsian condition of moral 
equality is simply not met.  As Darwall writes: “Since we all stand, fundamentally, in the 
relation of mutual accountability and have an equal standing to claim justification from one 
another, unequal claims must be able to be justified within that framework.  They must be 
supportable from a standpoint in which we regard one another, as Rawls put it, as ‘self-
originating source[s] of valid claims.’”17  To be such a self-originating source, as we have 
                                                 
15 “Rawls’s omission of animals from the theory of justice is motivated, then, both by his Kantian conception of 
the person and by the structure of the social contract position.”  Ibid. 335. 
16 Hilary Putnam, Ethics without Ontology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 4. 
17 Stephen Darwall, “Contractualism, Root and Branch: A Review Essay,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 34, 
No. 2, 2006, 205-206. 
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seen, is to possess dignity or inherent worth, which from the Stoics to Kant and Rawls, is 
contingent on the possession of reason.  Inclusion in the moral community as a moral agent 
has been traditionally secured by reason and reason alone.  If we change the conception of 
the moral agent in an effort to accommodate animals, including them as parties to the principles 
of justice, we separate the question of who frames the contract from the question of who the 
contract is being framed for.  Such reform assumes the interests of nonhuman animals can 
then be represented. 
 However, Rawls’s contractualism conflates these two questions and this “is how 
rationality ends up being critical of membership in the moral community: because the 
procedure imagines that people are choosing principles for themselves.”18  Animals cannot 
frame such contracts, yet the principles delivered from Rawls’s social contract argument are 
ones that regulate the parties to this contract.  Since inclusion of animals for particular moral 
consideration can then only be done derivatively, animals cannot be included within the 
sphere of justice.  The interests of animals may or may not be considered and even if they 
are, such considerations are made on compassionate and humanitarian grounds rather than 
grounds of justice.  Grounds of justice, for example, allow us to label certain wrongful 
behaviours toward and treatment of animals as unjust not simply immoral.  Grounds of 
justice are more likely to involve legally sanctioned punishments, not just moral disapproval, 
for certain abusive harmful treatment.  Finally, grounds of justice are more likely to inform 
policy reforms, systematic accountability, and conscientious scrutiny of things like factory 
farming practices and resource depletion. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice,” The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values. www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/volume24/nussbaum_2003.pdf, 484. 
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5.3 On Nonhuman Animal Rights and Global Justice 
 Now that I have critically examined why animals are excluded from the sphere of 
justice in Rawls’s theory, I will pursue the question of the Kerala High Court, ‘if humans are 
entitled to fundamental rights, why not animals?’  It is clear, at least as a first approximation, 
why animals are not entitled to fundamental rights according to Rawls.19  In brief, only those 
with the capacity to reason possess the dignity and intrinsic worth that makes them moral 
agents, and only moral agents are subjects of justice.  As we have seen, nonhuman animals 
are not moral agents according to Rawls and are thus excluded from considerations of 
justice.20  If subjects of justice are entitled to fundamental rights, then, for Rawls, nonhuman 
animals cannot be rights holders.  For Rawls, sentience gives rise to moral duties toward 
animals but not duties of justice.  If I am to convince the reader that this is indeed a crucial 
failing in his theory the case has to be made that animals are entitled to fundamental rights.  
My twofold strategy for defending this position is to make the case that the question of 
nonhuman animal rights is a matter of justice and that animal rights must be covered by any 
substantive theory of global justice. 
 A number of compelling arguments and strategic options exist within the 
contemporary debate on nonhuman animal rights.  The role Rawls assigns to reason and the 
related significance he assigns to sentience would be rejected by Peter Singer.  Singer argues 
that it is sentience, the capacity for suffering and enjoyment, not reason, which grounds our 
                                                 
19 For detailed work on Rawls pertaining to questions of rights and global justice see, for example, R. Martin, 
Rawls and Rights (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), 1985) and T. W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989). 
20 They may still be moral subjects to whom we owe duties of compassion.  However, this is not a form of 
fundamental right, which is a basic entitlement of a particularly urgent sort concerning just or unjust treatment.  
It is not only wrong of us to violate a fundamental right or moral entitlement by, for example, severely 
mistreating and exploiting animals, it is also unfair to such animals.  By considerations of justice I have in mind, 
for example, the relentless expansion of human population and development that has seen our population 
double in the last 50 years while habitat for wild animals and wild animal populations have decreased 
considerably.  “And the factory farm system keeps growing to meet (and fuel) the demand for meat.  World 
meat production has tripled since 1980, to the point that humans today kill 56 billion animals per year for food 
(not including aquatic animals).”  Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights, 2. 
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principle of equality and demands our ethical consideration of nonhuman animals: “The 
capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a 
condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way.”21  
To exclude nonhuman animals because they possess a different degree or state of 
intelligence, or that they simply are not human, is arbitrary and what Singer calls ‘speciesism,’ 
a bias in favour of one’s own species.  Singer contends that speciesism is “morally on par 
with sexism and racism.”22   
 Alternatively, Rawls’s apparent exclusion of nonhuman animals from the status of 
moral agent could be challenged by Tom Regan’s animal rights argument.  If humans have a 
right to life, Regan contends, then so do nonhuman animals since they too meet the 
condition of having positive interests that may be judged as intrinsically worthwhile.23  
Nonhuman animals can be said to possess inherent worth if they can be seen to contain 
some intrinsic quality, akin to our experience of existence that is independent of their utility 
in meeting human needs and wants.  Regan calls this quality ‘subjects-of-a-life’ and attributes 
it to any being that has interests and is capable of having beliefs and desires, goals and 
aspirations.  To the extent that any nonhuman animal can suffer, both Singer and Regan 
argue that the principle of equal consideration of interests demands that we consider equally 
their interest in continuing to live and not suffer.  Their sentience and subjectivity put them 
morally on par with any human and this renders their status and treatment a direct matter of 
justice.   
Additionally, I could analyze Rawls’s position in light of Michael Allen Fox’s 
insistence on a paradigmatic shift in the way we view our existence in the world, taking 
                                                 
21 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57. 
22 Lori Gruen, “Animals” in Peter Singer, ed. A Companion to Ethics (Malden: Blackwell, 1997), 350. 
23 Tom Regan, “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,” in K. S. Walters and L. Portmess, eds., Ethical Vegetarianism: 
From Pythagoras to Peter Singer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 158. 
183 
 
“humans to be part of nature, not apart from nature.”24  Specifically, he puts forth arguments 
based on good health, environmental impact, world hunger and injustice, and finally, an 
argument from sympathy and empathy.  Fox considers a natural reverence for all life, 
situating nonhuman animals squarely within the sphere of justice. 
 Here it is worth briefly exploring one unlikely source, the decidedly modern 
perspective of the ancient Epicurean philosopher Porphyry.  Porphyry’s remarkably relevant 
arguments appear to have anticipated Rawls’s basic position by thousands of years.  For the 
Epicureans, reason is what enables us to consider the status and treatment of nonhuman 
animals from an ethical point of view, it is not, primarily, what distinguishes us as subjects of 
justice entitled to fundamental rights and restricts other sentient beings as simply worthy of 
compassion.  According to Porphyry, the option of a social contract is not open to us and we 
cannot associate nonhuman animals’ lack of reason – their inability to participate in such a 
contract – as grounds for excluding them from the sphere of justice.25  Central to Porphyry’s 
argument is the implicit view that no moral distinction should be drawn between humans 
and nonhuman animals and that the onus of proof is on those who deny justice to 
nonhuman animals.26  With Rawls apparently in mind, Fox writes: 
According to Porphyry, domesticated animals and humans exist in a 
relationship of ‘innate justice’ toward each other … Porphyry hints that it does 
not matter whether any sort of social contract exists between humans and 
other animals, for there are innate bonds that create moral community that 
includes animals.  Many contemporary philosophers have either assumed or 
overtly proclaimed, with no reference to Porphyry’s work and little awareness 
of animals’ remarkable capacities, that in the absence of a contractual social 
relationship between humans and animals, humans have no significant moral 
obligations to animals.27 
 
                                                 
24 Michael Allen Fox, Deep Vegetarianism (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999), xvi. 
25 See the section on Epicurean ethics and the writings of Porphyry in A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., The 
Hellenistic Philosophers. Volume 1. Translations of the principal sources with philosophical commentary (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), specifically 102, 131-132. 
26 Fox, Deep Vegetarianism, 8. 
27 Ibid. 10-11. 
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Porphyry anticipates Kant by arguing that harming animals can stifle our moral 
development.28  He also anticipates, and rejects, Rawls’s position that limits nonhuman 
animals from considerations of justice by limiting their inclusion in the moral community.   
Duties of compassion, for Porphyry, are not enough.  He claims that: “He, therefore, 
who admits that he is allied to all animals, will not injure any animal.  But he who confines 
justice to man [sic] alone, is prepared, like one enclosed in a narrow space, to hurl from him 
the prohibition of injustice.”29  Here it is worth noting that, in addition to lack of entitlement 
to fundamental rights, one of the central differences between a duty of compassion toward 
nonhuman animals and a duty of justice is that the former lacks the same resources for 
articulating blame for the mistreatment of nonhuman animals.  The kind of purposeful injury 
to animals that Porphyry has in mind, for example, is not adequately addressed by a duty of 
compassion.   
Charges of animal cruelty, one might object, deny this since those who commit 
animal cruelty are guilty of a moral failing, namely failing to uphold a duty of compassion 
toward animals.  This holds in instances where, morally speaking, the welfare of animals 
matters but in a manner that is subordinate to human interests.  It is true, for example, that 
based on a duty of compassion we can blame the careless scientist for failing to exhibit 
sufficiently humane use of animals in his or her experiments.  However, charges of animal 
cruelty tend to concern more than unethical treatment.  Such charges concern unjust 
treatment or mistreatment of a particularly urgent sort that warrants serious and particular 
disapprobation.30  When part of a formal justice system such charges can accompany 
                                                 
28 Porphyry, “On Abstinence from Animal Food,” in Walters and Portmess, Ethical Vegetarianism: From 
Pythagoras to Peter Singer, 44-45. 
29 Quoting Porphyry in Fox, Deep Vegetarianism, 12. 
30 I mean more serious disapprobation in the sense of warranting, for example, official response rather than 
simply negative judgment.  ‘Unjust’ need not necessarily mean something more than ‘immoral.’  We might think 
of certain immoral parenting practices that strike us as worse than unjust parenting practices.  Other cruelties 
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significant penalties such as fines or imprisonment and can become part of one’s criminal 
record.  Without the further duty of justice we could acknowledge the unfortunate status of 
animals and perhaps refrain from or inhibit acts that cause their suffering, but we could not 
say such actions are morally wrong in the particularly urgent way duties of justice indicate.31  
Nussbaum argues,   
It seems, however, that what we typically mean when we call a bad act 
unjust is that the creature injured by the act has an entitlement not to be 
treated in that way, and an entitlement of a particularly urgent or basic type 
(since we do not believe that all instances of unkindness, thoughtlessness, 
and so forth are instances of injustice, even if we do believe that people 
have a right to be treated kindly, and so forth).32 
 
Duties of justice provide us with the resources for assigning this significant kind of blame by 
highlighting particular acts as unjust, not just careless, inconsiderate, or harmful. 
 Nussbaum’s theory appears to have the greatest potential to create a substantive 
theory of global justice that is capable of addressing the question of nonhuman animal rights.  
She writes, 
The sphere of justice is the sphere of basic entitlements.  When I say that the 
mistreatment of animals is unjust, I mean to say not only that it is wrong of us 
to treat them in this way, but also that they have a right, a moral entitlement, 
not be treated in that way.  It is unfair to them.  I believe that thinking of 
animals as active beings who have a good and who are entitled to pursue it 
naturally leads us to see important damages done to them as unjust.33 
 
In place of social contract doctrine she argues that the capabilities approach provides a 
better theoretical basis for addressing questions of nonhuman animal rights, focused as it is 
on dignity and needs for flourishing.  This approach allows us to regard and accept 
                                                                                                                                                  
performed by parents, loved ones, those in authority may be examples of forms of immorality that are in some 
senses worse than forms of injustice. 
31 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 336.  Again, my claim here is not that 
because we want to punish certain kinds of unjust behaviour it must be worse than, for example, immoral 
betrayal by family or friends for which judicial punishment seems inappropriate.  
32 Ibid. 337.  
33 M. C. Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion and Humanity’: Justice for Nonhuman Animals” in C. R. Sunstein 
and M. C. Nussbaum, eds., Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 302. 
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nonhuman animals as moral subjects who are subjects of justice because they have a natural 
good or intrinsic worth.  A being’s capability refers to a being’s freedom to function in 
certain ways and ability to be certain things deemed valuable.  The idea is that there are 
certain functions that beings should be empowered to do and that a life developed and 
shaped by choosing and doing a range of these functions is a dignified life.  Such an 
approach can be extended to embody ethical concern for various species.34  Nussbaum 
regards the capabilities approach as an ally rather than a competitor to the Rawlsian project.  
She argues that the capabilities approach can address certain aspects of his theory that are 
problematic, such as “justice for people with disabilities (especially mental disabilities), justice 
across national boundaries, and justice for nonhuman animals …”35  Simultaneously, the 
capabilities approach can embrace other aspects to provide action-guiding recommendations 
and enhance the inclusiveness of justice theory.36 
 Nussbaum’s examination of Rawls’s work plays a central role in her growing 
conception of justice.  She has clearly stated that her “list of the central capabilities is not a 
complete theory of justice.”37  Instead, her capabilities approach is best thought of as a 
theory of global justice that is in the process of elaboration and fine-tuning that, like Rawls’s, 
is strengthened with the addition of each critical voice: 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 304-310.  For an account that is sympathetic with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach to justice for 
animals, but moves beyond her species norm principle, see Donaldson and Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory 
of Animal Rights, 95-100.  They argue: “For both humans and animals, justice requires a conception of 
flourishing that is more sensitive to both interspecies community membership and intraspecies individual 
variation.” 99. 
35 Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice,” 415. 
36 Nussbaum’s “conclusion is not that we should reject Rawls’s theory or any other contractarian theory but 
that we should keep working on alternative theories, which may possibly enhance our understanding of justice, 
particularly with these difficult problems in view.”  Ibid. 416.  As noted, her “project is highly critical of John 
Rawls.  It should therefore be emphasized that the reason for singling out Rawls’s theory for critical 
examination is that it is the strongest theory we have, and, indeed, one of the most distinguished political 
theories in the Western tradition.”  Ibid. 418. 
37 Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 75. 
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Many of the most urgent problems of justice and distribution that face human 
beings who live within nation-states are problems that are now, in their very 
nature, international problems, requiring worldwide communication and 
common effort for their effective solution … If we are so much as to survive 
as a species and a planet, we clearly need to think about well-being and justice 
internationally, and together.38 
 
I have argued that theory of justice should include consideration of nonhuman animal rights.  
Given the rich and numerous relationships we have with animals in our everyday lives 
throughout the world it “seems plausible to think that these relationships ought to be 
regulated by justice, instead of the war for survival and power that now, for the most part, 
obtains.”39  Additionally, such a theory must have global reach and it must lead debate, 
exemplifying the important practical role theory can and must play.  Nussbaum insists, 
In short: it makes sense to take the issue of social justice seriously, and to use 
a norm of justice to assess the various nations of the world and their 
practices.  But if the issue of social justice is important, then the content of a 
conception of justice is important.  Social justice has always been a 
profoundly normative concept, and its role is typically critical: we work out 
an account of what is just, and we then use it to find reality deficient in 
various ways.40 
 
One strength of Nussbaum’s approach to theorizing justice is that it builds in and takes 
seriously a range of moral capacities, including sympathy and the imagination from which a 
genuine sense of justice can be effectively developed.41  Nussbaum argues that “[t]he sphere 
of justice is the sphere of basic entitlements.”  An act or situation is unjust to the extent it 
betrays the way a being should be treated, in a particularly urgent or basic way, because it is 
                                                 
38 Quoting Nussbaum in D. A. Crocker, “Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s Development Ethic, Part 1,” Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1992, 586. 
39 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, 326.  Jean Harvey, for example, has 
argued that consideration of certain rights involves moral demands involving a kind of justice that concerns 
relationships rather than simply distribution, where distributive justice “centres around the model of individuals 
accumulating benefits.”  J. Harvey, “Justice Theory and Oppression,” in C. Wilson, ed., Civilization and Oppression 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1999), 180. 
40 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice,” Feminist Economics, 
Vol. 9, No. 2-3, 2003, 47. 
41 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction Second Edition, 401. 
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both wrong of us and unfair to them.42  Nussbaum’s theory is focused on basic entitlements, 
and aims to flesh out the minimal conditions necessary for a just society.  For Nussbaum, a 
failure to secure basic entitlements is a violation of justice.  Her emphasis on the dignity of 
individual lives in terms of the species norm makes her theory of justice perfectly suited to 
account for and address duties of justice to nonhuman animals. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 I share Rawls’s view that justice represents a particular subset of moral 
considerations.  Justice is not the full range of morality.  In particular, I regard justice as a 
key subset of a particularly urgent kind concerning the sphere of basic entitlements.  Rights-
based accounts of justice, including nonhuman animal rights, do not exhaust what justice 
requires.  They are proposed as minimal, necessary conditions of social justice.  Rawls 
acknowledged that his theory would have difficulty dealing with justice for animals.  What is 
less clear is the extent to which he accepted that some important matters of justice run up 
against these theoretical limitations, or whether A Theory of Justice should be understood as the 
theory of justice, exhausting what or who counts.  It is not reasonable to expect a theory, 
including Rawls’s, to do everything.  Nonetheless, I have argued that the exclusion of 
nonhuman animals from Rawls’s theory of justice is a shortcoming.  With Nussbaum, I treat 
Rawls’s theory as powerful but limited, requiring theoretical innovation when it comes to 
certain frontiers of justice.  It is a building block as we expand theories of justice to address 
the justness of political arrangements, justice movements that are global in scope, issues of 
domination, exploitation, and oppression, as well as questions of justice for indigenous 
                                                 
42 So, as noted earlier, even if we believe that a right to be treated kindly or thoughtfully etc. exists, where a right 
is synonymous with a moral entitlement, we are not therefore committed to necessarily regarding all instances 
of unkindness or thoughtlessness as instances of injustice.  Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward 
Global Justice,” 485. 
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peoples, the disabled, the mentally challenged, nonhuman animals, biological systems, and 
future generations. 
 Rawls’s theory involves an ideal of reasonable reciprocity or fairness between moral 
equals.  This causes problems for the question of justice for nonhuman animals since we 
cannot expect them to reciprocate our conceptions of justice.43  Nonhuman animals are 
excluded from the sphere of justice because they do not qualify as moral agents, lacking both 
a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of justice.44  If we take Rawls as 
exhausting what or who counts within the sphere of justice we gain a clearer view of the 
deficiencies of his theory.  Whether we take Rawls as excluding nonhuman animals for 
lacking reason, or more particularly for lacking a capacity for reciprocity, justice is reserved 
for moral agents that are symmetrically situated and capable of giving justice to one another.  
Defenders of Rawls might argue that though our moral duties towards nonhuman animals 
are duties of compassion and humanity, and not duties of justice, they are no less 
compelling.  In other words, it is neither clear nor obvious that Rawls’s exclusion of justice 
for animals renders his theory deficient.45  I conclude by reiterating five related ways I have 
answered this objection.  First, Rawls’s theory is deficient because of the inferior status it 
assigns to nonhuman animals, excluding them from the key subset of moral considerations 
that constitute the sphere of justice.  Second, Rawls’s account is conceptually, and in 
practice, at odds with justice for animals.  Third, duties of compassion and humanity lack the 
                                                 
43 Perhaps one reason this is unfortunate is that, comparatively, the human species may be more radically unjust 
than most (all?) other species.  Should we try to emulate nonhuman animal behaviours that entail symbiotic 
relationships with other species and sustainable relationships with the natural environment? 
44 Here it is worth noting that, empirically, such claims remain far from settled.  See, for example, Jonathan P. 
Balcombe, Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals and the Nature of Feeling Good (London: Macmillan, 2006), Frans De Waal, 
Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), Virginia Morell, Animal Wise: The Thoughts and Emotions of our Fellow Creatures (New York: Crown, 
2013). 
45 Thanks to Michael Milde for encouraging me to clarify this matter.  While a more detailed exploration of the 
idea that justice depends on reciprocity is worthwhile, it remains outside the scope of my present inquiry. 
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resources of duties of justice for addressing and challenging individual or systematic cruelty 
and mistreatment.  Severely exploiting or eradicating a species can be a grave injustice, not 
just a failure of compassion.  When normalized and systematic such injustice can even 
accompany widespread compassionate regard.  Fourth, I have contested what I see as an 
ordering problem whereby theory of justice is delivered as the structure through which we 
do justice, an approach Amartya Sen calls transcendental justice.46  Instead, we should start 
with the question of justice for animals, employing our theoretical resources in response to 
such challenging problems in an effort to render the world comparatively less unjust.  
Finally, Rawls’s theory is deficient when it comes to the significant philosophical problem of 
justice in situations of asymmetrical power.  By assuming rough equality of power among the 
parties Rawls’s social contract does not produce good results, as he acknowledged, 
concerning, for example, the problem of rights-based justice for animals.47 
Nussbaum has rightly argued that, “a truly global justice requires not simply looking 
across the world for other fellow members who are entitled to a decent life.  It also requires 
looking around the world at the other sentient beings with whose lives our own are 
inextricably and complexly intertwined.”48  Accepting Nussbaum’s view that the best way to 
advance in our philosophical endeavours is to consider urgent matters of moral concern 
using the strongest theories we have, I have argued that Rawls’s social contract doctrine is 
incapable of including animals within the sphere of justice.  That is, the status and treatment 
of nonhuman animals is not and cannot be a matter of justice within the structure of Rawls’s 
theory.  Though some may try, attempts to expand the theory to cover issues relating to 
                                                 
46 See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009). 
47 Martha Nussbaum, “The Capabilities Approach and Ethical Cosmopolitanism: The Challenge of Political 
Liberalism,” in Maria Rovisco and Magdalena Nowicka, eds. The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 408. 
48 Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice,” 506. 
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nonhuman animals appear doomed to fail.  Failure in this respect is serious for any 
substantive theory of global justice.  Typical of the strategy of Rawls’s critics, I argued his 
theory of justice is inadequate to the extent that it fails to address and equip us with the 
means to address a central issue of justice, namely, the status and treatment of nonhuman 
animals.  Additionally, I explored what it means to say that the status and treatment of 
nonhuman animals is an issue of justice and why this should feature in a theory of global 
justice that is meant to contribute to the solution of urgent practical problems. 
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